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A GREAT MUNITIONS CENTRE: COVENTRY’S 
ARMAMENTS & MUNITIONS INDUSTRY 
1914 – 1918 
 




“We see new factories arise; we see aeroplanes in the air. The workshops 
have been industrial beehives all the time and Coventry has developed as a 
great munitions centre. The vast number of workmen near the factories at 
meal times show the force of the workers; but the flurry of activity at night 
is not as generally observed by the public. It will surprise people some day 
to learn how greatly Coventry contributed to the output of munitions for 
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It is now common in the study of concentrations of industry to consider them as local or 
regional clusters of firms. This stems from a wave of empirical and theoretical research 
into concentrations of economic activity continuing the earlier work of Alfred Marshall 
who observed that firms seemed to accrue benefits from concentrating in space and 
time. By 1914 the city of Coventry was undergoing rapid expansion and embracing a 
second wave of British industrialisation with its economy comprising a series of 
clustered light-engineering firms at the heart of cycle, motorcycle and motor vehicle 
production. During the First World War, the city became transformed into an arsenal of 
war for four-and-a-half years and contributed greatly to British and Allied armaments 
and munitions production. Crucially, the research conceptualizes this collection of firms 
as an evolving armaments and munitions cluster, undergoing rapid expansion and 
adaptation to meet the demands of the war effort. The research identifies the principal 
characteristics of no less than 166 factories manufacturing armaments and munitions 
and 13 support institutions and infrastructure and maps their changing distribution 
across Coventry between 1914 and 1918. Secondly, the research identifies the type(s) of 
cluster this wartime economy became and shows the cluster grew from a predominantly 
nucleated hub-and-spoke cluster to a state anchored/centred cluster and finally to a 
cluster leading to innovation. Thirdly, the research reveals how under wartime 
conditions a cluster was able to evolve rapidly from one type to another by 
demonstrating it was through the Coventry Armaments Output Committee. Finally, 
these research findings are related to what impact, both positive and negative, a 
successful WWI armaments and munitions cluster had upon the city’s development, 
suggesting engineering science and inter-firm and inter-governmental co-operation, 
were two important legacies. 
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This chapter shall outline the nature, scope and aims of the study. First, the chapter will 
justify why Coventry's engineering sector provides a useful case study. Second, it will 
show how previous research on the city’s engineering sector has been neglected for the 
years 1914 to 1918. Thirdly the main aim of this study (and the objectives needed to 
accomplish the research) will be outlined. Lastly, the chapter concludes by outlining the 
remaining structure of the thesis. 
 
1.1 The usefulness of Coventry as an industrial cluster1
 
 case study 
In the development of regional clusters Coventry can be considered a city that was 
propelled by a second-wave of industrial activity during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. At that time, it was described as the ‘Detroit of England’ and was 
the fastest growing city in Britain shortly before the First World War2. The city itself 
comprised a range of interconnected industrial clusters, including cycle, motorcycle and 
motorcar manufacturers, machine tool, electrical engineering and component firms. 
Importantly these were highly inter-dependent and the technologies and markets linking 
them were similar3
 
. With the onset of war this light engineering cluster provides a 
useful example of an economy which was radically altered and expanded through 
wartime demands and state intervention.  
During the War, the city was an arsenal of munitions production for four and half years 
and where the Army and Navy spent over £40,500,000 with local manufacturers4
In addition to large orders being placed the city’s population and urban landscape was 
radically altered to meet the ever increasing demands placed upon it.  
.  
 
                                                 
1 In its simplest form a cluster may be described as a concentration, in time and space, of interrelated 
firms 
2 Thoms & Donnelly (2000) 
3 Thoms & Donnelly (1987) Coventry’s Industrial Economy, 1880-1980. 
4 Wilkins (1919) ‘Coventry in the Great War 1914-1919’. 
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The number of workers engaged in munition manufacture was estimated at 60,000, with 
30,000 men and women drafted into the city through the labour exchanges5
 
. To house 
this workforce thousands of new houses were constructed and a scheme of official 
billeting was instigated across the city. This became inadequate and billeting spread to 
outlying towns and villages with some 16,000 workers commuting daily into the city 
during wartime. A new national fuse and filling factory was constructed on the outskirts 
of the city where over 220 acres of open fields were added to the industrial capacity of 
the city. So complete was the transformation of the pre-war economy to war-time needs 
it was later suggested that: 
No other city in this country was so completely absorbed in the 
production of munitions as was Coventry. The great cities had of 
course a larger output, but for the completeness of concentration 
of every tool in the hands of every worker in every workshop to 




Despite the significance of the First World War to the city’s local economic 
development it has largely been neglected in previous historiographies. Richardson 
(1972) and more recently McGrory(2003) both treat this period in the city’s industrial 
development quite fleetingly. Other studies have tended only to examine one aspect of 
the city’s expanding engineering sector spread throughout the course of the twentieth 
century.7 These previous studies on the one hand inform the research about particular 
companies and labour relations, and on the other, provide a window of opportunity as 
there has been no previous study of Coventry’s entire light engineering sector during the 
twentieth century8
 
. This study, therefore, will not only be inherently more holistic, but 
will also examine exclusively the neglected First World War period in the city’s 
industrial development. 
                                                 
5 Ibid 
6 Nowell (1927) ‘Coventry and the Great War’  
7 Britain (1989): machine tool firms; Beaven (1994): automotive component firms; Thoms & Donnelly 
(1985, 2000): motor car manufacturers, whilst others have addressed the changing aspects of labour 
within the city, Beasley (undated): women munition workers in Coventry; Hodgkinson (1970): the rise of 
trade unionism and Carr (1978): engineering workers in Coventry. 
8 There were two exceptions out of c.330 'light' engineering firms that can be considered ‘heavy’ 
engineering firms, namely the Coventry Ordnance Works and the Brett’s Patent Lifter Company. 
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1.2 Examining the armaments and munitions industry in Coventry during WWI 
 
Now that the both the usefulness of Coventry as a case study has been established and it 
was shown how the industrial development of the city between 1914 and 1918 has been 
neglected, it is timely to propose the aim of this study. The proposed research seeks to 
conduct an empirical case study examination of firms and support entities9
 
 involved in 
armaments and munitions production in Coventry, between the years of 1914 and 1918. 
Specifically, it wishes to understand the nature of the cluster, how it operated and 
evolved, and to consider the short and long-term implications this may have had upon 
the industrial development of the city. The main research aim is: 
• To examine the historical geography of Coventry’s armament and munitions 
cluster between 1914 and 1918. 
 
In order to accomplish this aim this study is concerned with completing four objectives: 
 
• To identify the principal characteristics of the companies manufacturing 
armaments and munitions between 1914 and 1918. 
• To map the changing distribution of these companies across Coventry between 
1914 and 1918. 
• To examine some of the linkages between these firms to establish the type or 
types of armament and munitions cluster(s) evident in the city at this time. 
• To develop an explanation as to why a successful First World War armaments 
cluster developed in Coventry and add to a broader understanding of the 







                                                 
9 Including such things as committees, trade associations, social clubs and key infrastructure used by 
firms 
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1.3 The remaining structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis will attempt to address these aims and objectives in a number of key stages. 
First, it will present a review of the various ways in which industrial clusters have been 
theorised (Chapter 2). Chapter 3 will outline how these theories have informed the 
research methods used in order to complete the research. Chapter 4 will go on to 
contextualize the industrial development of the city up to 1914, including the important 
restructuring and local historical factors that were present in the engineering cluster at 
the commencement of hostilities.  
 
Chapter 5 will identify the munitions firms operating within the city, what they were 
producing (and when) and establish some of the mechanisms that these firms relied 
upon. It will summarize this information in the form of three maps: the early war cluster 
(August – December 1914), the mid war cluster (Spring 1915 – December 1915), and 
the late war cluster (January 1916 – November 1918).  Chapter 6 will examine in 
greater detail the nature and role for a selection of firms paying particular attention to 
the linkages between firms and infrastructure in order to explain what type of cluster(s) 
armaments and munitions production was in wartime Coventry. Finally, Chapter 7 will 
account for why a successful armaments cluster emerged and what impact both positive 
and negative this may have had upon the city for the short and longer-term. 
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Having outlined the need for an investigation of Coventry’s First World War armaments 
and munitions industry this chapter now places the study into the wider context of 
existing research themes linked to agglomeration studies and in particular the theory of 
local industrial clusters11
 
. According to Wolfe, Davis & Lucas (2005) differences in 
emphasis and method by a variety of disciplines (especially regional science, economics 
and geography) make it difficult to synthesize and integrate the diverse strands of this 
literature on agglomeration studies. Therefore in order to sidestep this difficulty only the 
main concept of industrial districts and clusters shall be examined.  
2.1 Industrial districts 
 
The study of concentrations of industry is not new, and indeed it has been the object of 
attention from a wide variety of perspectives over many years. Corolleur & Courlet 
(2003; p300) identify they have been observed, since the industrial revolution, in 
industries such as textiles in Lancashire and cutlery in Sheffield12
 
.  According to Feser 
(1998), an industrial district in its simplest form, is a pattern of economic activity 
whereby smaller firms benefit from co-location. Perhaps a clearer definition is provided 
by Wilson & Popp (2003; p3) who suggest it is ‘a concentration of firms in an industry 
either in a single town or in a particular area of a larger city’. Marshall (1920) observed 
these smaller firms benefited from economic side-effects which accrue from 
concentrating in space and time. This he suggested as taking place within a 
geographically defined industrial district.  
 
                                                 
11 This study follows Brenner’s (2004) use of this term. 
12 Alfred Marshall (1842-1924) is considered the first person to observe spatially agglomerations of small 
firms in Lancashire’s cotton and Sheffield’s cutlery industries which inspired him to coin the term 
‘industrial district’. The original discussion of his industrial district concept maybe found in Marshall 
(1920) Book IV Chapter X 
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For the first time he revealed how micro-level business relationships might influence 
regional growth and economic development by him revealing the interdependencies of 
business structure, business strategy, technology, innovation and the market. He 
expressed these interdependencies as being ‘played out through a nexus that determined 
the balance of economies of scale and scope available to industry’13. Mackinnon & 
Cumbers (2007) suggested Marshall identified that firms within industrial districts 
enjoy three main external economies14
 
: the pooling of specialised labour, the 
availability of specialised services, and that knowledge is diffused more rapidly. 
Marshall (1920) also observed that smaller firms were able to achieve these economies 
by becoming welded almost automatically into an organic whole – the industrial district. 
He further saw these as a counterbalance to the economies of scale that larger firms 
could achieve internally and this in Marshall’s mind explained the persistence of 
concentrations of smaller firms and also their continued prosperity. 
Marshall (1920) identified additional economies of scale for firms residing within these 
districts including the facilitation of large and stable markets in labour skills and 
equipment. These may also lead to a reduction in costs in subsidiary trades and related 
business services or promote greater use and development of specialised machinery and 
organisational methods15
 
. One further aspect Marshall (1920) observed was that an 
‘industrial atmosphere’ was present within successful districts, although he wasn’t able 
to completely determine why. He concluded that these industrial atmospheres could not 
be quickly acquired but yielded benefits to manufacturers that were not easily acquired 
elsewhere and that they were also static.  
 
                                                 
13 Wilson & Popp (2003) p4. Economies of scale meaning here the reduction of the costs of goods with 
increasing output levels. See Hayter (1997) Chapter 8 pp192-194. Economies of scope are defined as cost 
reductions associated with a diverse range of products manufactured under one roof or within the same 
firm. For example, the inter-changeability of parts between ‘different’ products. However, there are 
different views as to what ‘different’ might mean. See Healey & Ilbery (1990) where they also link scope 
economies with vertical integration. 
14 External or agglomeration economies being benefits or cost reductions outside of the firm itself 
resulting from the clustering of activities across time and space. 
15 These economies of scale have been observed empirically by Krugman (1991) & Storper & Scott 
(1992) amongst others. They have been further classified as urbanisation economies, industrialisation 
economies and localisation economies. See Healey & Ilbery (1990) p88 
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Despite the age of the industrial district concept, Lazerson & Lorenzoni (1999) and 
Nachum & Keeble (2003) suggest it still provides a meaningful framework for 
conceptualizing concentrations of economic, industrial and social activity. This led to 
some authors, such as Piore & Sabel (1984) and Locke (1995), to herald these industrial 
district concepts as the central building block of industrial policy for developed market 
economies. This continued interest in Marshall’s ideas stimulated a re-examination in 
the light of contemporary industries over the last three decades and it is to this newer 
body of work the next section turns to. 
 
2.1.1 Marshallian Theory: A second reading  
 
A resurgence of Marshall’s industrial district concept occurred initially within Italian 
research in the late 1970s16. Subsequently the concept has been relabelled the 
‘Marshallian industrial district’ and ‘Italian industrial district’ respectably. In the case of 
the latter it was modified to focus more on the social phenomena occurring within these 
districts such as clubs, societies and religion17
 
. As these new insights were considered 
there was an increase in the number of approaches to the topic and therefore the Italian 
industrial district became more diverse. Despite this, some basic characteristics of 
industrial districts arising from this Italian research were: 
• The co-location of a large number of small and specialised firms 
• The strong division of labour amongst these firms 
• The presence of a social network of the relevant local economic 




                                                 
16 This can be traced to Becattini as far back as 1979 who was the first to make the link between 
Marshall’s metallurgical and textile-producing areas of Great Britain and certain concentrations of small 
firms he observed in new successful regions in Italy. 
17 See Becattini (1990) for an overview of a large part of the early Italian research since the late 1970s. 
For more recent studies and discussion see:  Pyke et al. (1990), Pyke & Sengenberger (1992), Trigilia 
(1992), Schmitz (1992) and Brenner (2004) 
18 Dijk (1995) as cited in Brenner (2004) p10. A social network defined as inter-firm personal relations 
which are based on trust and power relations. For a discussion of social networks see Harrison (1992), 
Amin and Thrift (1992), Gordon and McCann (2000) and Granovetter (2005), 
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Another influential Italian study was that of Amin & Thrift (1992) of the leather tanning 
industry in Tuscany where they were able to suggest some of the core features of 
Marshall’s ‘industrial atmosphere’. They contended that this area in Italy not only 
produced the external agglomeration economies typical of a Marshallian industrial 
district (see section 2.1), but also featured an area-wide asset which individual 
entrepreneurs could draw upon. In other words, this district, with its many small firms 
manufacturing medium to high quality leather for shoes and bags, not only produced 
specialized skills and artisan capabilities (Marshall’s local skilled division of labour), 
but also produced a constant supply of industry-specific information, ideas, inputs, 
machinery and services. They concluded these complementarities were the main 
ingredients of Marshall’s ‘industrial atmosphere’ (Amin & Thrift, 1992; p579). 
 
2.1.2 New Industrial Spaces/New Industrial Districts (NIS/D) 
 
Marshall’s ideas have stimulated further studies, particularly in the high technology 
regions of the USA. Subsequently these were seen as different from Italian industrial 
districts and labelled as ‘new industrial spaces’ (NIS) or ‘new industrial districts’ (NID). 
Here theorization has centred on the importance of vertical disintegration19 and co-
operation among small, flexibly specialized20 and innovative firms such as the 
embryonic days of Apple or IBM to the success of the Silicon Valley region.21
 
 Scott 
(1992, 1999, 2003 & 2004) has continued to suggest that NIS/D’s such as Silicon 
Valley will become the dominant new paradigmatic form of economic activity in the 
coming decades.  
Importantly, though, Scott’s definition of what constituted an NIS/D was virtually the 
same as that given by Dijk (1995), for Italian industrial districts (see previous page).  
                                                 
19 Vertical disintegration is defined as the situation in which the production process is broken down 
between several firms, each performing a limited subset of activities required to create a finished product: 
see Storper & Christopherson (1987) p260 and Storper & Walker (1989). 
20 The term flexible specialization was introduced by Piore and Sabel (1984) and defined as production 
which is more craft system based in small and medium sized firms. In industrial districts/clusters it means 
these firms manufacture a wide range of products by skilled workers using multipurpose machinery; see 
also Asheim (1992) and Hayter (1997) for discussions on flexible specialization. 
21 This region has received a vast amount of empirical study including, amongst others: Scott (1988a, 
1988b, & 1998 ), Storper & Walker (1989), Langlois (1992) and Saxenian (1991 and 1994). 
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Namely it comprises (a) geographic concentrations of activities; (b) populations of 
small and medium-sized firms which are linked together in various ways; and (c) 
appropriately skilled and accessible labour pools. These then appear to be three re-
occurring properties that must exist for an industrial district to be identified regardless 
of what concept is considered or applied. 
 
2.2 Industrial clusters 
 
The concept of industrial clusters and the clustering of firms has become the principal 
framework for industrial agglomeration research in the last decade. Throughout this 
time it has been continually defined by numerous authors in a variety of ways. Table 1 
shows how problematic a definition of what a cluster is:  
 
Table 1: Clusters: The confusion of definition 
Swann and Prevezer (1996)  'Clusters are here defined as groups of firms within one 
industry based in one geographical area.' p.139 
Enright (1996 & 2003) 'A regional cluster is an industrial cluster in which member 
firms are in close proximity to each other.' p.191 and p.337 
Rosenfeld (1997) 'A cluster... is used to represent concentrations of firms that are able 
to produce synergy because of their geographical proximity and interdependence, even 
though their scale of employment may not be pronounced or prominent.' p.4 
Porter (1998) 'A cluster is a geographically proximate group of interconnected 
companies and associated institutions in a particular field, linked by commonalities and 
complementarities.' p.199 
Feser (1998) 'Economic clusters are not just related and supporting industries and 
institutions, but rather related and supporting institutions that are more competitive by 
virtue of their relationships.' p.26 
Swann and Prevezer (1998) 'A cluster means a large group of firms in related 
industries at a particular location.' p.1 
Roelandt and den Hertog (1999) 'Clusters can be characterised as networks of 
producers of strongly interdependent firms (including specialised suppliers) linked to 
each other in a value-adding production chain.' Box. 2 p.414 
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Simmie and Sennett (1999a & 1999b) & Simme (2001), 'We define an innovative 
cluster as a large number of interconnected industrial and/or service companies having a 
high degree of collaboration, typically through a supply chain, and operating under the 
same market conditions.'p.88; p.51 and p.53. 
Crouch and Farrell (2001) '"cluster" suggests something looser: a tendency for firms in 
similar types of business to locate close together, though without having a particularly 
important presence in an area.' p.163. 
Van den Berg et al. (2001) 'Most definitions share the notion of clusters as localised 
networks of specialised organisations, whose production processes are closely linked 
through the exchange of goods, services and/or knowledge. ' p.187 
 
This is why Sayer (1992; p138) and more recently Martin and Sunley (2003) have both 
argued clusters still to be a ‘chaotic conception’ meaning it is, despite widespread use, 
still poorly defined and understood.22
 
 In side-stepping this impasse Baptista & Swann 
(1998; p525) prefer a simple, though by no means unproblematic, definition for a 
cluster as ‘a strong collection of related companies located in a small geographical 
area’. But this still leaves the question: what is a cluster and how is this concept 
different from the earlier work on industrial districts? 
The empirical use of the term cluster as a metaphor also appears problematic. Some 
authors interchange it with the term district: for example, Martin and Sunley (2003) 
describe the four district models from Markusen (1996) as cluster models. It would 
seem therefore the term cluster has become the more fashionable recent metaphor and 
that perhaps the two theoretical concepts are similar. Perhaps cluster is a better 
descriptive metaphor as it immediately denotes a concentration of activity whereas 
district does not. Despite this, more recently some authors feel it necessary to attempt to 
make a distinction between these terms.  
 
                                                 
22 For instance, Swann (2002) noted definitions ranging from ‘weak’ (simple co-location of firms, 
technological complementarity, agglomeration with superior performance, and input-output table 
connections) to ‘strong’ (Marshallian externalities, labour mobility between firms and explicit inter-firm 
collaboration). 
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For example, a cluster (when compared with a district) is seen by Wilson and Popp 
(2003; p3) as ‘a wider agglomeration of industries that may be connected by common 
products, technologies, markets (either supply or demand) or institutional frameworks’.  
Thus for these writers the concept of a cluster is not restricted to particular industries or 
spaces. However, to confuse definition still further there are related concepts of 
‘regional clusters’ and ‘industrial clusters’ that add those boundaries once again. 
Despite these problems of definition, the main value of the cluster concept has been to 
add to Marshall’s ideas in revealing a greater number of linkages at play in industrial 
agglomerations.  
 
Cluster theory, according to Nachum & Keeble (2003; p461), also identifies ‘the 
significance of business networks23; the suitability of the labour market; the external 
supply of intermediate inputs (marketing for example); the interaction with customers 
and responding to their needs; and the balancing of collaboration and competition with 
firms and organisations (often NGOs), and also the successful outcomes of collective 
learning and product innovation’. Marshall was really only concerned with three of 
these positive outcomes (see section 2.1). Another difference in cluster research is the 
greater scrutiny of many of these through both formal and informal channels, between 
firms and entities (trade associations, governmental bodies and NGOs) rather than a 
focus on the inputs and outputs of firms only and the ‘spillovers’ or ‘secondary effects’ 
caused by those linkages24
 
.  
The concept of clusters has therefore focused upon an understanding the benefits (both 
traded and untraded) that firms accrue because of their connections with other firms in 
close proximity to them. Cluster theorists see these profits resulting from co-operation, 
market relations, spillovers, and in some cases that more local start-up businesses are 
successful within clustered firms. Over the last 15 years one of the most influential 
bodies of cluster research has been the work of Michael Porter (1990 & 1998a) in the 
USA who suggested the clustering of firms promotes competition within that sector and 
ultimately this increases a country’s global competitiveness. The next sub-section now 
examines Porter’s research. 
                                                 
23 See this chapter page 13 footnote 28 for a definition of network 
24 An overview of these is given in Braunerhjelm & Carlsson (1999). 
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2.2.1 Clusters and competition 
 
From a business and management perspective Porter’s (1990, 1998a & 1998b) use of 
the cluster concept has been very influential25. Overall his work has highlighted the near 
universal significance of clustering to competitive economic advantage. He introduced 
what he phrased as a ‘diamond’ model of forces determining competitiveness, which is 
very much grounded in Marshallian concepts. In this model he saw clustering activity as 
producing four important mechanisms which help drive competitiveness: productivity, 
innovation, flexibility gains and new business creation (also termed spin-offs)26
 
. These 
are very similar to the local self-augmenting processes discussed in the industrial district 
literature. 
Despite the popularity of Porter’s cluster theory, for twenty first century policy makers 
there still remains a major ambiguity in defining what a cluster is. This is Martin and 
Sunley’s (2003; p10) position who suggest the situation in the cluster literature is that 
we know what they are called, but defining precisely what they are, is more difficult.  
Porter (1998; p197) defined a cluster as: 
 
 'Geographic concentrations of interconnected companies, specialised   
 suppliers, services providers, firms in related industries, and associated   
 institutions (for example, universities, standards agencies, and trade   
 associations) in particular fields that compete but also co-operate.' 
 
There appears two core elements to this definition. First, Porter insists, that firms within 
a cluster must be linked in some way. These links could be vertical (buying and selling 
relationships) and also horizontal (including complementary products and services, the 
use of similar specialized inputs, technologies or institutions, and other linkages).  
Significantly he implies most of these linkages involve social relationships or networks 
that produce these benefits for the firms involved27
                                                 
25 For a discussion on why Porter’s work has attracted considerable interest see Martin & Sunley (2003). 
. He termed this the socio-economy 
of clusters.  
26 See (Porter, 1998a, 1998b and 2000). 
27 Unfortunately he doesn’t define networks at all, but appears to place a great emphasis on them 
providing the social glue, or in Markusen’s words the stickiness, that binds firms together and contributes 
to the value created in clusters. See Porter (1998a; p225). 
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More recently Rugman & D’Cruz (2003; p18) have attempted to provide a definition of 
these networks as webs of relationships that tie the cluster members together.  These 
networks can more precisely be understood by defining what they are not. Linkages 
within a business network are not simply the transactions between firms in a market or 
the internal transactions inside the firms themselves: they embody linkages that are 
achieved through the harmonization of the strategies of the firms themselves. This 
means they involve elements of both market transactions and intra-firm structures and 
processes. Resulting from these networking linkages, firms can often make use of 
resources owned by other firms such as technical or marketing expertise. While some of 
those external resources are tangible and can be bought, others are intangible such as 
skills and relationships between people in the firms concerned, for example ‘old boys' 
networks’. This makes these types of networking linkages more difficult to acquire 
through economic transaction and are very static and difficult to replicate.28
 
 Considering 
business networks Porter (1998; p226) suggested that even ‘a cluster is a form of 
network that occurs within geographic location, in which the proximity of firms and 
institutions ensures certain forms of commonality and increases the frequency and 
impact of interactions’. 
Many problems are raised from this understanding of what constitutes the network of 
linkages that form a cluster. In these definitions there is a lack of a clear boundary, both 
industrial and geographical. Also it is difficult to determine at what level of industrial 
agglomeration a cluster may be identified. Furthermore what range of related industries 
and activities are internal and how strong do linkages between firms and entities need to 
be for it to be termed a network? Also how economically specialized does a 
concentration of firms (in time and space) have to be, for it to be a cluster? The final 
area of ambiguity is Porter does not appear to insist that clusters are economically 
specialized entities in the Marshallian sense, yet all his examples are.  
                                                 
28 A clearer definition of a business network in relation to Porter’s work was provided by Casson (2000; 
p170 and 2003) where he saw them as ‘a set of high-trust linkages connecting a set of entities’. He 
suggests these linkages are based on information flows and that the entities can be either people – forming 
an inter-personal network, or institutional – forming an inter-institutional network 
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He also fails to make it clear at what spatial scale do clustering processes (inter-firm 
linkages, knowledge spillovers, rivalry, business and social networks29) operate. 
Despite these problems the cluster concept, and in particular the work of Porter, has 
become widely adopted by regional policy makers who are looking to promote local 
economic development and researchers looking to understand the continued vitality of 
regions with concentrations of firms30
 
. One way in which Porter’s cluster emphasis was 
applied was in the study of two UK high technology sectors and the next sub-section 
now discusses this. 
2.2.2 Clusters and a life-cycle model 
 
One area of research which has emerged from the cluster and network concepts is that 
of Swann & Prevezer (1996 & 1998) with regard to the computing and biotechnology 
industries in Britain. Here they introduced an evolutionary model (the life-cycle model), 
in which clusters pass through four principal stages: critical mass, take-off, peak entry 
and saturation, Swann (1998; pp52-54). This model brings into interaction concepts 
already identified such as agglomeration externalities and positive feedbacks, but adds 
to this by considering the negative effects that clustering may bring, for example, 
congestion effects, severe competition and the convergence of technology which 
emerges as the clustered industry matures. 
 
In analysing both of these new high-tech industries they suggest that firms within 
clusters grow faster than those in isolation. Clusters also attract a higher rate of entry at 
least during the early growth phases of the life-cycle for a particular industry. This 
happens because of agglomeration economies, which impact on entry and growth and 
lead to a positive feedback and that these effects are strongest when there is 
geographical concentration. They, like Porter, also highlighted that clustering promotes 
the easier transmission of tacit knowledge31
                                                 
29 Social networks being defined here as inter-firm personal relations heavily based on trust, see Gordon 
and McCann (2000) 
.  
30 For example a large body of cluster research has emerged on ‘Britain’s Motorsport Valley’ including 
Henry, Pinch & Russell (1996); Pinch (1997); Pinch & Henry (1999a, 1999b, 2000 & 2001), and Henry et 
al. ( 2003)  
31 For a definition see p8. 
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After a period of growth and prosperity Swann then suggested cluster congestion effects 
emerge. Rate of entry of new firms and therefore cluster growth begins to slow down or 
even enters decline. He suggested this happened more so in very large clusters, mainly 
because the cost of locating in that cluster starts to outweigh the benefits.  Added to this 
he also observed separate technologies, and the industries producing them, beginning to 
converge. By this he meant there were important cross-sector effects in clusters 
whereby a growth or decline in industry one affects the same in industry two. If this 
relationship is strong it is said to be converging, if it has no effect these industries are 
said to be distinct. Overall Swann’s work suggested that clusters were alive and they 
went through patterns of growth, decline and sometimes renaissance. 
 
Swann’s model seems not only to apply to modern high technology industries as Wilson 
& Singleton (2003) made it central to their work when studying broadly the Manchester 
industrial district between 1750 and 1939. When applying elements of Swann’s (1998) 
life-cycle model, they revealed a pattern where initially vibrant economic systems 
emerged through local technical innovations and as these industries evolved, their 
dynamism, was eroded away or in other words other regions in Britain caught up to 
Manchester. Therefore in explaining the successful emergence of the Manchester region 
it was catapulted forward through its central role within the textile and later machine 
tool industries. Over time gradually other English regions, usually not always in the 
same sector, began to catch up partly through diffusion of some of those innovations 
into their related sectors.  
 
The weakness that may lie with the life-cycle model is when applied in this way it 
demonstrates that each district or cluster is temporally and spatially specific making a 
generic life-cycle model difficult to formulate.32
                                                 
32 Staber (1996a, 1996b & 1998) is one such critic of such models in stating that no single model can 
capture the diversity apparent from an empirical study of rich and vibrant industrial regions 
 Life-cycle models, then, although 
revealing much in the recent computing and biotechnology industries only really 
provide overarching theories that have tendencies to gloss over some of the ‘messiness’ 
and complexity of other empirical case studies.  
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Despite this its value has been in bringing to the fore elements of timing (e.g. a cluster 
has a life of its own) and the existence of negative effects within clusters which had 
previously been down-played. 
 
2.2.3 The innovative milieu concept (IM) 
 
Another influential concept has been one from France of the ‘milieu innovateur’ mainly 
carried out by GREMI33
This project investigated French regions outside of large cities and analysed them 




 present between firms. 
According to GREMI an innovative milieu is defined as: 
The set, or the complex network of mainly informal social 
relationships on a limited geographical area [therefore they are set 
within a district/cluster], often determining a specific external 
‘image’ and a  specific internal ‘representation’ and a sense of 
belonging, which enhance the local innovative capability through 
synergetic and collective learning processes35
 
. 
To summarize this concept there appears three main sets of features which constituent 
an innovative milieu:  
 
Table 2: The three main features of an Innovative Milieu (IM) 
 
1. Effective actor relationships within a regional or local cluster  
This first feature relates to the fact that co-operation and information exchange 
between key actors of economic development (such as firms, entrepreneurs, and 
government or non-government organisations) are facilitated by the location of 
them in the same local district/cluster, and thus in spatial proximity to one another, 
which allows for easy and frequent face-to-face contacts.  
 
                                                 
33 GREMI being an acronym for Groupe de Recherche Européen sur les Milieux Innovateurs. The main 
results of their original study are summarised in Camagni (1995) 
34 Synergies defined here as outcomes that result from co-operative interaction amongst firms or actors 
which produce an enhanced combined effect. 
35 Camagni (1991) p3. Emphasis added 
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For the actual innovativeness to be triggered these actors need to also be the 
decision makers explicitly coming from different types of organisations 
(manufacturing or supplier firms, universities, research laboratories, administrative 
bodies such as committees or trade associations) (Maillat el al. 1993), as creativity 
stems from the new combination of ideas that belong to different fields of activity 
that were not associated previously.  
These actors can combine complementary capabilities and competencies that are 
necessary to create new technical solutions or implement new programs. This 
crucial quality of the innovative milieu to induce and co-ordinate economic change 
and the regrouping of productive assets have been stressed by GREMI (see Ratti et 
al. 1997 & Crevoisier 2001). They add that the relevant personal network36
 
 which 
develops becomes bound to the locality, but also it needs to be sufficiently open to 
allow inflows of know-how from outside which enrich the local circulation of 
information (Le Heron & Harrington 2005). 
2. Social contacts that enhance learning processes 
A second main feature of the innovative milieu relates to specific advantages of 
embedded learning processes. Exchanges of know-how and acceptance of other 
people’s advice are favoured by good informal, often also private contacts, between 
individuals with a high degree of mutual trust, for example, ‘old boys' networks’.  
These face-to-face contacts allow fast flows of confidential or non-routine 
information as uncertainty is reduced and learning and therefore innovation 
accelerated (Sweeney 1987). This effective combination of personal, professional 
and private relationships not only provides preferential or cost-free access to 
strategically important news or services, but also acts as a form of emotional 
support which reinforces business decisions to innovate through providing 
motivation, encouragement and recognition (Fromhold-Eisenbith 2002).  
 
3. An image or sense of belonging 
The final feature of the innovative milieu suggests that actors are aware of forming 
a coherent unity or collective image, which can be demonstrated to those external to 
                                                 
36 See this chapter page 13 for a definition of network 
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the locality. A sense of belonging also determines the spatial extent of the 
innovative milieu where the limit is seen as where social coherence fades out 
(Maillat el al. 1993). This fulfils an important function by harmonising the 
individuals’ differing professional backgrounds and interests and directs them 
towards common goals.  
A final point to note is that all three milieu features are often activated by upcoming 
crisis that call for the need to join forces. Military conflict or market forces being 
two such examples.  
Sources: For a summary of the I.M. concept see Fromhold-Eisenbith (2002) & Le Heron & Harrington 
(2005) 
 
The value of this concept has been to stress the importance of informal and untraded 
linkages between firms and the importance of social aspects to firms’ behaviour, 
innovativeness and to a regions economic growth and prosperity. 
 
2.2.4 Summary of the cluster concept 
 
Despite the problems of defining what constitutes an industrial district or cluster, it is 
still seen a useful concept for the studying of geographical concentrations of firms.  
Henry & Pinch (2006) suggest the ‘added value’ in the cluster concept is to shift an 
understanding by moving analysis away from overt, traded, exchanges of commodities 
and services towards the study of predominantly untraded exchanges of knowledge and 
ideas. This has resulted according to Lovering (1999) and Martin & Sunley (2003) in a 
body of cluster research, with Porter at the centre, to be widely regarded by many 
national governments and local and regional development professionals as a universal 
panacea for encouraging economic competitiveness at all scales. 
 
Having now discussed both the problems, and insights that the literature on districts and 
clusters have brought to the study of concentrations of firms the third and final section 
now wishes to suggest how all of this can be brought together to form a meaningful 
conceptual framework for the study of Coventry’s First World War armaments and 
munitions industry. 
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2.3 Towards a classification of Industrial Districts/Clusters 
 
Further empirical studies have tried to differentiate types of industrial clusters rather 
than continually searching for a singular idealised form37. Again an impetus to classify 
industrial concentrations comes from Italian research with a recent government 
programme setup to identify different types and the locations of industrial districts38
 
. 
The weaknesses of this classification are the social phenomena becomes side-lined or 
neglected, mainly because they are difficult to measure, and secondly larger firms are 
often ignored altogether.  
In light of these problems Markusen (1996 & 2003) has been able to put forward a four 
district typology from US research, each with distinctive industrial structures and 
relationships to external organizations and markets. Another more recent formulation is 
provided by Gordon and McCann (2000 and 2005) who use the term industrial clusters. 
Markusen’s earlier typology considers the way to differentiate different industrial 
district types is to examine their spatial element and the relationships between the firms 
and entities both internal and external to the district. In contrast, Gordon and McCann 
determine a three cluster typology by examining the complex processes that may 
underlay such concentrations of firms. As this study wishes to examine the spatial 
dimension of Coventry’s First World War armaments and munitions cluster it is 
Markusen’s earlier industrial district classifications which are now discussed. 
 
2.3.1 Markusen’s industrial district typology 
 
A first industrial district observed by Markusen (1996) is the same type already 
discussed which was identified in the Emilio-Romagna region of Italy or Silicon Valley 
in the USA and termed as Italian Industrial Districts or New Industrial 
Spaces/Districts39
                                                 
37 According to Paniccia (1998; p667) this desire stems from the fact that behind the academic use of the 
term, many different forms of organization of labour and different socio-cultural contexts are hidden. 
.  
38 Tappi (2003) gives an overview and discussion of these developments. 
39 See this chapter section 2.1.1 and 2.1.2. In addition for an comprehensive study of the ‘Third Italy’ see 
Piore & Sabel (1984 ) and Sabel (1989) and for a discussion on NIDs see Storper (1989) and Scott (1988a 
and 1999).  
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Added to this Markusen also identifies three more industrial districts which she terms as 
‘sticky places’. In other words, geographic space which acts like sellotape, and has the 
ability to attract, retain and nurture economic activity. The definition she gave was ‘an 
industrial district is a sizeable and spatially delimited area of trade-orientated economic 
activity which has a distinctive economic specialization, be it resource-related, 
manufacturing, or services’40. The following sub-sections now summarize each of the 
four industrial district models she identified41
 
. 
2.3.1a A Marshallian/Italianate/New Industrial Space/District (NIS/D) Model 
 
This refers principally to the industrial district outlined earlier. However, by building on 
Marshall’s observations Markusen (1996) also noted that firms in this type of district 
make investment and production decisions locally. Trade within this district is 
transacted between buyers and sellers which often entail long-term contracts or 
commitments. Something Marshall did not observe, but identified by Markusen, is that 
linkages and/or co-operation with firms outside the district tend to be minimal. Figure 1 














                                                 
40 Park & Markusen (1994) and Markusen (1996) p296. 
41 See Markusen (1996) pp298-299 Table 1 for a detailed list of the hypothesized features of each of the 
four distinct district types. 
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Figure 1: A Marshallian/Italianate/(NIS/D) Industrial District 
 
         Source: Adapted from Markusen (1996) p.297 Figure 1 
 
This district type is therefore comprised of many small firms buying and selling from 
each other for eventual export from the region. The left-hand arrows depict the 
necessary purchases of raw materials and business services from outside the region and 
the products eventual sale to external markets on the right-hand side. This is in a form 
of exchange rather than any form of co-operative relationships external to the region. 
The many small firms within the region benefit from the quality and nature of the local 
labour market which is highly flexible. Individuals move from firm to firm, and owners 
as well as workers live in the same community, where they benefit from the fact that 
‘the secrets of industry are in the air’. Workers are committed to the locality more so 
than the firm. Labour out-migration is minimal and growth in the region stimulates in-
migration. This form of district is seen as a relatively stable community of firms, 
resulting in a strong local cultural identity and shared industrial expertise. This is 
through tacit knowledge exchange.42
 
 Effective transfer of this knowledge generally 
requires extensive personal contact and trust.  
Specialized service industries also emerge inside these districts and are often tailored to 
unique products or industries located there.  
                                                 
42 Knowledge that people carry in their mind which means it is difficult to access and codify. 
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These services may include technical expertise in certain product lines, machinery, 
marketing or repair and maintenance services. They may also include local financial 
institutions offering so called ‘venture capital’. These often take longer-term risks 
because they have both inside information and greater trust in the entrepreneurs of local 
firms Markusen (1996; pp299-300). All of these features are captured under the 
umbrella term of external agglomeration economies (see section 2.1).  It is these which 
according to Markusen (1996) produce the stickiness of a place, not the individual firms 
themselves nor their entrepreneurs and workforce. A final consideration unobserved by 
Marshall (1920) is actors within this district at all times are consciously (and perhaps 
sub-consciously) co-operating and competing with each other in order for the district to 
exist, expand and prosper. 
 
Having outlined Markusen's (1996) first idealised district her second is now 
summarized. 
 
2.3.1b A hub-and-spoke industrial district 
 
This district is where a number of key firms and/or facilities act as ‘hubs’ to the regional 
economy. From these ‘hub’ firms, suppliers and related activities spread out like the 
spokes of a wheel43
 
. The following Figure 2 i s a simplified depiction of a hub-and-








                                                 
43 Examples of this type of industrial district have been identified in Seattle, USA by Gray et al. (1996) 
where Boeing, Microsoft and two education/research establishments all acted as ‘hubs’ in that economy. 
Likewise 'Toyota City' in Japan has been another hub-and-spoke-district put forward  by Gordon and 
McCann (2000) and lastly Nachum & Keeble (2003) have demonstrated it empirically for media firms in 
London, England. 
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Figure 2: A hub-and-spoke industrial district 
 
        Source: Adapted from Markusen (1996) p.297 Figure 1 
 
Here the large ‘hub’ firm buys from both local and external suppliers and sells mainly to 
external customers. Crucially the dynamism in this district is associated with the 
positionality of the ‘hub’ or anchor firms and organizations in their national and 
international markets. Hub-and-spoke districts are thus dominated by one or several 
large, vertically integrated firms, in one or more sectors. They are then surrounded by 
smaller and less powerful suppliers. There is also some internal variety as they may 
exhibit a strongly linked form. Here these smaller firms are very dependent on the large 
‘hub’ firms and institutions or even infrastructure ‘hubs’ such as ports and airports for 
markets or supplies.  
 
Another pattern may take a weaker, more nucleated form, where small firms in the 
district enjoy the external agglomeration benefits of the ‘hubs’ without necessarily 




                                                 
44 This is where there are only a few firms in the industry and they can greatly influence price and 
stabilise market conditions sometimes through collusion. Also usually a business decision in one 
oligopoly firm affects another. 
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Examples include the automotive industry with the big three automotive corporations 
(Ford, Chrysler and General Motors) in Detroit, USA or the Toyota company in ‘Toyota 
City’, Japan which both dominated their industrial districts and markets. Markusen 
(1996) suggests key investment decisions for these ‘hubs’ are made locally, but their 
effects are felt globally. There may also be present intra-district co-operation (between 
firms in the same district), but she also suggests this will generally be on the terms of 
the ‘hub’ firm. The intra-district trade which does occur tends, like a 
Marshallian/Italianate/(NIS/D) district, to take the form of long-term contracts and 
commitments. However, exchanges of personnel take place to a l esser extent than the 
Marshallian/Italianate/(NIS/D) industrial district. 
 
Additionally what is markedly lacking in a hub-and-spoke district is the co-operation 
between competitor firms to share risk, form a stable market, and to share innovations. 
Any strategic alliances that are formed are likely to be forged with partners outside the 
region. There are also differences in the labour market as here it is less flexible than in 
the Marshallian/Italianate/(NIS/D) model. This is because workers loyalties are to the 
‘hub’ firm, then to the district and lastly to the smaller less ‘spoke’ firms.  If jobs 
became available in the ‘hub’ firm, workers will often ‘jump ship’ to obtain them. This 
of course makes it tough for small firms in these districts to survive, but a 
counterbalance to this is the ‘hub’ firms often attract new labour into the district through 
in-migration. 
 
Fresh capital within hub-and-spoke districts is often a lacking for local start-up firms. 
The largest sums tend to be tied up as retained earnings in the major ‘hub’ firms who do 
not reinvest them locally, but redeploy them wherever their global or national strategic 
plans demand. Trade associations (when present) are weaker than in the case of the 
Marshallian/Italianate/(NIS/D) usually because ‘hub’ firms have the power, if so 
desired, to alienate themselves from their activities. According to Markusen (1996) hub-
and-spoke districts are highly dependent on their ‘hub’ firms for their stickiness. If these 
‘hub’ firms or industries enter an economic downturn the whole district suffers and this 
is an inherent weakness of this form of economic concentration.  
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Having now outlined Markusen’s (1996) second industrial district the third is now 
summarized. 
 
2.3.1c A satellite platform industrial district 
 
This district differs as it is chiefly composed of branch plants of externally orientated 
multinational corporations. This type of district may either consist of high-tech branch 
plants or chiefly contain low-wage, low-tax, publicly subsidized establishments. These 
can sometimes be also assembled at a distance from major conurbations by national 
governments. They can also be set up by entrepreneurs as a way of starting regional 
development by escaping the high wages and rents in successful districts or cities, for 
example, some of the science parks established in England since the 1990s. Tenants of 
satellite platforms may range from routine assembly plants to relatively sophisticated 
research firms, but Markusen (1996) suggested they must ‘stand alone’.45
 
  
Figure 3: A satellite platform industrial district 
 
               Source: Adapted from Markusen (1996) p.297 Figure 1 
 
                                                 
45 Glasmeier (1988) explained this as these firms must be detached spatially from either up or 
downstream operations within the same firm or from agglomerations of competitors and external 
suppliers or customers. 
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Satellite platforms have been identified in almost all countries regardless of 
developmental stage.46 Concerning the structure within these satellite platforms they are 
dominated by large externally headquartered firms that make key business decisions 
outside the region. Scale economies47 within these branch plants are moderate to high 
and turnover is usually moderate to low. Importantly, there appeared to be minimal 
intra-district trade or communication between these so called platform tenants. 
Contracts, both formal and informal, are lacking from local suppliers and these branch 
plants are very externally orientated. As these firms are remotely controlled they do not 
easily form joint ventures to share risk, stabilize the market, or engage in innovative 
partnerships48. In this respect they diverge from a hub-and-spoke model where the 
larger firm is locally based. Therefore this district’s most important feature, (as shown 
in Figure 3), is the complete absence of any form of connections, networks or linkages 
within the region49
 
. There is only the predominance of linkages outside the region with 
other branch plants or to the firms’ headquarters. 
It would be a mistake to describe these branch plants as isolated as they are embedded 
into a network of external relations. They cooperate and communicate daily with their 
parent companies and also personnel exchanges occur along these same channels. To 
reinforce this non-place embeddedness high-tier managerial and technical staff in an 
early developed satellite platforms cut across district boundaries. In other words they 
are internal to these vertically integrated firms, rather than the district itself. This can 
become applicable to all labour once the satellite platform becomes well established. 
This results in high labour migration in and out of these districts, especially for 
managerial, professional and technical staffs. The availability of capital within these 
districts is also operated through external channels.  
 
                                                 
46 Examples include Kumi in South Korea with low-end textile and electronics firms. Diniz and Borges 
Santos (1995) highlighted an area of Manaus in Brazil where state sponsored expansion has developed an 
import/export zone. Markusen and Sasaki (1994), amongst others, have termed these platforms as 
‘technopoles’, such as those also located at Oita and Kumamoto in Japan 
47 See section 2.1 for definition 
48 This is because key decision makers, who would usually take a lead in these activities, are not present 
within the district. 
49 Network defined as a series of tangible and intangible linkages which help to bind firms, entrepreneurs 
and infrastructure together within the district. 
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Technical expertise and business services may also be external to the region and 
furnished through a firm's headquarters. Satellite platform districts, according to 
Markusen (1996), therefore have little local capital to draw upon.  Moreover, because 
the activities of these branch plants can be diverse there is a weak pressure to form trade 
associations. Long term growth in these districts is possible, but it is constantly 
threatened by the portability of these branch plants to another region. This vulnerability 
can be further explained as these plants are very much outward looking and therefore do 
not engender strong cultural bonds locally. They also do not establish a new identity for 
a region even though by their presence they may destroy existing ones.  
 
Thus their main weakness, when compared to the Marshallian/Italianate/(NIS/D) and 
the hub-and-spoke districts, is that they are less sticky. However, they can generate 
some stickiness by the large capital investments which are implemented when these 
branch plants are first established: for example, through infrastructural upgrading such 
as new road, rail, air or port facilities.  
 
Having outlined Markusen’s (1996) third industrial district the last one is now 
summarized 
 
2.3.1d A state-anchored/centred industrial district  
 
This district type has been identified through studies into the rise of military 
establishments throughout the USA during the cold and first Gulf Wars50
According to Markusen (1996) it is more difficult to theorise and this is why she could 
not represent it diagrammatically and why one is not reproduced here.  
. It is a more 
eclectic district where a public or non-profit entity: for example, a military base, 
defence plant, weapons laboratory, university, prison complex, or a concentration of 
government offices are the key anchor tenant within the district. Here the local business 
structure is dominated by the presence of these facilities which are often located into a 
region through political or defence considerations rather than by market forces.  
                                                 
50 For these see Markusen (1991) and Markusen et al.(1991) 
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Despite this, she suggested it would look similar to that already given for a hub-and-
spoke district (figure 2) in so much as it could involve larger embedded ‘hubs’ within 
this district, but it would have fewer linkages to the regional economy and therefore is 
this respect it is similar to the satellite platform model (figure 3).Despite these 
similarities there are some unique features that can be noted which make this the fourth 
type of industrial district. Perhaps the best way to illustrate their existence is through 
examples. Military bases, academies and weapons labs, largely explain the post-war 
growth of U.S. cities such as Santa Fe, Albuquerque, San Diego and Colorado Springs. 
Added to this Markusen (1991) and Gray (1996) identified it was through a series of 
defence plants that contributed to the early growth of Los Angeles, Silicon Valley and 
Seattle.  
 
In terms of non-military anchors, Markusen (1996; p306) highlights Denver owing 
much of its post-war growth due to it hosting the second largest concentration of federal 
government offices within the USA. Additionally Diniz and Razavi (1994) identified in 
Japan and South Korea it was government research complexes at Tsukuba and Taejon 
that fuelled economic and urban growth there. They further noted in Brazil, the city of 
Campinas owed much to its top-ranked university, while San Jose dos Campos’s growth 
is based around a government-owned, military-orientated aerospace complex.  
 
In general, scale economies51 in these complexes are relatively high. This is because 
state-owned or state-orientated facilities are so large, supplier sectors do grow up 
around them and they become dependent on public expenditure. Short-term contracts 
and commitments exist between these anchors and their surrounding local suppliers, but 
this can be subject to political change. Long-term contracts can emerge in areas where 
the anchor is a defence establishment. This is because they are based largely on trust 
and cooperation and the procurement process is usually protracted in these instances and 
this means buyer-supplier relationships can extend over longer distances.52
 
 
                                                 
51 See section 2.1 for definition 
52 For example, between Silicon Valley and Washington D.C. in the U.S.A, or along the entire length of 
Britain between shipyards at Govan and Portsmouth, when constructing sections of warships for the 
Royal Navy. 
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Markusen (1996) also suggested labour markets within these districts were tailored to 
the particular state activity hosted where the workers loyalties will be to the large state 
institutions and/or state-dependant facilities first, then to the district and then to the 
firms themselves. Local firms will play a less significant role in these districts than in 
the Marshallian/Italianate/(NIS/D) or hub-and-spoke districts and will not be in a 
position to stabilize the market from cooperation or by sharing risks. As in the satellite 
platform model, trade associations are suggested to be weak, but local government also 
within this district. Local fixed capital may therefore come from central government in 
the form of boosterism to enhance the anchor facility. However, there is little 
consideration to regional investment in these districts.  
 
Long-term growth in state-anchored districts depends on two factors: first, the prospects 
of the facility at the centre of the region, and second, the extent to which they can 
generate spin-offs53. These can be new businesses or increasing the labour supply in the 
region and are termed as ‘secondary effects’. The problem with developing these is that 
often the anchor within the district is so large it overwhelms any contribution that could 
potentially be made by any spin-offs or ‘secondary effects’ to local regional 
development.54
 
 Due to the high dependence of these districts on these single key 
anchors local business and political energy is always centred on solidifying their 
commitment to the district and at the expense of other local firms. 
Having now outlined the four industrial district models identified by Markusen (1996) it 





                                                 
53 Spin-offs are new firms or facilities formed by a split from a larger one. An example could be a new 
company forming from a university research group. However, in state-anchored/centred districts the main 
ones tend to be government spin-offs. 
54 Examples of hugely dominant anchors include the Los Alamos research facility in New Mexico, USA 
with an annual budget of $1.4 billion, Markusen (1996; p307).  In the UK the large 169-acre BAE 
systems submarine facility at Barrow in Furness, Cumbria where c.3,200 steelworkers, designers, 
engineers, fitters, electricians and other skilled workers are all dependent upon this key anchor firm. BBC 
NEWS ‘New nuclear sub is lifeline for Barrow’ by Toby Poston, Monday, 28 August 2006, see 
bibliography for web-address. 
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2.3.2. Summary of Markusen’s industrial districts 
 
Markusen’s typology provides a useful framework for revealing the diversity of 
industrial districts. However, even she points out that they are suggestive rather than 
being definitive Markusen (1996; p308). Further empirical research is still needed to 
validate the different types she outlined and also to reveal their applicability to other 
historical concentrations of industrial activity. Also if and how a district can change 
from one type to another seems another possible question that this study could address. 
 
To blur the boundaries between Markusen’s four district typology some regions show 
elements of all four types. To use the region which has received considerable research, 
Silicon Valley in California, there Saxenian (1994) suggested the electronics industry 
confirmed to a Marshallian model, but also revolved around several ‘hubs’ such as 
Lockheed, Hewlett Packard and Stanford University. At the same time it hosted a 
platform of several large branch plants of U.S. and non-U.S. firms including IBM, Oki, 
NTK Ceramics, Hyundai and Samsung. Finally it had also been one of the largest 
recipients of military spending in the U.S.A. suggesting it has properties of a state-
anchored/centred district. 
 
Overall the weakness of Markusen’s industrial district typology appears it focuses too 
much on ‘big business’ including the large multinational firms and their role and 
linkages to central government55. This means it does not capture the full diversity of a 
region. It has been left mainly to Italian research56
 
 to incorporate SMEs and to establish 
their role within these districts. This district typology also seems to concentrate too 
often on observable linkages between firms, for example, formulised contracts. This 
means it cannot fully identify and explain what Marshall’s ‘industrial atmosphere’ 
actually is. In order to tackle some of these issues a related concept, that of the 
innovative milieu, has emerged and it to this that the next section now discusses.  
 
                                                 
55 However, perhaps a focus on ‘big business’ is to be expected from US research. 
56 See Becanttini 1989, 1990, 1991 2003 2004; Brusco 1986 1989 1990 1992; Lazerson & Lorenzoni  
1999 and Paniccia 1998, 2002) 
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2.4 The conceptual framework for this study 
 
From an examination and discussion of the wider literature on industrial districts and 
clusters this study is now better informed as to where to position an investigation of 
Coventry’s First World War armaments and munitions industry. This study shall base 
its conceptual framework around three key elements from the literature: 
 
1. To add to the work on industrial districts by relating Markusen’s 
(1996) four idealised models to a British wartime armaments and 
munitions industry.  
2. To synthesize these models with the newer work on clusters 
involving a greater scrutiny of both tangible and intangible linkages 
between firms of all sizes and other entities such as trade 
associations in order to understand how and why this First World 
War industry was successful. 
3. Lastly to incorporate some of the work on networks, including the 
innovative milieu concept, to identify if social aspects were also 
important to Coventry firms. 
 
Drawing together these related concepts this study now has a diverse and yet 
meaningful conceptual framework to relate an investigation of Coventry’s WWI 
armaments and munitions industry with. Before this is undertaken one final area to 
clarify is to outline a clear conceptual boundary.  
 
As has been suggested the concepts of industrial districts and clusters are similar and the 
terms interchangeable within the literature. For this study, Brenner’s (2004) term: local 
industrial cluster (LIC), seems to provide an appropriate conceptual boundary for this 
study.  The use of this term denotes the spatial scale as that of a city (Coventry) and not 
that of a region (the West Midlands). That the study is firm/industry centred.57
                                                 
57 Therefore banks, shops, trade unions and other service sectors are not widely considered 
 Finally 
the adoption of the newer metaphor cluster denotes it is not based upon a singular 
industry. In this case it is based on a set of interconnected light engineering industries. 
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Furthermore cluster also suggests the study shall scrutinise a variety of linkages and/or 
networks which may be present. 
 
Having now placed this study into the wider context of existing research themes linked 
to industrial districts and clusters the next chapter now wishes to outline an appropriate 
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Chapter 3: Research Methods 
 
Having outlined how an evolving agglomeration of industry may be theorised using a 
cluster approach, the methods through which this may be researched are now discussed. 
Whilst cluster theory can support a range of methodological techniques, it does require 
the use of both extensive, quantitative research to identify patterns and more intensive, 
qualitative research to explain those patterns.  For this reason the research methodology 
was divided into an extensive and intensive phase. This section shall begin by outlining 
the justification for these two phases. It will then detail how both the extensive and 
intensive phases were conducted and which methodologies were utilised. 
 
3.1 Extensive and Intensive Research 
 
Sayer (2000) argues that concrete research relies on having complementary extensive 
and intensive methods. Philip (1998) suggested that in social science research a 
quantitative, extensive method usually takes the form of structured interviews, 
questionnaires, experiments, structured observation, content analysis and the analysis of 
official statistics58. Some of these extensive methods are necessary in this research to 
ask the more general questions of Coventry’s Local Industrial Cluster (L.I.C.). They 
will be quantitative in nature and are concerned with revealing the broad properties and 
patterns over the entire cluster. However, in using extensive research methods, such as 
content analysis, explanatory power is arguably sacrificed so that representativeness 
may be achieved59
 
. In other words the extensive phase will be useful in showing how 
widespread Coventry’s WWI armaments and munitions cluster was, but it shall be weak 
in terms of explaining the cluster and identifying the reasons for its development. This 
problem is addressed by having a more intensive, qualitative second phase. 
An intensive phase of this research is therefore required to reveal an understanding of 
how particular companies and entities were operating within the cluster.  
 
                                                 
58 Philip (1998) p264 
59 Cloke, Philo & Sadler (1991) p156. 
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In so doing it helps to reveal any casual processes and mechanisms behind specific 
events, for example the setting up of the Ministry of Munitions in May 1915 could 
potentially be one event which instigated processes within the cluster. However, as 
Sayer (1997; p118) notes ‘discovering how a mechanism works does not tell us how 
widespread that mechanism is’ and this is why the extensive earlier phase is required to 
address this. The following table 3, adapted from Sayer (1984), is now given which 
summarises the research strategy adopted and shows how both phases help to answer 
different sorts of complementary questions concerning the historical geography of the 
armaments and munitions cluster under investigation:
 
Table 3: A Summary of Extensive and Intensive Research 
 Extensive Intensive 
Research 
Question 
What are the regularities, broad 
patterns and distinguishing features 
of a population of armament and 
munition firms forming a cluster? 
How widely are certain 
characteristics or processes 
distributed or presented within the 
L.I.C.? 
How does a particular firm, 
entrepreneur or sector work in a 
particular case or small number of 
cases?  
What produces a certain change 
within the L.I.C.? 
How did the agents such as 
committees or individuals 
operate? 
Relations Formal relations of similarity Substantial relations of connection 
Type of groups 
studied Taxonomic groups Causal groups 
Type of account 
produced 
Descriptive 'representative' 
generalizations, lacking in 
explanatory penetration 
Causal explanation of the 
production of certain cluster 
changes or events, though not 
necessarily representative ones to 
the whole cluster or for other 
clusters 
Typical methods 
Large-scale survey of all 
engineering businesses and support 
entities to form a representative 
sample using content analysis 
Study of individual companies, 
agents and individuals in their 
casual contexts using qualitative 
analysis of emergent themes 
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Limitations 
Although representative of a whole 
cluster of factories and actors in 
Coventry between 1914 and 1918 
it is unlikely to be generalizable to 
other industrial clusters at different 
times and places. 
Limited explanatory power. 
Actual historical occurrences and 
contingent relations between 
firms and other entities are 
unlikely to be 'representative', 
'average' or generalizable. 
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3.2 Extensive Research Phase 
 
The purpose of this phase was to meet objectives one and two of the research which 
were to identify and map the armaments and munitions cluster. This phase is necessary 
to identify broad patterns, regularities and the overall distribution of this cluster. There 
were four stages to this extensive phase: first to produce a list of all engineering 
businesses within the city between 1912 and 1919; second to conduct a scoping exercise 
to investigate what archival material existed for firms; third to then reduce that list into 
specific firms identified producing armaments and munitions; and fourth to map those 
firms over three time periods of the First World War. 
 
The following four diagrams (overleaf) all summarize each of these four stages to the 
extensive phase and outline some of the principal sources, method(s), problems 
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Figul'f 4: Producing a list of Conntrv engineering businesses bennen 1912 and 1919 
/ 
Principal Sources: Extensive phase Method (s): 
- Trade directories 
of the research - Content analysis - Commercial directories (whereby quantitative data is 
- Locally produced guides extracted from qualitative sources) 
- Business lists obtained from the 
- Here the incidence and frequency 
Transport Museum 
of company names and addresses 
- Websites were noted 
- Thesis tables and appendices 
- Various literacy sources 
\. ... 
STAGE 1: 
To produce a list of all 
engineeling businesst>s 
within the city betwet>n 
1912 and 1919 
~ '\ 
Solution: 
Several trade directories were used 
for the years immediately before and 
after the war. This allowed, through a 
Problems sometimes process of cross-checking, the researcher 
encountered: to pinpoint which businesses existed 
Records have restricted ~ throughout the war, which had changed 
access due to health company name and also at which 
and safety issues premises these firms were located. 
" 
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' I \ 
Principal Sour·ces : Extensive phase 
- Trade directories 
Method(s): 
- Commercial directories of the research - Key word searching via the 
- Locally produced guides 
Archon tool on the National 
- Business lists obtained from 
Archives website to locate where 
the Transport Museum 
specific local business records 
- Motor industry websites 
are held. 
- Thesis tables and appendices 
- Utilise the Access2Archives 
- Various literacy sources 
website to generate lists of specific 
documents within those collections ... 
/ 
- Introduce the research to archivists 
and discuss which sources may 
reveal the relevant information to 





en coun ter·ed: 
Business records have ~ Solution : 
sometimes been destroyed 
-,. Examine material in the trade press or 
newspapers for that particular firm 
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'\ 
Principal Sources: Extensive phase Metbod(s): 
- Business records of the research 
Rigorously asking the following 
- Government departmental questions of every firm: 
records - Is there mention that the firm 
- Trade press manufactured any armaments and 
- Newspapers munitions? 
- Any mention the firm was a 
contractor to the War Office, 
Admir.Uty, Air Board, Ministry of 
/' Munitions or a foreign allied power? 
STAGE 3: - Was the firm mentioned as being 
To reduce that list into specific 
'requisitioned by the government' 
\ or a 'controlled establishment'? 
firms identified producing 
armaments and munitions 
Problems sometimes Solution: 
encounter·ed : Examine government records not at 
Wartime censorship of .. that time in the public domain and 
information 
.. therefore not prone to wartime 
censorship 
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Pr incipal Sources: 
- Trade directories 
- Commercially available maps 
- Printed Ordnance Swvey maps 
- Digitised Ordnance Swvey maps 
- Building plans 
- Contemporary A to Z street 
index for the city 
Pr·oblems sometimes 
encountered: 
Location of firm 
preruises unclear 
Extensive phase 
of the research 
STAGE4: 
To identify their location and 
map those firms over three time 
periods of the Fh·st World War 
M etbod(s): 
- Cross-checking all the various 
information presented on the 
maps and then reconciling this 
with data extracted from a 
contemporary A to Z street 






- Combining the information in trade 
directives with maps of various streets 
and counting the number of properties 
along a street or clockwise within a 
court behind a street until the correct 
firm location is found. 
- Examination of photographs against 
maps of the city's streets to determine 
a factory's precise location 
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3.3 Intensive Research Phase 
 
A second more qualitative, intensive phase was now needed in order to address 
objectives three and four of the research. This was to understand how firms operated 
within the cluster; what were the linkages between them and the support entities; how 
changes or expansion were implemented and also what instigated new entrants to join at 
the specific time they did. To achieve this, the study followed Porter’s (1998) 
suggestion that to understand how a cluster operated important institutions and 
infrastructure linked to industry have to be identified. Furthermore the role of central 
and local government and any industrial regulatory bodies must also be examined60
 
.  
The rest of this section explores how these entities and/or actors were identified, 
mapped and the clusters operation further conceptualized  by examining four “emergent 
themes” which arose from the earlier extensive phase. These were: the role of 
ownership, control and the direction of growth within the cluster; the timing of new 
entrants; and the adaptation of firms from peacetime manufacturing to munitions 
production. How these four themes were researched, using a more qualitative method is 
summarized by the following four diagrams overleaf. Each one also outlines principal 












                                                 
60 Porter (1998) On Competition Chapter 7 Clusters and Competition  
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Pr incipal Sources: Intensive phase Method(s): 
- Minutes of the Coventry 
of the research 
-A more qualitative 
Corporation questioning of sources 
- Minutes and reports from the in the light of these 
Coventry Chambers of Commerce emergent themes 
- Local newspapers 
- Ministry of Munitions papers 
EMERGENT THEME 1: 
Ownership, Control and 
Direction of Gt•owth 
Within the Cluster 
I 
Pr·oblems sometimes 
encountered: Solution : 
The research process Allow the research process to be far 
was much more reactionary .. more dynamic and allow leads and 
and less structured than the ~ clues to lead to sources and/or 
extensive phase answers to the emergent themes 
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Principal Sources: Intensive phase Method(s): 
- Richardson oral history collection, 
of the research 
-A more qualitative 
Lanchesrer library questioning of sources 
- Various Government departmental in the light of these 
records emergent themes 
- Business records e.g. order books 
and accounts 
- Local newspapers 
- Various finn produced literature 
and adverts 
EMERGENT THEME 2: 
Timing of New Entrants 
Solution: 
Push the study to its empirical and 
Pr·oblems sometimes practical limits and continue to 
encountered: 
.. scrutinise as many different types .. 
Censorship of information of sources as existed 
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Principal Sources: Intensive phase Method(s) : 
- Official History of the Ministry 
of the research 
-A more qualitative 
of Munitions H.M.S.O. (1920) questioning of sources 
- Examining munition contracts in the light of these 
between different firms themselves emergent themes 
and the Government 
- Local newspapers 
EMERGENT THElVIE 3: 
Firm and Cluster 
Adaptation 
Solution: 
Scrutinizing any surviving sources 
Pr·oblems sometimes which were not prone to wartime 
encountered: 
.. censorship e.g. private contracts .. 
Censorship of information or Ministry of Munitions records 
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Pri ncipal Sources: Intensive phase Method(s): 
-Board of Trade records 
-Ministry of Munitions records of the research 
-A more qualitative 
questioning of sources 
- Labour Ministry records in the light of these 
- Personal memoirs of managing emergent themes 
directors 
EMERGENT THEME 4: 
Firm and Cluster 
Expansion 
Problems sometimes 
encounter·ed: Solu tion : 
Firms not always wished to Examination of official governmental 
reveal how they were 
~ 
sources and other surviving sources 
profiting from war-time .. e.g. memoirs of the MD. for the 
contracts Coventry Ordnance Works 
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3.4 Summary: Methodology Matrix 
 
Table 4 (overleaf) now summarises the entire methodological strategy employed to 
research Coventry’s First World War armaments and munitions cluster:
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Table 4: Methodology Matrix 
Methodological Technique Data Produced Purpose of the technique in relation to the research 
Research objectives 
addressed 






To compile a list of engineering businesses in the city between 
1914 and 1918 and to codify each firm into a specific firm 
typology. 
Objectives 1 & 2 
Scoping exercise Archive Lists 
 
To locate what sources existed for the city’s engineering 
businesses in local, regional and national archives between 1914 
and 1918. 
Extensive questioning of source 
material 
Maps 1, 2 and 
3 
To reduce the business list of c.330 engineering firms by 
identifying which firms were producing armaments and munitions 
during the war. To pinpoint where there firms were located in 
order to position them onto a 1914 Ordnance Survey map. 
INTENSIVE RESEARCH PHASE 
Intensive questioning of qualitative 
sources in relation to emergent themes Qualitative 
To identify other actors, infrastructure or institutions important to 
the clusters operation. To then map those onto a 1914 Ordnance 
Survey map thereby completing the identification and mapping 
for this wartime cluster. 
By revealing these aspects of this historical cluster it may then be 
observed in a small number of cases how certain actors, 
institutions and infrastructure shaped the clusters operation and 
evolution. 
Objectives 3 & 4 
 
Having now discussed and developed a conceptual framework for this study and also devised a methodological framework the next chapter 
wishes to provide a contextual setting for the study.
 - 48 - 
Chapter 4 :  The Industrial Development and Restructuring of Coventry Industry 
1860’s to 1914 
 
 
This chapter outlines the empirical background and context to the study that follows. 
The city’s rich historical past shall become evident and also how in its midst emerged a 
thriving industrial city which, by the early twentieth century, was the fastest growing 
city in the country. The city throughout remained dualistic where the old and the new 
seemed to co-exist although the later would come to dominate. A.E.W Mason, a Liberal 
MP for Coventry writing in 1912, described the city as a place: 
 
'where a few steps will take you out of the thronged streets into 
some old garden quiet with the peace of ancient memories;....And 
round about these old places stand a ring of factories, where in 
good times, the lights blaze until morning and the whir of its 
machines never ceases from your ears. It is a city whose 
continuous life is written for all to see upon its buildings. Here 
kings and queens have tarried on their journeys; where Chambers 
of Commerce hold their meetings. From small and ancient 
beginnings it has been made by the activity of generations of men 
into a modern industrial city'61
 
. 
The chapter shall begin by outlining Coventry’s transition away from its staple 
industries into newer more ‘modern’ industries mainly light engineering based. Next, 
the important restructuring which occurred towards the turn of the twentieth century 
will be outlined and the nature and geography of the engineering industry and 
workforce by 1914 shall be revealed. Lastly the chapter concludes by outlining the most 







                                                 
61 Mason (1912)  The Turnstyle 
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4.1 Medieval guilds to silk ribbon weaving and watchmaking 
 
Coventry’s importance as an urban centre can be traced back to the medieval period 
when it was the first recorded settlement granted a Charter of Incorporation which 
effectively gave it city status in 134562. In medieval England the economic life of the 
city depended upon the cloth trade. Much of this was exported abroad mainly through 
the ports of London, Bristol, Southampton, and Boston. Alongside this, the city had a 
small, but thriving metal-working, leather and fur trade and it would seem many of 
these industries operated through the form of craft guilds63
 
. By the time of the 
nineteenth century, Coventry’s economic structure was based on two long-established 
staple industries that of silk ribbon weaving and watchmaking, which were both craft 
industries.  
Ribbon weaving was established in the city when the woollen-cloth trade became 
depressed and the city’s textile workers turned their attention to producing silk-ribbons 
in the seventieth century. This was stimulated still further in the eighteenth century 
when Coventry received new ideas from France and the market demanded certain types 
of ribbons that fashion dictated. This industry was initially cottage-based, but from the 
1830s onwards technological advances emerged in the form of the Dutch engine loom 
and later the Jacquard loom which encouraged production to become factory based. The 
weavers of Coventry often opposed this and both production systems of “cottage 
factories” and large factories seemed to co-exist.  
 
By 1818 weaving provided employment for 4,973 persons out of a city population of 
21,242 (in 1821). During the 1830s Coventry was at the centre of a weaving area of 
13,000 looms supporting 30,000 people64 and continued to expand until it reached its 
peak around 186165. This industry enjoyed longevity and from 1765 to 1857, silk was 
the dominant industry in the city66
                                                 
62 McGrory (2003) A History of Coventry p38. 
. Despite this, it seemed to face many difficulties 
including intense foreign competition.  
63 Ibid pp151-57 
64 Victoria County History Vol.8 section on ribbon weaving. Hereafter V.C.H. 
65 Searby (1976) Watchmaking in Coventry 
66 V.C.H. Vol8. pp162-89 
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By the 1860s the city’s ribbon weaving had begun to collapse due to four things. First 
Cobden Treaty was made with France in 1860 by which their ribbons were now 
imported free of any duty. Secondly the U.S.A. put an import duty upon English 
ribbons, and, thirdly, ribbons started to go out of fashion. Fourthly an attempt was made 
to reduce wages in Coventry, which led to strikes, from which, the trade never 
recovered. By 1901 the industry had shrunk to a workforce of just 2,177 losing over 
80% of its mid-century workforce. The distress which occurred in that time was more 
acute than at any time in the history of the city with half of Hillfields suggested to have 
become depopulated with row upon row of houses standing vacant67
 
. This is highlighted 
in Table 8 (p.63) where the census figures for Coventry show between 1861 and 1871 
silk ribbon weavers in the city halved and also the total population of the city decreased. 
Alongside Coventry’s main trade of silk-ribbon weaving in the nineteenth century the 
city also developed as an important centre for watchmaking in Britain.  
As far back as the seventieth century a local trade of watchmaking emerged initially to 
support the needs of producing and maintaining the clocks situated around the city. In 
the course of the next century it became firmly-established within the city, however, by 
1817 an early downturn of only 14,000 watches were made, against 20,000 in the 
previous years, this being blamed on imports68
 
. By the mid-eighteenth century the 
watchmaking trade stimulated the city's expansion with many of the watchmaker shops 
clustered in the growing Spon End and Chapelfield areas of the city. At this time 
Coventry’s watchmakers were at their most prosperous and commanded a high 
reputation and the city had to rely largely on the watch industry as its principal source of 
income. This horological industry, however, was soon next in line to suffer as the 
market became flooded with cheaper machine-made watches from Switzerland and 
America.  
The industry did however enjoy a brief resurgence in 1870-71, no doubt due to the 
Franco-German war then occurring, but throughout the remainder of the nineteenth 
century it declined in importance to the city's economy.  
                                                 
67 Coventry Herald  04/06/1897. 
68 Searby (1976) 
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It would still continue on into the twentieth century, mainly in factory form69, but the 
city had to look elsewhere for employment and prosperity. Despite the distress and 
decline in Coventry watchmaking those that were employed would earn around £3 a 
week and have to only work 3 days a week in order to have sufficient to live on70. 
Alongside the development of these two important trades the city also enjoyed better 
links to its markets as by 1768 the Coventry Canal Company began to cut a canal from 
Coventry to Fradley Heath. This was later expanded to link it to Birmingham, London, 
Liverpool, Manchester and Oxford. The same connectivity was late in coming with the 
railway as the city did not enjoy the benefits of becoming a major railway centre and 
only a single line from London to Birmingham passed through, with the station having 
been opened, with the line, in 1838. Despite these improved forms of communication 
the Industrial Revolution was late in coming to this area of the West Midlands and 
Coventry demonstrated this pattern as she remained dominated by her traditional craft 
industries of ribbon weaving and watch making71
 
.The following table summarises the 
growth and the decline of Coventry’s two most important industries of the nineteenth 
century: 
Table 5: The Growth and Decline of silk-Ribbon Weaving and Watchmaking  
in Coventry 1841-1921 
69 Rotherham’s, Errington’s and the Coventry Watch Movement Company being the few remaining firms 
to continue watch production into the Twentieth Century on a significant scale. 
70 Coventry Official Guide 1918 p27. 
71 Thoms & Donnelly (1987 and 2000). Batchelor (2005) also found this common in North Warwickshire 
for the nearby town of Nuneaton. 
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4.2 Watchmaking leads to cycle, motorcycle and motorcar production 
 
The significance of watchmaking to the city was not just in the employment 
opportunities it gave to citizens when silk-ribbon weaving suffered it also gave the city 
a light-engineering sector. Initially this was in the form of manufacturing sewing 
machines when in 1863 the Coventry Sewing Machine Company was established to 
exploit the skill of the large body of trained watchmakers in the city72
Furthermore, Coventry Machinists’ acted as a seed bed firm
.  Lack of capital 
and American competition made expansion for the firm difficult and although the 
company survived and extended its factory trade was slack towards the end of the 
1860s. Therefore in 1869 the company was re-established as the Coventry Machinists’ 
Company Ltd. This firm, under the guidance of James Starley, commenced to 
experiment with a new vehicle known as a “bone shaker” imported from France.  
73 and would attract wealth 




This marked the commencement of the cycle industry in Britain and as the machine was 
improved so to the industry germinated in Coventry and a large number of new firms 
commenced the manufacture of bicycles and tricycles75
 
. Another important aspect of 
Coventry Machinists’ was that many of the leading men who worked, or were 
apprenticed, there went on to setup in business locally themselves, namely, James 
Starley, William Hillman, Alfred Herbert and George Singer amongst others. With the 
introduction in the 1880s of Bessemer and Siemens-Martin steel, in place of wrought 
iron, which had been difficult to machine, it provided a further stimulus to the 
production of lighter, cheaper standardized parts. This along with the bicycle’s design 
being perfected into the modern safety bicycle it increased in popularity and expansion 
continued in the city. 
                                                 
72 V.C.H.Vol8 pp. 162-89. 
73 Meaning the firm acted as a “hub” or a nucleus from which other ‘spin off’ trades, firms and 
individuals branched out from. See Lloyd-Jones & Lewis (2003) Business networks, social habits and the 
evolution of a regional industrial cluster: Coventry 1880s–1930s 
74 Hassell (2004) The Coventry Machinists’ Company Limited.  
75 Other centres of cycle production were Birmingham and Wolverhampton, though Coventry had the 
greatest number of firms. 
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With the cycle industry prospering consequently a cluster of support industries, namely 
machine tools and bicycle component and accessories manufacturers developed in the 
city. This further attracted entrepreneurs to establish themselves in Coventry, such as 
Thomas Humber and Daniel Rudge, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, who 
would both setup cycle firms of their own76. Thus by the end of the nineteenth century 
Coventry was a city of much social and economic change. By 1881 sixteen cycle 
manufacturers were noted as resident which had risen to seventy five during the boom 
years of the 1890s77
 
. To establish these firms little capital was needed and production 
was often carried out initially in only modest premises.  
This new cycle industry attracted much attention from the company promoting 
fraternity and therefore many of these firms were floated and capitalised, with Hooley 
and Lawson being the chief concern in this78. This left many of these firms with large 
capital investments generated from the sale of shares which they then utilised to erect 
and equip factories in Coventry to manufacture sufficient quantities of bicycles and 
components to generate a dividend for their shareholders. This had negative and 
positive spinoffs, firstly it helped stimulate employment and migration into the city and 
thus improve its prosperity79, but it also meant that with a greater number of larger 
companies mass-producing bicycles the supply started to exceed demand and the 
collapse of the mid 1890s ensued.  The continuity of Coventry’s industrial development 
is highlighted by many factory premises becoming vacant and thus then being ideal for 
firms to adapt for the embryonic motor industry. Coventry had a pool of relatively 





                                                 
76 Thoms & Donnelly (1985) p18. 
77 Lowe (1982) A Guide to Sources in the History of the Cycle and Motor Industries p6. 
78 Iliffe, Sir E. (1924) Coventry Industrial History Offprint JN670. 
79 See Table 8 where between 1870 and 1901 Coventry’s population increased by 75 percent largely due 
to the prosperity that the booming cycle industry generated. 
80 For example several of Daimler’s workforce were originally steam engine boiler makers having 
previously worked at Crewe in the railway industry and were later attracted to the city during the boom 
period of the cycle industry and then moved to Daimler’s during the firms’ formative years. 
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The existing firms which had survived the slump in the 1890s were able to further 
capitalise and expand their existing works or move to larger ones and these same firms 
were also in a position to realign production from cycles to motorcycles and later to 
motorcars or in some cases producing all three as well as sidecars.  
 
The Daimler Motor Company entered the city and showed the way forward in 1896 and 
is regarded as the genesis of motor car production in Great Britain81. Having such a 
‘first mover’ into the embryonic British motor industry locating in the city meant that 
whenever motorcar production was discussed in the late Victorian/Edwardian period 
Coventry’s name would always be mentioned. By 1905 the number of motorcar 
manufacturers had reached 29 many of which were small and could not be considered 
mass production. These firms were producing virtually anything which needed a wheel, 
from bicycles, tricycles, side-cars, small cars, commercial vehicles and luxury cars for 
domestic and export markets. By 1913 many of the fragile companies had fallen by the 
wayside, but the city was still the centre of the motor trade with prestigious names such 
as Daimler, Rover, Rudge-Whitworth, Triumph, Singer, Swift, Rex, Lea-Francis, 
Humber, Standard and Maudslay to name only some of the leading firms. This allowed 




Almost piggybacking off the cycle and motor industries had emerged a cluster of 
component firms supplying the many needs of the assemblers for increased outputs. 
Firms such as The Coventry Chain Company, commencing in the city in 1896 by Alick 
Sargeant Hill83, who had come from the watch trade, began to support the demand for 
roller cycle chains84. Another such firm was the Coventry Radiator Company which 
began initially as a plating company and then became one of the main radiator supplies 
for the motor industry by 191285
                                                 
81 For more information on Daimler’s contribution in beginning the motor industry in Coventry see Nixon 
(1946), Smith (1972),  Burgess-Wise et al. (1995), Long (1990 and 1995) and Bobbitt (2001) pp18-26. 
. A third example was that of the British Chuck and 
Tool Company established by one W.A. Oubridge in 1909.  
82 Prosser (1955) Coventry: A Study in Urban Continuity’ p90. 
83 Who would later become Major of Coventry from 1916 to 1917. 
84 Tripp (1956) Renold Chains 
85 Richardson (1977) The British Motor Industry 1896-1939 p93. 
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He found it more profitable to realign the firm into a specialist motor component firm in 
1911 to concentrate on the manufacture of piston rings86. These ‘support firms’ were 
not just situated in Coventry as another firm, also linked to Mr Hill, was that of Bluemel 
Brothers situated in the nearby village of Wolston. They supplied to many of the 
Coventry’s leading bicycle and motorcar firms with accessories and parts such as 
mudguards or sparking plugs. Broadly speaking most component firms were small 
concerns as it was noted that between 1895-1914 only three Coventry firms that of 
Dunlop, British Thompson Houston and Coventry Chain were public floated 
companies87
 
. Figure 12 (overleaf) summarises the growth of this emerging support 
sector before the First World War: 
Figure 12: The Rise of Motor Vehicle Component Firms in Coventry  
before the First World War 
 
        Sources: Beaven (1993 and 1994) 
 
The emergence of drop forging can be seen as another support industry for Coventry’s 
cycle and motor industries.  
                                                 
86 Anon (undated) B.R.I.C.O. publication Coventry Archives. 
87 Beaven (1993 & 1994) Out of these three firms Dunlop had its origins and headquarters in 
Birmingham, British Thompson Houston was Rugby based and both had branch works or subsidiaries in 
Coventry. Thus leaving only Coventry Chain as the sole Coventry headquartered firm which was floated 
and sufficiently capitalised. This again reinforces that Coventry’s many component firms up to 1914 were 











Car Component Firms in Coventry 28 38 61
1902 1908 1912
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Its beginnings in the city have largely to do with a Mr E.S. Brett, a pioneer of drop 
forging in Britain, who established Brett’s Stamping Company in the 1890s. Due to 
improvements in forging pioneered by Brett’s, the manufacturing costs for bicycles and 
later for the motorcar could be reduced. This was due to the fact hand forging metal was 
a slow, costly and not entirely satisfactory process, often wasting much metal owing for 
the need to leave a surplus for machining purposes. Machine drop forging obviated this, 
as each part produced became exactly like the one produced before, and there was also 
less wastage of metal88. The Stamping industry was also a near relative to drop forging 
and its emergence in Coventry also propelled the cities industrial growth in a similar 




Within the city a leading machine tool firm, Alfred Herbert Ltd., emerged exploiting the 
demand placed on them from this expanding light engineering sector.  The Coventry 
cycle manufacturer, for example, looked for labouring saving machinery to bend, form 
and produce steel tubes rapidly while later on the car manufacturer demanded improved 
machine tools capable of producing machined parts to very fine limits of accuracy and 
tolerance in the minimum time and with the least amount of supervision. In the later part 
of the nineteenth century the American and Continental engineers catered for this 
demand, for example, Alick Hill’s first Coventry Chain machinery, used in his small 
Dale street premises for making cycle chains, had to be imported from the USA. Or for 
Coventry’s few remaining watchmaking firms, such as Rotherhams, much of their 
machinery had to be imported from Switzerland90
 
. 
                                                 
88 Drop forging also allowed more complex manufacture where the number of parts ran to hundreds or 
thousands. Also as uniform materials of known strengths could be used, and the working temperatures 
regulated to a fine degree, it was then possible for the supplier of these forgings to give a very explicit 
guarantee to the cycle or car manufacturer. In turn they could then pass that guarantee of quality on to 
their customers in respect to a cycle frame or motorcar engine. Significant economies of scale occurred 
when any engineering products from the city’s manufacturers could now be drop forged for the first time 
in large batches. 
89 Coventry Official Guide 1915 &1918. One of the main driving forces also stimulating a growth in 
Coventry stamping, pressing, drop forging and other general metal working firms was the city’s car 
assemblers refocusing production towards producing small light cars made in higher numbers than 
previously. For example, Standard and Singer both took this direction between 1910 and 1914. This in 
turn put a greater emphasis on external motor component supply as larger production runs were now 
desired of standardised and sometimes interchangeable parts. 
90 C.A. PA1467/89/1-2. 
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How Coventry’s growing machine tool production stimulated development in the cycle 
and later the motor industry is illustrated by the following example. In 1902 a machinist 
working on an ‘old-fashioned’ centre lathe, at Daimler, producing a component such as 
steel gear blanks would be allowed 10½ hours to complete each one. By 1914, in the 
same works, now could be found a row of automatic machine-tools which each could 
produce a similar blank, without much supervision on the part of the operator, in exactly 
18 minutes! One semi-skilled operator could supervise the working of up to four of 
these machines at one time. Indeed, with this progress, the skilled craftsman was being 
swept aside by the semi-skilled machine operator and now it was the automatic machine 
tool which set the speed of production91
 
. Alongside the reduced costs in labour saving 
and productivity brought about from this automation, machine tools also produced a 
precision of machined parts which would have been beyond that of any worker and 
especially in the never ending repetitious nature that was desired in these expanding 
industries. 
Other industries to emerge in the city at the beginning of the twentieth century included 
electrical engineering firms with the largest concern being British Thompson Houston 
established in 1912 to produce electrical meters92
John Brown
. However, perhaps the biggest change 
for the city came in 1902 when for first time it became an important centre for 
armaments production. The famous Birmingham coach-building firm of Mulliner’s 
merged and decided to relocate their activities to a tubing works in the northern 
Foleshill district of Coventry. This firm becoming Mulliner and Wrigley and was 
supplying gun carriages to the British Army. By 1905, Cammell Laird had taken 
complete ownership and with further financial backing from , and Fairfield 
Shipbuilding, the Coventry works was reformed as the Coventry Ordnance Works 
(C.O.W.)93. This move was prompted by a desire to break the duopoly held by 
Armstrong’s and Vickers Ltd, in heavy naval armaments manufacture94
 
.  
                                                 
91 Coventry Official Guide 1915 and 1918. 
92 Price-Hughes (1946) B.T.H. p34. 
93 Trebilcock (1977) The Vickers Brothers p116 and Warren (1998) Steel, Ships & Men pp8-9. 
94 By the time hostilities commenced C.O.W. was a contractor favourably placed on the War Office and 
Admiralty lists which meant they would be one of the first firms asked to tender for munition contracts. 
H.M.S.O. (1920) History of the Ministry of Munitions Appendix VIII p112. 
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This firms’ original intention was to break into the naval gun market, but it struggled to 
gain any significant orders for the first five years of its existence mainly due to it not 
been looked on favourably by the Admiralty or the War Office95. During this time the 
firm survived by manufacturing components for Coventry’s motorcar assembly firms96. 
However things improved by 1910 and it started to secure government contracts and 
export orders which were accelerated by the arms race with Germany. One of the first 
significant contracts it was able to secure, before 1914, was for the manufacturer of 18-
pounder gun carriages97
 
. The Ordnance Works improved situation continued shortly 
before the war as their designs for a new 4.5-inch field howitzer were so successful it 
was adopted as the main field weapon for the British Army. 
4.3 Restructuring within Coventry’s economy and the pre-war character of its 
engineering labour force 
 
It is, however, too simplistic to consider Coventry’s industrial development merely as 
cyclical periods of growth and prosperity leading from one industry to another.  
Important restructuring occurred within the city during the third quarter of the 
nineteenth century which was located within the broader structural transformation in 
Britain between 1870 and 1914.  Britain’s economy at this time shifted from traditional 
trades of coal, iron, steel and textiles and Coventry followed this pattern by moving 
away from silk-ribbon weaving and watchmaking into industry mainly based around 
light engineering98. This narrow sector comprised a range of interconnected industries, 
including cycle, motorcycle and motorcar manufacturers, machine tool, electrical 
engineering and component firms. Significantly these were highly inter-dependent and 
the technologies and markets linking them were similar99
 
.  
By the time of the 1911 census the city had grown by 52percent in the previous decade 
to 106,349 persons.  
                                                 
95 This was partly due the then Managing Director of the C.O.W., Mr H. H. Mulliner, who was looked 
upon with hostility and suspicion especially from the Admiralty after the 'We Want Eight And We Won't 
Wait' naval arms race scandal with Germany. 
96 Beaven (1994) p87. 
97 Hogg (1998) Allied Artillery of World War One p25. 
98 The Ordnance Works being really the only heavy industry within the city by 1914. 
99 Thoms & Donnelly (1987)  
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Of this total, 20,315 were recorded employed in the cycle and motorcar cluster of 
industries demonstrating its vital importance to the growth of the city100
 
.  The following 
table 6 (overleaf) now summarises how, by 1911, the employment pattern had 
transformed from the city’s traditional industries into that centred on vehicle production, 
light engineering and metal working: THE FOLLOWING TABLE IS REMOVED FOR COPYRIGHT
REASONS 
* 2,830 or 73 percent of this total were Women. Comparing this to 1841; when the proportion of 
women and men in textiles was roughly equal, this shows that between 1841-1911 many of 
Coventry’s male workforce, of employment age, were being drawn into the city’s engineering and 
metal working trades. Furthermore, it shows how female labour persisted in Coventry’s textile firms 
and was, outside domestic service, their main source of employment up to the First World War. 
Note: The Coventry Census Enumeration District covered 4,147 acres which did not include the 
1,900 acres in Coventry's outlying districts. Here a separate Enumeration District that of the 
Warwickshire Rural District is utilised for Census surveys. This means a proportion of population 
which would have worked in Coventry industry is excluded from these 1911 figures.                                                         
           Source: Census Statistics Books AB312 
                                                 
100 Census Statistics Books for 1911 AB312 
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By 1911, semi-skilled workers accounted for 45 percent of local engineering employees 
(compared to an industry average of 18 percent), blurring the traditional division 
between all-around craftsmen and unskilled labourers101. In this respect Coventry’s 
engineering labour force did not confirm to a typical British pattern. The relatively 
inexperienced workers required for cycle and motorcar production were secured not by 
downgrading skilled engineers, but by recruiting unemployed craftsmen from older, 
depressed local trades (ribbons and watchmaking) and from migrants from the 
surrounding rural districts. Thus the traditions, techniques, and representatives of 
engineering craftsmanship never enjoyed the prominence in Coventry that they did in 
more traditional metal working centres such as Sheffield102
 
. 
4.4 The geography of Coventry industry by 1914 
 
The city by the early twentieth century can be seen as one of contrasts. It had a centre of 
interwoven narrow medieval streets lined with timber framed buildings with many 
overcrowded courts behind. It was in these locations that many of the early 
manufacturers had developed, especially the smaller concerns. Here space was very 
restrictive, but it was this medieval centre in districts such as the West Orchard where 
weaving premises would become vacant for the cycle and later motorcycle and motorcar 
manufacturers to establish themselves. There persisted well into the Twentieth Century 
strong watchmaking areas namely the central Spon End area and spreading out towards 
the South-West of the city into suburbs such as Chapelfields and Earlsdon. The northern 
suburbs of Radford, Foleshill and Longford formed a growth pole during late-Victorian 
and Edwardian England where new houses and factories began to be erected. This 
expansion was driven by firstly the bicycle boom, for example, Challenge Cycle, 
Coventry Eagle and the Riley Cycle Company all had factories there. Secondly it was 
the location where Britain’s first motor firm was established, Daimler in 1896 at the 
Motor Mills and then by 1912 consolidated there with a second plant in Radford.  
 
                                                 
101 Hinton, (1973) The First Shop Stewards' Movement, p. 218. 
102 Haydu (1991) Between Craft and Class p163. 
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White and Poppe, perhaps Britain’s leading engine manufacturer before 1914, also had 
its works situated in the nearby Foleshill district. Finally it was this northern corridor 
where many of the larger component and machine tool firms also became established 
prior to the First World War. For instance, in Coventry’s growing machine tool, drop 
forging and stamping sectors Alfred Herbert’s Edgwick Foundry (1900), Webster and 
Bennett’s Northey Road Works (1887), Sterling Metals, making castings also in 
Northey Road (1907), Albion Drop Forgings (1900), Brett’s Stamping Company, and 
Brett’s Patent Lifter Company (1890s) all could be found here103. So too could electrical 
engineers Morris & Lister and smaller component firms such as Condor Motor Fittings. 
Significantly this was also the location for the Coventry Ordnance Works which 
between 1906 and 1914 had become one of the largest employers in the city with a plant 
continually expanded between 1909 and 1914 when it began to obtain military 
contracts. This suggests that the northern corridor of Coventry, which had good access 
to both the main railway line and canal, was the main focus of industrial and urban 





This chapter has discussed the changing trades and industries that Coventry developed 
from its medieval origins up to the commencement of the First World War. It has 
discussed how the city moved from the cloth trade to silk ribbon weaving and 
watchmaking by the nineteenth century. After these two industries started to decline a 
newer industry began to supersede them that of sewing machines produced by the 
Coventry Machinist Company. This occurred largely because the city’s watchmaking 
skills were transferable into sewing machine manufacture and this gave the city a light 
engineering base. By the late 1860s this same firm embraced the invention of the 
bicycle and along with many new cycle firms established within the city the technology 
was largely perfected and it became a commercial success.  
 
                                                 
103 V.C.H. Vol.8 (1969) Foleshill p57-70. 
104 For example, a new railway ‘loop line’ was constructed for the ordnance works in 1914 and their 
works and that of Daimlers were well placed on two of the main northerly arterial roads and also had 
good access to the Coventry canal. 
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Alongside bicycle firms ‘spin offs’ comprising component suppliers and metal working 
establishments came into being to supply these assemblers who were pursuing a policy 
of profusion and expansion for both domestic and foreign markets. By the late 1890s the 
cycle industry was largely in a state of oversupply and the city embraced new 
technological inventions once again - that of the motorcar. Like the cycle industry 
beforehand the city prospered by exploiting the technological infancy and sought to 
perfect and make it commercially viable. Consequently the city grew still further and 
with the commencement of the twentieth century it was seen as one of the most 
progressive urban centres in Britain with unprecedented urban growth rates.  
The most significant characteristics of Coventry industry before the commencement of 
hostilities is summarised thus: 
 
• The industrial base was a narrow cluster of light engineering firms which by 
1914 were producing inter-related products such as machine tools, cycles, 
motorcycles, motorcars, engines, motor components and electrical goods. 
• From 1905 onwards the city established heavy engineering with the 
setting up of the Coventry Ordnance Works (C.O.W.) this meant for 
the first time the city was also a centre for armaments production. 
• Broadly speaking the engineering labour force had a disproportionate 
amount of semi-skilled workers operating a high degree of automated 
machine tools in their workshops when compared to a national average. 
 
Having now provided an empirical background and context for the study the next 
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Chapter 5: The Anatomy and Evolution of the Coventry Armaments and 
Munitions Cluster August 1914 – November 1918 
 
 
The research findings are presented in two chapters. This chapter seeks to identify and 
map the First World War armaments and munitions Local Industrial Cluster (L.I.C.) at 
three time periods. The chapter is therefore split into three main sections. The first 
(section A) outlines the early cluster between August and December 1914. The second 
(section B) outlines the changes which occurred between April 1915 and December 
1915. The third and final section (section C) outlines the cluster at the end of hostilities 
between January 1916 and November 1918.  
 
Each of these three time periods are further sub-divided into four sub-sections. The first 
looks to place the cluster within the changing historical context of the war. The second 
then describes the geographical patterns and structural changes noted within the cluster. 
A third section discusses the change in ownership and control within the clusters 
operation and a fourth and final sub-section then gives a brief overview of significant 
armaments and munitions that the Coventry cluster was tasked to produce. The chapter 
then concludes with a summary of the key changes within the cluster between August 
1914 and November 1918. This chapter therefore accomplishes objectives one and two 
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Section A – Coventry’s Armaments and Munitions Local Industrial Cluster 
 August 1914 - December 1914 
 
5.1 Historical Context 
 
With the invasion of Belgium, Britain declared war on Germany on the 4th of August 
1914 as she had signed the Treaty of London in 1839 guarantying her neutrality. Thus 
the First World War began with Britain, France and Russia forming the Triple Entente 
against the Central Powers of Germany and Austro-Hungary. Both sides were 
misguidedly optimistic and Britain expected only a limited war in which she would rely 
upon her naval superiority only. On both sides political and public opinion was that it 
would be over by Christmas. However, it had been a century since Britain had fought a 
war against a major European power. During that time she had fought the Crimean and 
Boer wars, but neither had necessitated fundamental readjustments to her economy. 
Therefore there was no experience of the economic stresses and industrial efforts 
needed for a modern total war105. To be in a position to support her French ally Britain 
needed to recruit a large new army which pre-war was dwarfed by both the French & 
German standing armies.  Thus on the 7th of August Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener 
instigated a policy of voluntary recruitment which by the end of 1914 had produced 
slightly over one million men for the British Army106
 
. 
This rapid increase meant that during 1914 supplies for the British Expeditionary Force 
already in France, the Royal Navy and this growing British Army at home had to come 
from the royal arsenals and established armaments and munitions firms on the approved 
War Office List107. Lloyd (1924) for example, suggested the government's aim was to 
‘rely on private enterprise and the laws of supply and demand’; ‘a prosperous state of 
trade, regular employment at good wages and high profits for the Revenue to tax and the 
Treasury to borrow, were regarded with good reason as essential conditions for the 
successful prosecution of the [early]war’108
                                                 
105 Pollard (1973) The Development of the British Economy 1914-1969, p42. 
.  
106 Dewey (1984) Military Recruiting and the British Labour Force during the First World War p199 and 
Hartigan (1999) Volunteering in the First World War: The Birmingham Experience pp167. 
107 Of which in Coventry, only the Coventry Ordnance Works was a contractor on this list. 
108 Lloyd (1924) Experiments in State Control p22-23 & p261 emphasis added. 
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War on the scale that quickly became apparent meant that almost immediately some 
intervention was inevitable. Therefore, under powers derived from an Act passed at the 
time of the Franco-Prussian War in 1871, the government commandeered the railway 
network on the 4th August 1914109
 
. Despite these exceptions Government policy at this 
early war stage was reactive and to intervene only at selected points in the economy as it 
was still committed to the doctrines of free trade and individualism. To implement this 
‘business as usual’ policy the War Office or the Admiralty were given by the Treasury 
virtually unlimited spending power and it was hoped that by offering sufficiently high 
prices, the supplies of armaments and munitions would be forthcoming. 
5.2 Geography and Cluster Structure 
 
Map1 (overleaf) depicts the early war cluster of armament and munition firms and the 
support institutions and infrastructure serving their needs by December 1914110
 
. It is 
further complemented with Table 7 which provides a summary of each firm, their 
address and the munitions (if known) they were producing at this time. In addition, the 





                                                 
109 May (1996) An Economic and Social History of Britain 1760-1990. p335. 
110 Referring to the Legend on Map 1, firms were categorized into small, medium or large firms by the 
size of their workforce: A small firm being less than 100 employees; a medium sized firm being between 
101 and 500 employees; and a large firm being one which possessed 501or more. NA MUN5/101/360/16 
July 1915 - July 1918 was a useful national survey which gave the number of employees for some local 
firms during the war. For firms not included, other archival sources such as company records, histories or 
thesis and building plans were used (see bibliography). Where no figure could be located, an 
approximation of workforce size was assigned by examining the size of a firm’s premises and the nature 
of the work they were undertaking from mainly map, building plan and photographic evidence.




Table 7: Coventry’s Armaments and Munitions Cluster by December 1914
Firms
noitcudorP snoitinuM dna stnemamrA raW ylraEedarT lapicnirPsserddA yrotcaFemaN ynapmoCoN
10 to & secanruF ,sesserP rewoP ,sremmaH tnetaPsrerutcafunaM remmaH porDdaoR gnirpS ,skroW llihseloF.dtL .oC retfiL tnetaP s'tterB her installation plants together with accessories and spare parts
13 British Chuck & Piston Ring Co. Sandy Lane (Right-hand East-side after bridge) Chuck & Piston Ring Manufacturers Producing Piston Rings for Motor Vehicle Engines & also Piston Castings, Shackle Bolts & Gudgeon Pins.
16 senalporea & selcihev rof sotengaMsreenignE lacirtcelE & s'otengaMteertS droF rewoL.dtL .oC notsuoH-nospmohT hsitirB
23 sredliuB ydoB rotoMteertS kraP hcuM 921 & 821.dtL seidoB htrowselrahC Rebuilt commandeered Coventry and other town & city's public transport Buses into War Department Lorries. Also manufacturing 100s of Ambulance Bodies, Staff Cars, Field Kitchens & Lorries for British & Allied Governments
25 4191 tsuguA morf strap oreA & sevlaV enignE oreAsevlaV enignE oreA & enignEegaraG teertS daorB 481-281sgnittiF & rotoM rodnoC
36 gniriaper gnidulcni ,sotengaM4191 .tse sotengaMteertS noinU a51.dtL .oC otengaM yrtnevoC
42 paT ,sehctiwS rotoM ,straP enalporeA etacileDeppoP & etihW ot sreilppus & stnemevoM hctaWteertS nopS.dtL ,.oC tnemevoM yrtnevoC s, Petrol & Oil Indicators, Grease Cups, Nuts & Bolts & other components
44 - 46 hS ,sreztiwoH ,snuG dleiF ,sesuFserutcafunaM looT llamS & stnemamrAdaoR ecnandrO 11 ,skroW ecnandrO.dtL skroW ecnandrO yrtnevoC ells, Tubes & spare parts  & B.E.2a,b & B.E.8 Aeroplanes
51 selcihev ymrA rof srotaidaR epyt yvaeh gnirutcafunaMsrotaidaR elciheV rotoMteertS nalgaR ,skroW nalgaRdtL .oC rotaidaR yrtnevoC
60 & 61 senignE & elciheV laicremmoC ,racrotoMskroW drofdaR & enaL ydnaS ,slliM rotoM.dtL .oC relmiaD Cars & Lorries of all types for Military use including around 1,000 Ambulances & Staff Cars B.E.2c Aeroplanes and Gnome and R.A.F.1a Aero Engines
76 sttuB ehT ,salliV samohT .tS.dtL derflA trebreH
77 llihseloF ,daoR lanaC ,skroW kciwgdE.dtL derflA trebreH
78  lainoloC rof ylniam ,selcycrotoM noitanibmoCsrerutcafunaM noitanibmoC & elcycrotoMdrahcrO tseW 25 ,slliM noiblA.dtL sdoowelzaH war service
86 selcyciB & snehctiK dleiFsrerutcafunaM enignE & selcycrotoM ,sraCekotS ,skroW rebmuH.dtL rebmuH
95 eciffO raW eht rof seirroL rotoMselciheV laicremmoC & sraCdaoR notniuQ & ediskraP.dtL .oC rotoM yalsduaM
96  eht dna smrif ot smeti rehtaeL gniylppuSsrerutcafunaM draugduM & elddaS elcyCteertS kraP elttiL 98-78dtL hgulpmaL & eromelddiM War Office
101 smrif racrotoM eht ot sotengaMsotengaM & sreenignE lacirtcelEenaL tsruhkcoL 052 ,skroW notlraCdtL retsiL & sirroM
102 slooT llamS & slooT enihcaM ,seguaG ,senignE,srekaM looT enihcaM & sreenignEteertS xoC ,skroW raeG ehT 931 & 731revaeW & notroM
106 eniatnoC fleS not5 ,snogaW tropsnarT tnemnrevoGsredliuB ydoB rotoMteertS kraP elttiL 201-101 & drahcrO tseW 84.dtL samohT ,ssaP d Trailers, Ambulances & Service Cars
112 & 113 skcurt rehto & s'yalsduaM rof srotaidaRsrotaidaReromselyehC ,enaL eliM & )4191( teertS nosleN.oC rotaidaR eldnaR
116 - 118 Riley Motor Co. Ltd City Works, St. Nicholas Street & Cunard Works, Aldbourne Road  srac ffats yelssorC ,llahxuaV ,relmiaD rof sleehW eriW dna senignEsrerutcafunaM racrotoM & selcycrotoM
124 Rover Cycle Co. Ltd Fleet Works & St. John’s Works, & Reliance Foundry, 42 Spon Street eciffO tsoP eht rof 0001 & eciffO raW eht rof selcyciB 0001srerutcafunaM selcyC
127 Rudge-Whitworth Ltd. Rudge Works, Crow Lane & 34 Spon Street & 36 Hertford Street Cycle & Motorcycle Manufacturers
400 Motorcycles for the Russian Army. (9th -20th Oct.1914) 
& 400 Motorcycles for the Belgium Army (1914-early1915)
133 Siddeley-Deasy Motor Co. Ltd 51 Parkside & 128 Much Park Street (Experimental work at Charlesworth Bodies) secnalubmA ph81 ysaeD-yeleddiS & snehctiK dleiF ,seirroL hgielenotSsrerutcafunaM enignE & racrotoM
148 & 149 Triumph Cycle Co. Ltd. Triumph Works, Priory Street, Much Park Street & Dale Street ymrA hsitirB eht rof selcycrotoMsrerutcafunaM elcycrotoM & elcyC
160 stekcoS llehS .rdp81 & seidoB 08 esuFsreenignE rotoM & sredliuB enignEllihseloF ,enaL tsruhkcoL.dtL eppoP & etihW
Support Institutions and Infrastructure
Letter erutcurtsarfnI ro noitutitsnI fo epyTsserddAerutcurtsarfnI ro noitutitsnI troppuS
C Cycle and Motor Cycle Manufacturers & Trader's Union Ltd The Towers, Warwick Road Pre-war Business Support Institution
D erutcurtsarfnI tnemtiurceR ruobaL raw-erPteertS droF rewoLegnahcxE ruobaL
E llaH ymrA s'noilattaB tnediseRdaoR airotciV neeuQllaH llirD
H Coventry Chambers of Commerce 9 Masonic Buildings, Little Park Street Pre-war Business Support Institution
L bulC laicoS etavirP dehsilbatsEdaoR s'neeuQbulC ytnuoC & yrtnevoC
Cycle, Motorcycle & Motorcar Manufacturers = 9 Component Manufacturers = 11 Machine Tool Manufacturers = 4
 5 = erutcurtsarfnI dna snoitutitsnI troppuS 0 = smriF gnikroW lateM 1 = latoT srerutcafunaM tnemamrA
The Complete Early War Armaments and Munitions Cluster                                      30 Firms and Support Institutions or Infrastructure
Machine Tool Makers & Iron founders Machine Tools such as Capstan lathes for Russian Government and various types for the British Government
Sources: See Bibliography
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Map 1 reveals the late 1914 cluster was around 4sq. miles in size and included 25 
engineering firms or slightly over 13 percent of the total number within the city. Out of 
this 25 it was dominated by cycle, motorcycle and motorcar assemblers and their 
component suppliers who together accounted for 80 percent of this early war armaments 
and munitions cluster. In terms of the types of firms immediately embracing munitions 
production, they tended to be the larger firms within their sector e.g. White & Poppe 
[160] (components and engine manufacturer), Rudge-Whitworth [127] and Triumph 
[148 & 149] (cycles and motorcycles) and Daimler [60 & 61] or Humber [86] (motor 
vehicles). Also they tended to be limited liability companies accountable to shareholders 
and governed by boards of directors. Their locations were mixed being both established 
pre-war premises in the inner-city and on the city’s edge. There were also noticeable 
omissions of any participant firms in the South Western areas of Earlsdon and 
Chapelfields.  
 
Isolated local clustering can be observed in certain areas including the Parkside area of 
the city where the Randle Radiator Company [113], Maudslay Motor Company Ltd. 
[95], Rover Company Ltd. [125] and the Siddeley-Deasy Motor Company Ltd. [133] 
were all located in close proximity. Map 1 also demonstrates that there were minimal 
support institutions and infrastructure specifically within the cluster to serve the 
wartime needs of firms. Therefore the cluster had to rely on the existing pre-war 
infrastructure, for example, the Labour Exchange [D] for labour recruitment.  
 
5.3 Ownership and Control 
 
In 1914 industrial mobilisation and co-ordination could only be instigated locally 
through formal entities such as the Coventry Chambers of Commerce (C.C.C.) [H] or 
the Cycle and Motor Cycle Manufacturers and Traders Union Limited 
(C.M.C.M.T.U.L) [C] or informally through the Coventry and County Club [L]. Arising 
from the Chambers of Commerce, one immediate step was the formation of a Coventry 
Emergency Committee (C.E.C.) to deal with ‘situations that may arise from the war’.   
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It comprised an executive committee and reporting to this executive committee were 
five ward committees and numerous other sub-committees covering such things as 
distress, insurance, education and labour supply. What this meant to the forming and 
operation of the cluster at this time was minimal intervention into the business activities 
of firms, both for those turning to armaments and munitions production and those 
continuing with their private work. In essence the early war armaments and munitions 
cluster had weak local and national control and firms were left to either carry on 




5.4 Armaments and Munitions Production 
 
Coventry industry was recognised as an important supplier for any forthcoming war as 
two days before war was declared meetings were held in the city between War Office 
officials and the local motor manufacturers. Arrangements were made with these 
companies to supply large quantities of cars and motor cycles from their stocks112
 
. 
These early arrangements were to provide vehicular transport the newly mobilizing 
army to reach France and to keep them supplied. Figures 13 and 14 (overleaf) entitled 
‘Animated scenes at the Daimler works at Coventry consequent upon the declaration of 
war’ and ‘A fleet of Daimler chassis which were prepared in two days notice’ depict 









                                                 
111 Coventry Herald (Hereafter C.H.) 4-5th September 1914. The full composition of this Committee and 
a discussion of its role are given in Chapter 6 section 1.3. 
112 Wilkins (c.1919) Journal of the European War 1914-19.  
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Figures 13 and 14: Motor Vehicle Requisition & Production 1914 
    
 
 
Sources: The Motor 18th August 1914 p86 and p88. These photographs 
  appear to be taken at Daimlers Radford factory [61] on Map1. 
    Note: The top-right photograph (labelled 2) also appears to show War Office  
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Immediate requisition, such as that depicted, meant these manufacturers had their 
domestic and export trade halted within weeks of war being declared. In the same 
month Daimler supplied 200 vehicles from their national network of depots, showrooms 
and repair shops and another 100 from their two factories in Coventry demonstrating 
immediately their significance to the war effort113. It is recorded that the British 
Expeditionary Force took with them 842 motorized vehicles to France during August 




Similarly bicycle production also received immediate orders with one example being 
with the New Rover Cycle Company fulfilling two large government orders for their 
bicycles between August and October 1914, the first being for the War Office and 
second for the Post Office115. Coventry machine tool firms were also frantically meeting 
war orders both domestic and foreign. Alfred Herbert’s two factories received 
acknowledgement in the local press that they had manufactured and dispatched a large 
consignment of capstan lathes for the Allied Russian Government. As the 
accompanying photograph shows overleaf the shortage of vehicular transport meant 
they had to be sent from the city by horse and cart. Also for British war needs the 
Brett’s Patent Lifter Company was manufacturing and installed drop hammers at a 











                                                 
113 Frost (1920) Munitions of War 
114 Fitzpatrick (1998) The Bicycle in Wartime  p89.  
115 C.H. September 19th 1914, CG October 23rd 1914 and C.G. March 5th 1915. The Post Office order was 
to replace their earlier requisitioned bicycles. 
116 The Engineer 30th October 1914 pp412-413 
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Figure 15: Capstan Lathes for the Russian Government 1914 
 
        Source: Coventry Graphic 23rd October 1914 p13. 
                                        
Before the war Humber Ltd, the Coventry Ordnance Works and the Coventry Victor 
Company had all experimented with aircraft production but failed to make it 
commercially successful117. By June 1914 (2 months before war was declared) the 
Coventry Ordnance Works had received a small order from the Military Wing for 17 
machines118. By August and the onset of war, the Daimler Company also established 
their production in the city. In that same month Britain possessed just 272 aeroplanes in 
service with the Royal Flying Corps (R.F.C.) and the Royal Navy Air Service (R.N.A.S) 
respectively119
                                                 
117 Smith & Fry (1997) Godiva's heritage  p64-66, Lewis (1962) British Aircraft & Smith (2004) 
Warwickshire Airfield 
. This deficiency was immediately exploited by Daimler who opened into 
negotiations with the French Gnome Engine Company on the 7th August 1914 to 
manufacture their aero-engine under license in Britain. Having received a prototype 
engine from Hendon to dismantle, examine and copy by the end of September they had 
manufactured and assembled its 1,100 pieces and the first British Gnome aero-engine 
was manufactured in Coventry.  
118 N.A. AIR1/764/204/4/199. 
119 Dewar (1921) The Great Munition Feat Ch.8 pp187-188. 
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The firm also accepted orders on the 30th of August 1914 from the Royal Aircraft 
Factory to manufacture its R.A.F.1 engine and B.E.2c aeroplanes120. Once this new 
production was underway, Daimler was now fast becoming the leading commercial 
engineering firm in Britain to enter into aero-engine and aeroplane manufacture121
 
. 
Before the war Britain had relied on supplies of high-tension magnetos from the Robert 
Bosch Company in Germany. With this supply now cut off, the motoring press and 
local institutions, such as the Coventry Chambers of Commerce, stressed the need to 
establish a British magneto industry to supply this vital ignition component122. British 
Thompson Houston (B.T.H.) [16] and Morris and Lister [101] immediately responded 
and entered into manufacturing magnetos copying the existing Bosch types123. In 
addition the small firm of Coventry Magneto was able to repair and adapt existing 
stocks to further increase the supply locally124. B.T.H received their first war order for 
300 sleeve type magnetos from the War Office in November of 1914 and these would 
be particularly adapted for use in military aircraft125. Other motor component firms 
operated as they had been doing before the outbreak of war with them continuing on 
supplying radiators or piston rings to the automotive firms. However, it is likely these 
would now have been almost exclusively for military vehicles. One area of departure 
was for the city’s motor body builders who were tasked with much urgency to convert a 
variety of civilian vehicles for war use. In this respect large numbers of Britain’s public 




At the beginning of hostilities, White and Poppe, unlike other component firms in the 
city, adapted and embraced munitions production immediately.  
                                                 
120 Hare (1999) Aeroplanes of the Royal Aircraft Factory Chapter 2. 
121 The proceeding Daimler story has been summarised from the following: Frost (1920), Nixon (1946),  
Smith (1972), Montagu & Burgess-Wise (1995) ‘Sleeve valves go to War’ and Long (1995) Chapter 5: 
Daimler goes to war. 
122 The Motor 25th August 1914 pp109-110, 1st September 1914 pp136-137, 22nd September 1914 p211 
and Coventry Chambers of Commerce (C.C.C.) Minutes August 1914.  
123 M.R.C. MSS.242/BT/9/11 
124 C.C.C. Minutes October 1914,  
125 B.T.H. (undated) Our Part in the World War p52. 
126 Coventry and its Industries: Official Handbook 1918 p42. 
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On the eve of war they were noted to have a workforce of 350 which was manufacturing 
carburettors, light car engines (mainly for Morris Motors) and a War Office subsidy 
engines127. With the outbreak of war they began preparatory work such as drawing up 
operation sheets for the manufacture of fuse bodies and they overhauled and adapted 
their machinery and also tools and jigs were supervised and repaired. On the 24th of 
August the Newcastle firm of Armstrong, Whitworth & Company Ltd. sub-contracted 
to them an order to manufacture 10,000 type 80 Mk.V fuse bodies and the same number 
of 18pdr. sockets per week128
 
.  
Therefore they ceased engine and carburettors manufacture and all their available space 
was given over to these new munitions contracts. In October the demand for fuse-bodies 
had increased to 25,000 each week, and alongside demands for a Subsidy engine 
program, space was now most congested in their Lockhurst Lane factory [160]. Inside 
machines were so tightly packed together it was described as impossible to walk 
through the machine shops without being splashed with lubricant.  By December fuse-
body demand had increased to 43,000 per week alongside 10,000 shell sockets per week 
and the firm noted their Transport and Progress department was bursting apart with 
stacked fuse-bodies, sockets and engine parts129
 
. 
Activity was just frenetic at the Coventry Ordnance Works (C.O.W.) [44, 45& 46] 
where just before war was declared they were undertaking the manufacture of 4.5-inch 
field howitzers for the Canadian government and now were receiving numerous 
additional contracts. As Table 8 summarizes their resources were geared to fulfilling 
early contracts for fuses and many more howitzers for the War Office. Additionally they 





                                                 
127 The Limit, and Hassell (2003) White & Poppe Ltd. 
128 Richardson (1977) Twentieth Century Coventry p78-79. 
129 The Limit 
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Table 8: Coventry Ordnance Works (C.O.W.) Armaments and Munitions Contracts 1914-1915 
Date Contract No. Armament or Munition Price Quantity 
Delivery Rates 
 (per week) Delivery Dates 
09.04.1914 Canadian Government 
4.5" Howitzers, 
cartridges, shells  
& stores 
£288.6.8d 24*  
Half by 31.03.1915, 
remainder by 
31.03.1916 
15.8.1914 F/2288 Fuse No.80 £60.0.0 per 100 116, 000   
24.08.1914 F/2338 Fuse No.82 £75.0.0 per 100 30, 000   
13.10.1914 G/1653 & G/1661 4.5" Howitzers 
£2329.10.0 total  
per Howitzer 200 
5 increasing  
to 12 13.13.1914-10.05.1915 
13.10.1914 G/1719 & G/1728 4.5" Howitzers 
£2429.10.0 total  
per Howitzer† 100 at least 12 10.05.1914-31.06.1915 
28.10.1914 75/7/9403 Fuse No.80 £65.0.0 per 100 150, 000   
29.10.1914 F/2544 Fuse No.82 £85.0.0 per 100 50, 000   
30.10.1914 G/1748 4.5" Howitzers £2429.10.0 total  per Howitzer† 150   
11.01.1915 94/G/32 4.5" Howitzers  and spares 
This was a higher price 
than G/1748 200   
† The price was increased by £100 as this extra money was sanctioned for additional plant 
* Orders placed by the War Office & Ministry occupied the whole of C.O.W.'s capacity and this order was transferred to the Imperial 
Government. 
The Orders for ammunition and stores were cancelled on 02.01.1917.  
The fuses, however, were delivered to the War Office and the guns to the Ministry during 1916. 
            Sources: NA MUN7/137, MUN5/373/1200/1, H.M.S.O. (1920) History of the Ministry of Munitions Pt. 1 Chapter III p84. 
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Section B – Coventry’s Armaments and Munitions Local Industrial Cluster  
April - December 1915 
 
5.5 Historical Context 
 
As the War continued on into 1915 the policy of ‘business as usual’ and non-industrial 
intervention failed to meet the military demand, particularly for munitions. In fact 
deficiencies in munitions supply began with the very first recruiting drives of the war 
during late 1914 and progressively got worse as the army grew in size and offensive 
followed offensive. By March 1915, political pressure for the physical control of British 
industry became overwhelming when after the failure of the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, 
Colonel Charles Repington, a war correspondent with The Times, reported: ‘We had not 
sufficient high explosive to level his parapets to the ground, after the French [and 
German] practice....The want of an unlimited supply of high explosive [shell] was a 
fatal bar to our success’130
 
. This battle report highlighted the lack of capacity in British 
industry which was severely hampering Britain’s ability to wage the type of artillery 
warfare that was now necessary. The blame was laid at the feet of the War Office and in 
particular Lord Kitchener the Secretary of State for War.  
Therefore a ‘shells crisis’ scandal ensued. It became apparent that the over-reliance on 
the already existing armament firms was a critical error: ‘the Army ought to have 
received by May 15th [1915], according to contract [from the armament firms], 481,000 
H.E. 18-pounder shells. Instead of that, only 52,000, or very little more than one-tenth 
of the whole, were delivered’131
Herbert 
Asquith
. This was to have a profound impression on public 
opinion in Britain. As a result the Liberal government fell on 25th May 1915 and a new 
coalition government established (under the continuing Prime Minister 
).  
                                                 
130 The Times 04-05-1915 emphasis added. For an in-depth discussion on the ‘Shells crisis’ see George 
(1933) Vol.1, H.M.S.O. (1920) Official History of the Ministry of Munitions Vol.I & Dewar (1921) The 
Great Munition Feat 
131 Prime Minister Herbert Asquith speaking on 03-06-1919 as cited in Dewar (1921) p32, emphasis 
added. 
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Within the government a complete reorganisation of military procurement and industrial 
organisation was set in motion by creating a new department, the Ministry of Munitions 
(M.O.M.), and its responsibility handed to David Lloyd George.  
 
From its inception Lloyd George saw that this new Ministry needed increasing control 
into all areas which the previous organisation had failed to come to terms with. One of 
the first and most important for an engineering city such as Coventry was the problems 
of a shortage of male workers in the engineering trade. To remedy this shortage their 
recruitment into the army was blocked and skilled men in engineering firms became a 
‘protected’ occupation via a system of exemption badges. Having stopped the exit of the 
most valuable section of the country’s workforce, something had to be done to facilitate 
an expanded munitions industry132. To this end Lloyd George accomplished an 
agreement with the representatives of the trade unions who now would permit labour 
‘dilution’. This was the substitution of skilled labour with semi-skilled or unskilled men 
and women and the unions also relinquished, for the duration of the war, other trade 
union practices which might have restricted output. These included the right of the 
worker to leave his/her job without the permission of the firm and any right to strike 
was replaced by arbitration. In return the trade unions obtained a guarantee that these 
powers would be restored at the end of hostilities and also that they could only be 
enforced in government “controlled establishments”133
 
. 
By September 1915 the Ministry pushed forward this policy with all haste and already 
had 715 of Britain’s main engineering companies as “controlled establishments”, 14 of 
which were in Coventry. By utilising this form of centralised ‘top down’ control, the 
Ministry now had an unprecedented degree of economic control. It would now also be 
possible for them to build new national factories to manufacture shells and fuses in 
unprecedented quantities. 
                                                 
132 Pollard (1973) p44-45 
133 This term simply meant that the factory or firm was commandeered by the Ministry of Munitions and 
therefore prohibited to undertake any private work. Thus its entire labour force and machinery were 
dedicated to munitions contracts and furthermore no one could leave without acquiring a leaving 
certificate. Generally speaking the more valuable to the war effort the firms output was the sooner it 
became a “controlled establishment”. 
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 They further had the power to draw into this expanding munitions industry semi-skilled 
and unskilled labour particularly women. These powers were enforced by numerous 
Acts of Parliament including the 1914, 1914 Consolidation and 1915 Defence of the 
Realm Acts, the Shells and Fuses Agreement, 5th March 1915 and the Ministry of War 
Act 1915 all of which are summarized in Annex 2-5. 
 
5.6 Geography and Cluster Structure 
Map2 (overleaf) depicts the mid-war cluster of armament and munition firms and 
support institutions and infrastructure serving their needs by December 1915. It is 
further complemented with Table 9 which provides a summary of each firm, their 
address and the munitions they were producing at this time134
 
. In addition, the key 
support institutions and infrastructure, serving their needs are outlined:
 








                                                 
134 The type of munition being produced is only given in Table 12 if this could be ascertained. Further if 
the munition type being produced had changed since Table 10 any new products are also given. 

Firms
noitcudorP snoitinuM dna stnemamrA raW-diMedarT lapicnirPsserddA yrotcaFemaN ynapmoCoN
2 lucirgA & selibomotuA ,senignE-oreA ,tfarcriA rof sgnigroF porDsregroF porD llihseloF ,daoR gnirpS.dtL .oC sgnigroF porD noiblA tural Manufacturers
4 aimatoposeM & naissuR ,hsitirB rof selcycrotoMsrerutcafunaM elcycrotoMdaoR dnaldiM ,etis skroW ecnandrOdtL skroW leirA
5 srerutcafunaM eniwT & epoR woR rehctuB a81 .dtL ,snoS & nhoJ ,yeltsA Equipments for troops
6 reA yratoR rof yliramirp sgniraeB llaBrerutcafunaM tnenopmoC dna sgniraeB llaB teertS daeR & teertS dooH.dtL .oC yrenihcaM otuA o Engines & Shell Driving Bands
8 .dtL skroW ecnandrO yrtnevoC eht ot sebuT noitcirF T gniylppuSseirosseccA elcyC & rotoMyrtnevoC raen ,notsloWsrehtorB lemeulB
10 o & secanruF ,sesserP rewoP ,sremmaH tnetaPsrerutcafunaM remmaH porD daoR gnirpS ,skroW llihseloF.dtL .oC retfiL tnetaP s'tterB ther installation plants together with accessories and spare parts
11 sgnigroF porDenaL llanraH 75dtL .oC gnipmatS s'tterB Unknown
12 sreenignE & srednuoF muinimulA teertS lleW & teertS xoC 23.oC yrdnuoF ainnatirB Delicate Aeroplane Cylinders, 15-inch Shell castings, Aluminium Parts for Submarines,  Phosphor Bronze Gun-Carriage Bearings and numerous other castings for the Admiralty & War Office
13 tsiP gnicudorP ssaMsrerutcafunaM gniR notsiP & kcuhCegdirb retfa edis-tsaE dnah thgiR enaL ydnaS.oC gniR notsiP & kcuhC hsitirB on Rings for Motor Vehicles & Aero Engines & also Piston Castings, Shackle Bolts &Gudgeon Pins.
16 aG osla dna senalporeA ,selciheV rof sotengaMsreenignE lacirtcelE & s'otengaMteertS droF rewoL.dtL .oC notsuoH-nospmohT hsitirB uge Manufacture
17 seirosseccA & slooT ,spmaL rotoMseirosseccA rotoM & relaeD looT ,regnomnorI elaselohWairotciV neeuQ 031.oC & .R tsruhdaorB
18 B yraidnecnIsreenignE & sracrotoM ,sracediS)skroW emaS( teertS nopS ,draY sremraF & teertS revoD.dtL .oC gnireenignE mahgnikcuB ullets for use in Machine Guns
19 sllehS .E.H 5.4 & rdp81 rof )"2 eloH esuF( sgulP tisnarT nedooWsrenruT dooW teertS yareuqceV ,skroW airotciV noS & .H ,egdibruB
20 spoort ot tnes seilppus doof rof snotrac repaPsrekaM xoB & sretnirP teertS kraP elttiL & enaL woC 71,01 .dtL snoS & .T llihsuB
21 secnalubmA rof sissahC ph81srerutcafunaM racrotoM & elcyC teertS drofsoG raF 561.dtL .sorB ttoclaC
23 sredliuB ydoB rotoM teertS kraP hcuM 921 & 821.dtL seidoB htrowselrahC
Rebuilding commandeered Coventry and other town Buses & Public Transport into War Department Lorries. 
Manufacturing 100s of Ambulance Bodies, Staff Cars, Field Kitchens, Lorries for British 
& Allied Governments & Motor Bodies for Austin cars for Russian Government
24 Challenge Cycle & Motor Co. Ltd. Challenge Works, 201-269 Foleshill Road, Cycle & Motorcycle Manufacturers Unknown
25 4191 tsuguA ecnis strap oreA & sevlaV enignE oreAsevlaV enignE oreA/ enignEegaraG teertS daorB 481-281sgnittiF & rotoM rodnoC
28 sratroM hcnerT sekotSselcycrotoM xeR & sredliuB ydoB rotoMnodslraE ,daoR nrobsO.dtL .oC rotoM emcA yrtnevoC
31 seirosseccA & sniahC noissimsnarTdnE nopS ,skroW niahC.dtL .oC niahC yrtnevoC 18pdr & 2.75-inch Shells for the Coventry Armaments Output Commitee & 1000s of Fuses& Wooden Transit Plugs (Fuse hole 2-inch) No.3 mk.II From October 1915
32 srekaM looT enihcaM & eguaGnodslraE ,teertS kciwraW.dtL .oC looT llamS & eguaG yrtnevoC Gauges & Small Tools
33 & 34 selcycrotoM & selcyciBdaoR llihseloF 962-102 & teertS nlocniL 4dtL .oC rotoM & elcyC elgaE yrtnevoC Unknown
36 Coventry Magneto Co. Ltd. 15a Union Street & Fleetwood Works, Greyfriars Lane Magnetos est. 1914 Magnetos, mainly repairing
39 H rof srotaidaR muinimulA tsaCsrerutcafunaM seirosseccA rotoMdaoR tforC & teertS drofsoG raF 501-401.oC sgnittiF rotoM yrtnevoC eavy War Transport Vehicles for Daimler and other firms.
40 sgnitsaC rotoM fo srerutcafunaM)edis-htroN( ,teertS daeR.oC yrdnuoF rotoM yrtnevoC Unknown
42 paT ,sehctiwS rotoM ,straP enalporeA etacileDeppoP & etihW ot sreilppus & stnemevoM hctaWteertS nopS.dtL ,.oC tnemevoM yrtnevoC s, Petrol & Oil Indicators, Grease Cups, Nuts & Bolts & other components
44 - 46 serutcafunaM looT llamS & stnemamrAdaoR ecnandrO 11 ,skroW ecnandrO.dtL skroW ecnandrO yrtnevoC Filling empty primers manufactured through the COVENTRY ARMAMENTS OUTPUT COMMITEE. & Ministry of Munitions., Field Howitzers, Naval Guns, Shells & Fuses, B.E.2a,b, B.E.8a & R.E.7 Aeroplanes
48 ,krowsserp eht gnikatrednu ylekil tsoMsrekrowsserP & srehsiloP ,sretalP teertS droF rewoL .dtL .oC krowsserP & gnitalP yrtnevoC  plating & polishing  for radiators for Army vehicles for the Coventry Radiator Co.
49 & 50 snoitinuM nwonknUsrerutcafunaM racrotoM & selcycrotoM ,selcyCteertS nlocniL 8 & sdleiflliH ,teertS daeR 01.dtL reimerP yrtnevoC  & Bicycles
51 selcihev ymrA rof srotaidaR epyt yvaeh gnikaMsrotaidaR elciheV rotoMteertS nalgaR ,skroW nalgaRdtL .oC rotaidaR yrtnevoC
52 rerutcafunaM tnenopmoCteertS yrubretnaC ,skroW nalgaR.dtL .oC noititepeR yrtnevoC Turnbuckles, Pins, Stream Line Wires, Fork Ends, Eye Bolts, Universal Joints & Propeller Bolts. Small Screws, Studs, Nuts, Washers, Special Bolts, Including the many important parts of an Engine, such as Connecting-Rod Bolts.
55 Coventry Swaging Co. Ltd. White Friars Mills (Needle), Whitefriars Lane Spokes, Nipples & Sewing Machine Needles Unknown
60 & 61 im rof sepyt lla fo seirroL & sraCsenignE & elciheV laicremmoC ,racrotoMskroW drofdaR & enaL ydnaS ,slliM rotoM.dtL .oC relmiaD litary use. B.E.2c & B.E.12 Aeroplanes & Gnome, R.A.F.4a, R.A.F.4d & Beardmore 120hp Aero Engines
65 EETIMMOC TUPTUO STNEMAMRA YRTNEVOC eht rof sllehS .E.H 5.4srekaM miR & leehWedis-htroN teertS amlA.dtL .oC leehW dna miR polnuD  and  wheel rims for Aeroplanes & Military Vehicles
66 OC TUPTUO STNEMAMRA YRTNEVOC eht rof sllehS .E.H 5.4srerutcafunaM seirosseccA rotoMedis-htuoS teertS amlA.dtL .oC rebbuR polnuD MMITEE and  wheel rims for Aeroplanes & Military Vehicles
69 C rof sllehs .E.H rednuop-81sgnisserP & slooT sserP retal & sreenignE edis tsaE dnah thgiR ,daoR airotciV neeuQ 611noS & remraF OVENTRY ARMAMENTS OUTPUT COMMITEE & Laminations for Magnetos
72 muinimulA ni sgnitsaC suorref-noNsevotS saG & sretaeH lamrehT ,sreteM saGllihseloF ,daoR llihseloFdtL ,sreteM saG nosliW egroeG  & Gun-Metal specialised in and made for Motor, Aeroplane Engines, Gun Fittings, Shell parts & Mines
74  deilppus osla & shpmuirT rof sracediS gniylppuSsrerutcafunaM racediS & elcyCteertS kraP hcuM 31-21 neewteBdtL .oC elcyC airolG for the War Dept. Gloria Pigeon carrying Sidecars for use in communications
76 & 77 Herbert Alfred Ltd. St. Thomas Villas, The Butts & Edgwick Works, Canal Road, Foleshill sitirB eht rof sepyt suoirav dna tnemnrevoG naissuR rof sehtal natspaC sa hcus slooT enihcaMsrednuof norI & srekaM looT enihcaM h Government
78 noloC eht rof ylniam ,selcycrotoM noitanibmoCsrerutcafunaM noitanibmoC & elcycrotoMdrahcrO tseW 25 ,slliM noiblA.dtL sdoowelzaH ies
80 srerutcafunaM racrotoMdaoR rebmuH.dtL .oC rotoM namlliH Unknown
81 srecudorP llehSteertS droF rewoL)ehT( yrotcaF llehS namlliH High Explosive Shell Cases.
83 ciffO raW ,ytlarimdA eht rof snuG enihcaMsrerutcafunaM snuG enihcaM)edis-htuoS( teertS drofsoG ,skroW yrellitrAeiC te ssikhctoH e & Ministry of Munitions & also supplying to Allied countries
86 srerutcafunaM enignE ,selcycrotoM ,sraCekotS ,skroW rebmuH.dtL rebmuH 18pdr & 4.5-inch High Explosive Artillery Shells for C.A.O.C., French Mortar Bombs, Field Kitchens; Contract on the 30th August 1915 for 150,000 Gaines, Artillery Draught Poles; Aeroplanes Avro 504a/k & 100s of 'wicked-looking steel darts for throwing from aircraft'
87 srekamhctaW)edis-htuoS( daoR ynablA ,"aitevlaH"retseroF .F.I Chronometers for the Admiralty
88 srerutcafunaM elbaC cirtcelE & eriW )edis-tsaE( teertS kraP hcuM 32 .oC & .E ,reklaK Shells from mid 1915 likely for the COVENTRY ARMAMENTS OUTPUT COMMITEE., No. IIA Special Magneto cables and Armoured Electric Lighting and High & Low Tension Ignition Cables For Automobiles & Aircraft
91 moC spihS ,seodeproT rof sleweJsrerutcafunaM leweJ lacirtcelE & hctaWseitreporp dn2 & ts1 edis tsaE ,teertS revoD 7.oC & .F eeL passes & Electrical Meters
95 selciheV laicremmoC & sraC daoR notniuQ & ediskraP.dtL .oC rotoM yalsduaM Type ‘A’ Subsidy Lorries for the War Office, Post Office, The Great Western, Great Eastern, Midland & Great North of Scotland Railway Companies, Lever Bros. and others & Aero Engine Components
96 idlos rof dedeen smeti rehtaeL gniylppuSsrerutcafunaM draugduM & elddaS elcyCteertS kraP elttiL 98-78 dtL hgulpmaL & eromelddiM ers equipment to the War Office & Admiralty
97 & 98 Mills-Fulford Ltd. Crown Works, Stoney Stanton Road, & Progress Works, 287 Stoney Stanton Road mrA' gnicudorp sa detsil osla & proC gniylF layoR eht rof tropsnarT reciffO rof sracediS gniylppuSsrerutcafunaM racediS & elcyC aments'
100 srerutcafunaM racediS teertS droF rewoL  11-9 neewteBsracediS yremogtnoM Sidecars for the military & Triumph
101 & selcihev rof sotengaMsotengaM & sreenignE lacirtcelE enaL tsruhkcoL 052 ,skroW notlraC)sotengaM LM retal( dtL retsiL & sirroM  aeroplanes
102  teertS xoC ,skroW raeG ehT 931 & 731revaeW & notroM Engineers and Machine Tool Makers, & Early Aeroplane Manufacturers
Gauges, machine tools, small tools and gear cutting for the Allies.
Also producing Victor Engines to be used as auxiliaries in aeroplanes and bombing sights for aircraf
103 srerutcafunaM otengaMdrahcrO tseW ,skroW airotciV.dtL ,etacidnyS otengaM LM Magnetos for vehicles & aeroplanes
104 selcycrotoM & selcyCytreporp dn2 edis htron ,daoR tforCskroW elcyC agemO Hotchkiss machine gun bodies
106 & 107 iatnoC fleS noT5 ,snogaW tropsnarT tnemnrevoGsredliuB ydoB rotoM teertS kraP elttiL 201-101 & drahcrO tseW 84 .dtL samohT ,ssaP ned Trailers, Ambulances and Service Cars. Also Bodies for Maudslay Motor Lorries
109 rotoM ,seirroL rotoM ,senalporeA rof emas gnikaMsniP noegduG & snotsiP )ytreporp ts1 edis-htroN( teertS drofsoG raF.dtL snotsiP cars & Motorcycles in Iron, Steel or Aluminium
111 Priory Accessories (Spencer Bros. from 1918 onwards) Priory Mill, Priory Street Reed, Slay, Harness & Motor Accessories Manufactu tnempiuqe bew yratilim rof syals leets nrettap-yvaeHrer
112 & 113 seirrol rehto dna yalsduaM rof srotaidaRsrerutcafunaM rotaidaReromselyehC ,enaL eliM & )4191( teertS nosleN .oC rotaidaR eldnaR  & also for aeroplanes
115 selcycrotoM & sraC daoR enruobsO ,skroW nodslraE.dtL .oC gnirutcafunaM rotoM xeR Stokes Trench Mortars.
116 - 118 Riley Motor Co. Ltd. City Works, St. Nicholas Street & Cunard Works, Aldbourne Road Motorcycles & Motorcar Manufacturers
Wire wheels for Daimler, Vauxhall, Crossley staff cars and other vehicles. 
Aero Engines and Components, including Pistons, and Riley Engines for Generator
120 & 121 Rotherham and Sons Ltd. Gosford Street Works, Bayley Lane & 27 Spon Street (South-side) Watch Manufacturers, Engineers & Motor Components
Supplying T Friction Tubes to Coventry Ordnance Works Ltd. Rifle Clips for cycles, Motor taps, Aeroplane parts, 
Mechanical Clockwork fuses, delicate fuse work for Singers, scientific instruments & various component parts
122 - 126 Rover Co. Ltd. & Rover Cycle Co. Ltd. New Meteor Works, Rover Road. Helen Street, Foleshill. Fleet Works, St. John’s Works, & Foundry 42 Spon Street Motorcycles, Motorcar & Cycle Manufacturers
500 Maudslay Lorries & 1,781 Sunbeam Ambulance & Staff Cars & Spare Parts. (1915-18). Stokes Trench Mortars, Gas Shells, 
Fuses and Tank Transmissions. Bicycles for the War Office & Post Office, 18pdr. Shells & 4.5-inch High Explosive Shells
127 & 128 Rudge-Whitworth Ltd. Rudge Works, Crow Lane, 34 Spon Street & 36 Hertford Street Cycle & Motorcycle Manufacturers
Fuses, Rifle Bullets, Sidecars to the Belgian Army, Sidecar bodies for Italian mountain troops. Aerial Torpedoes of 500lbs to 50lbs. Floating Mines for use at 
sea, Artillery shells, and Machine-gun shields. Barbed Wire Cutters, Carburettors in Aluminium most likely for Aeroplanes. Water Pumps, Landing Gear and 
any Metal Fittings for the B.E.2 Aeroplanes. A few hundred Motorcycles for the Italian Military. Military Motorcycles also for Russia, Belgium, South 
Africa, Australia & New Zealand (during 1915-16). Detachable Wire Wheels for use in Crossley Ambulances, Staff Cars and Aeroplanes.
129 F tfarcriA layoR & eciffO raW ,ytlarimdA eht rof sehctaWsrerutcafunaM hctaW elaselohW daoR dlO yelsellA 16 .snoS & rednaxelA .S actory
131 slooT enihcaM gnillirD laidaR &  gnipahSsreenignE & slooT enihcaMdaoR s'egroeG tSdtL .oC gnireenignE nosleS
133 & 134 Siddeley-Deasy Motor Co. Ltd 51 Parkside & 128 Much Park Street (Experimental aeroplane design work at Charlesworth Bodies) Motorcar & Engine Manufacturers
R.E.7 Aeroplanes, R.A.F. 1a & R.A.F.4a Aero Engines, Stoneleigh Lorries, 
Field Kitchens & Siddeley-Deasy 18hp Ambulances & Cars for the War Office
135 31 & 08.oN sesuF dna srac ffatSsrerutcafunaM raC dna elcyC ,elcycrotoM sdleiflliH ,teertS yrubretnaC 45-05.dtL .oC rotoM regniS 1
136 s’ynapmoC tnempiuqE detaicossA eht rof stnenopmoC 005,1sregroF porDenaL deR ,skroW enaL deR.dtL skroW gnipmatS )samohT( s'htimS  3ton Lorries. Paravanes for Minesweeping for the Admiralty.
138 - 141 Standard Motor Co. Ltd. Cash's Lane Works, Bishopgate Green Works & Widdrington Road Works Cycle & Motorcar Manufacturers B.E.12 Aeroplanes, supplying Component Parts for 18hp Chassis for Ambulances & also Shell & fuse manufacture (some of which done in Leamington)
144 srednuof norIteertS egroeG 1 & llihseloF ,daoR yehtroN.dtL slateM gnilretS Motor & Aeroplane Castings
145 & 146 Swift Cycle Co. Ltd. Cheylesmore Works, Cheylesmore Street & Quinton Works, Quinton Road 
Cycle, Cars, Motorcycle Manufacturers 
& Motorbody builders Bicycles to the Government & 18pdr. Shells for the Coventry Armaments Output Committee
147 spoort rof stnempiuqe rehtaeLedarT rotoM eht rof srotcaF rehtaeLteertS pohsiB 24-14.oC & snikdA ,ybooT
148 & 149 Triumph Cycle Co. Ltd. Triumph Works, Priory Street, Much Park Street & Dale Street Cycle & Motorcycle Manufacturers
Gauges & 30,000 Motorcycles for the British Army. 2 ¼ inch Fuse-Heads and Primers 
& 2 ¾ inch large Shell Noses & Friction T. Tubes Mk.IV from August 1915 onwards
154 shtimskcalB .dnE nopS ,yhtimS .J .E ,draW Producing 1000s of horse shoes for the Army
155 srednuoF muinimulA teertS lleW ,skroW norI nacluV)sdrawno 6191 morf etoM & ekralC( .dtL sitO doogyaW Unknown
156 hcaM gnilliM-eliforP slliM gniroB xelpuD sehtal gnidulcnIsrekaM looT enihcaMllihseloF ,skroW daoR yehtroN.dtL ttenneB & retsbeW ines and Large Marking-Out Tables for Aeroplane Work
160 & 161 White & Poppe Ltd. Lockhurst Lane Works, Foleshill & National Fuse & Filling Factory No.10/21, Holbrooks Lane Engine Builders & Motor Engineers
Subsidy Engines for Lorries made at the Lockhurst Lane Factory and Fuse 80 Bodies, 18pdr. 
Shell Sockets, rings, caps and base plugs at both factories initially and then at Holbrooks only once fully operational
162 W.H. Jones & Sons Ltd., Holbrooks Lane (East-side1st property after Foleshill Railway Bridge)  decudorp & sexoB noitinummA fo s0001 derutcafunam tub ,smrif snoitinum lacol rof snoisnetxe fo tol a tliuBsrotcartnoC gnidliuB laminations for magnetos
164 srekamhctaWdaoR daehyloH ,yrotcaF hctaW notgnirrE .dtL .oC & .H ,snosmailliW Watchmakers to the British Army.
Support Institutions and Infrastructure
erutcurtsarfnI ro noitutitsnI fo epyTsserddAerutcurtsarfnI ro noitutitsnI troppuSretteL
snoitinuM fo yrtsiniM tnemnrevog eht rof eciffo yrtnevoC)edis-tsaE( teertS kraP hcuM 41snoitinuM fo yrtsiniMA
C Cycle and Motor Cycle Manufacturers and Trader's Union Ltd noitutitsnI troppuS ssenisuB raw-erPdaoR kciwraW ,srewoT ehT
erutcurtsarfnI tnemtiurceR ruobaL raw-erPteertS droF rewoLegnahcxE ruobaLD
llaH ymrA snoilattaB tnediseRdaoR airotciV neeuQllaH llirDE
tnemtiurceR rekroW noitinuM rof eciffo emit-raWenaL yelyaB ,llaH s'yraM tSuaeruB skroW noitinuMF
H Coventry Chambers of Commerce 9 Masonic Buildings, Little Park Street Pre-war Business Support Institution
I Radford Aerodrome Aircraft Acceptance Park No.1 Next to Daimler's Radford Factory Aerodrome and proving ground for city’s aeroplanes
bulC laicoS etavirP dehsilbatsEenaL yelyaB ,llaH sreparDbulC sreparDK
bulC laicoS etavirP dehsilbatsEdaoR s'neeuQbulC ytnuoC & yrtnevoCL
M Coventry Armaments Output Committee The Towers, Warwick Road Local Co-operative Munitions Committee
Cycle, Motorcycle & Motorcar Manufacturers 
New Entrants = 21, Total = 30
Component Manufacturers 
New Entrants = 25, Total = 36
Machine Tool Manufacturers 
New Entrants = 5, Total = 8
Armament Manufacturers 
New Entrants = 2, Total = 3
Metal Working Firms 
New Entrants = 11, Total = 11
Support Institutions and Infrastructure
New Entrants = 5, Total = 10
The Complete Mid-War Armaments and Munitions Cluster                                      98 Firms and Support Institutions or Infrastructure
Sources: See Bibliography
Table 9: Coventry’s Armaments and Munitions Cluster by December 1915
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Map 2 reveals an expanded cluster by the end of 1915 now comprising an area of 
around 6.3sq miles and including an additional 65 firms. Out of 88 firms forming the 
cluster three-quarters were cycle, motorcycle and motorcar assemblers and their 
component suppliers. This is a continuance of the early war firm typology and 
demonstrates how the city’s core sector was continually being mobilised. However, the 
mid-war cluster now contained a higher proportion of smaller firms. For example, new 
entrants included the small blacksmith of Ward, E. J. [154] and the engineers Farmer & 
Son [69]. Another change was that 11 metal-working firms where now producing 
armaments and munitions compared to zero in the early-war cluster. This sector, which 
included foundry, pressing and stamping firms, now accounted for around 12 percent of 
the total number of mid-war firms. Firms such as the Britannia Foundry Company [12] 
or George Wilson Gas Meters, Ltd [72], amongst others), were producing castings for a 
whole variety of munitions135
 
. There were also some noticeable changes in location of 
some of the new entrants to the cluster.  Four firms now appeared in the South West 
wards of Earlsdon and Chapelfields, and three more in the Western fringe of the city 
which were both previously areas devoid of munition firms. New isolated clusters of 
firms also appeared straddling two of the main Northerly arterial roads: the Foleshill 
Road and Lockhurst Lane. 
Larger new entrants to the cluster were appearing in a variety of locations. One such 
company was the Ministry of Munitions No.10 National Shell Filling & Fuse Factory136
                                                 
135 See Table 9 for the types of castings being undertaken. 
 
[161 managed by White & Poppe]. This had to be accommodated to the North of the 
city boundary on land of the Warwickshire Rural District. Other large firms, such as the 
French machine gun manufacturer Hotchkiss et Cie [83] were able to take over and 
expand vacant premises in the city centre. Also at this time, numerous support 
institutions and infrastructural changes emerged within the cluster. These included the 
city’s own Ministry of Munitions office [A] and a Munition Works Bureau [F] to help 
with labour recruitment.  
136 Later on in the war this name was changed to No.21 National Shell Filling & Fuse Factory as there 
was a number of faulty fuses from this factory when assigned the number 10. Upon seeing any fuse at the 
front which was stamped No.10, artillerymen viewed them with suspicion and would no longer use them. 
To resolve this matter the Ministry of Munitions renamed the factory No. 21 and investigated and 
resolved any manufacturing defects so White & Poppe produced fuses could once again be used 
normally. 
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Perhaps the most important development involved Daimler reaching agreement with the 
War Office (on the 21st April 1915) for them to lease part of the company’s Radford 
Estate to erect an aerodrome there. This officially became termed the Aircraft 




5.7 Ownership and Control 
 
Due to the greater level of government intervention (outlined in section 5.5), many 
engineering factories became controlled by the Ministry of Munitions during the mid-
war period. The first such works in Coventry included the Ordnance Works and Alfred 
Herbert Ltd., both in July 1915, highlighting their national significance. By the end of 
the year the number had increased 48 “controlled establishment” factories within the 
mid-war cluster. No longer were their business decisions (such as production schedules 
or investment decisions) taken solely by Chairman or Boards of Directors. Everything a 
firm wished to do had to be in line with Ministerial “controlled establishment” 
regulations and if expansion or recruitment was desired, approval had to be granted. To 
enforce this control, often these firms had on-site inspectors sometimes in the form of a 
military officer. For example, White & Poppe had an invalided Captain present at their 
works to monitor if “controlled establishment” procedures were being adhered to138
 
. 
The impact of greater governmental control upon and within the cluster was no longer 
firms could carry on as ‘business as usual’: complete industrial mobilisation was called 
for and instigated. Also no longer was it left to the War Office to use market forces 
(price inducement), or left to individual entrepreneurs and firms (noticing potentially 
lucrative contracts), to organise efficient national munitions supply as had been the case 




                                                 
137 Frost (1920), Long (1995) p102 & p105 and Smith (2004) p14. 
138 The Limit 
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To carry through this change locally, a local committee - the Coventry Armaments 
Output Committee (C.A.O.C.) [M] was established, largely through the willingness of 
the city’s business community to help meet the needs for huge quantities of shells and 
fuses139. In essence, the city and the outlying districts became a form of industrial co-
operative where all firms which could participate in armaments and munitions 
production were invited to tender for orders140. The first order which the C.A.O.C. 
tendered for and secured was to produce 100,000 18pdr. High Explosive (H.E.) shells at 
initially 10,000 per week for 18 shillings each141. The C.A.O.C would then, dependent 
upon firm size and capability, subdivide the contract between various firms and provide 
them with technical, financial and administrative support. For this they charged 2 
shillings per shell for their management fees, leaving 16 shillings per shell for the firms. 
Contracts could still be obtained by Coventry firms negotiating directly with the 
M.O.M., but the smaller firms especially were now being organised and managed 
exclusively through the C.A.O.C.142
 
.  
A letter from David Lloyd George, then Minister of Munitions, to the Coventry Mayor, 
Malcolm K. Pridmore (reproduced overleaf), is testimony to the importance attached to 
the C.A.O.C’s ability to meet munitions supply at this critical stage of the war. With this 
committee now in operation, and many of the leading engineering firms now setup as 
“controlled establishments” the city’s latent capacity for armaments and munitions 






                                                 
139 See the following chapter for the composition of the C.A.O.C. and NA MUN5/363/1121.24/2, 
MUN5/363/1121.24/4 and H.M.S.O (1920) History of the Ministry of Munitions Chapter X, Pt.II p101-
103 for further details.  
140 The complete area covered by the C.A.O.C. included Coventry, the Foleshill District (which at this 
time was partly within and outside the city boundary) and the two small villages of Berkswell and 
Wolston which were five miles from the city. NA MUN5/363/1121.24/4 p3. 
141 H.M.S.O (1920) The Official History of the Ministry of Munitions, Appendix III p146, Chapter X Pt.II 
General Organisation, Midlands p102 and Industrial Mobilisation 1914-1915: Chapter III Pt III Local 
Organisation 31st March - 28th April, p70 and C.H. 11th /12th June 1915. 
142 NA MUN5/363/1121.24/2 and NA MUN5/363/1121.24/4 
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Figure 16:  Letter from David Lloyd George to the Mayor of Coventry 
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5.8 Armaments and Munitions Production 
 
By December 1915 the number of firms now involved in specifically making shells and 
fuses or components thereof had increased from two in 1914 to 32 by the end of 1915. 
This was in direct response to the ‘Shells Crisis’ and the setting up the C.A.O.C. 
outlined earlier. Specific examples included Dunlop in their two factories [65 & 66] 
producing 4.5inch shell cases, Rover [122,123 &126] producing 18pdr., 4.5inch H.E. 
and gas shells and Standard143
 
 who were also now undertaking shell work. The 
accompanying photographs depict these High Explosive shells now being undertaken by 
many Coventry firms: 
 Figure 17: 18pdr. & 4.5-inch shells,           Figure 18: Complete surviving  
 minus their fuses, now being            examples from the Imperial War  
 manufactured in Coventry         Museum,  London 
  
                    
 Source: Midland Daily Telegraph 19th July 1915     Source:  Exhibits at the IWM MUN546 (18.pdr)                                    
              and  MUN3233 (4.5-inch) 
                                                 
143 The Standard Motor Co. premises used for shell making were in the nearby town of Royal Leamington 
Spa where in total they leased four premises, three for shell making, and one for aeroplane wing 
manufacture. All four of these premises were “government controlled” in addition to their Coventry 
factories. This was done mainly because of the acute shortage of female labour in Coventry. 
 - 86 - 
One example of the many smaller firms now undertaking such munitions work was that 
of the Hillman Shell Factory [81]. William Hillman, a local cycle and motorcar 
manufacturer, adapted one of his small vacant Auto Machinery Company premises in 
Lower Ford Street and with the use of female labour began to produce, along with other 
firms, the shells photographed in Figure 17144
 
. In fact a special article was written on 
this particular factory in 1915 and is reproduced overleaf as it gives a good indication of 



















                                                 
144 C.G. 20th August 1915 and M.D.T. 14th and 17th July 1915. 
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Source: Coventry Graphic 20th August 1915 pp4-5. 
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Eight of the city’s machine tool factories were now also overflowing with war work as 
more and more machinery was needed by firms across the country taking on munitions 
production for the first time. Six of these were “controlled establishments” by the end of 
1915145 with their entire outputs being directed by the Machine Tool Department at the 
Ministry of Munitions146 (highlighting their early national significance). Herbert’s, the 
largest concern [76 & 77], was now supplying its renowned automatic No. 4 Capstan 
lathes to ‘the great arsenals, ship yards, and engineering shops, not only in this country, 
but abroad’147. Smaller firms such as Walter Tatlow Ltd148 [32], which had only been 
formed in 1913, were inundated with war orders for their jigs, tools and, in particular, 
gauges149 and had to increase their workforce from 20 to 80. Large orders were being 
executed by this firm for the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich and the Small Arms Factory at 
Enfield as well as aircraft manufacturers and others150
 
. 
The city’s electrical engineering firms were also struggling to cope with the seemingly 
insatiable wartime demand for their products, particularly for high-tension magnetos. 
By the end of 1915 British Thompson Houston [16] (B.T.H.) were manufacturing a 
variety of magnetos, with their Type ‘A’ being made at the rate of 400 per week for use 
in British aircraft151
 
. The firm of Morris and Lister had been forced to relocate their 
works in the city as their Foleshill premises [101] were inadequate for the quantities of 
magnetos they were now asked to produce. In 1915 they therefore reformed the business 
as the M-L Magneto Syndicate Ltd and relocated to a disused former mill in the central 
West Orchard area of the city – this they renamed their Victoria Works [103].  
 
 
                                                 
145 Albion Drop Forgings Co. Ltd.*, Brett's Patent Lifter Co. Ltd.*, Coventry Gauge & Small Tool Co. 
Ltd., Alfred Herbert Ltd.** (both the Butts and  Edgwick factories) , Morton & Weaver,  Selson 
Engineering Co. Ltd.* and Webster & Bennett Ltd.* (* denotes ‘controlled establishments’). 
146 Of which Alfred Herbert along with some of his Directors were put in charge of from April 1915. 
147 C.G. 2nd April 1915 Automatic Allies of the Army – Romance of War-Munition Machinery. 
148 This firm was renamed in 1916 to Coventry Gauge and Small Tool Co. Ltd. 
149 A gauge being simply an instrument used for measuring precise conformity, in this instance, usually 
for measuring munitions after machining. These gauges were used in ever increasing quantities within the 
engineering industry during the war to implement accurate repetitious production, the inter-changeability 
of parts, and also to assist the use of diluted labour. 
150 CG&T (1953) Precision Par Excellence as cited in Brittain (1989) p79-80. 
151 M.R.C. MSS.242/BT/9/11 p3. 
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As the war continued even this became too small: 
 
‘The new works of the M-L Magneto Syndicate Ltd. at 
Coventry…..are already running at full capacity, and are ever 
growing and causing continual extensions. At the present time the 
firm are almost exclusively employed on Government contracts’152
 
. 
Two artist’s impressions (Figures 20 and 21), highlight the size of both M-L’s and 




Figure 20: The M-L Magneto Syndicate Ltd. Victoria Works,  
West Orchard, Coventry [103] 
 






                                                 
152 The Autocar 1916 
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Figure 21: British Thompson-Houston Co. Ltd. Lower Ford Street  
Magneto Factory c.1916 [16] 
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Section C – Coventry’s Armaments and Munitions Local Industrial Cluster 
 January 1916 - November 1918 
 
 
5.9 Historical Context 
 
With the continuation of the war into a third and fourth year there still seemed little 
hope for victory. Drawn out offensives, such as the Somme in the summer of 1916 and 
the Third Battles of Ypres (Passchendaele) a year later, had failed to break the deadlock 
on the Western Front. Russia had collapsed into revolution in the winter of 1917 and 
sued for peace. This meant that during 1917 and 1918 Britain and France opposed a 
strengthened German Army across their trenches in Belgium and France as one million 
men were redeployed from the East Front. However, due to German unrestricted 
submarine warfare, political pressure, and an uncovered German plot to back Mexico in 
a war against them, the U.S.A. entered the war in April 1917 much to the Allies relief. 
That said, it would be long into 1918 before their army or their industrial strength would 
start to affect the allied war effort to any great extent. The onus then was on Britain and 
France to continue the struggle. In Coventry this attitude was expressed in terms of war 
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Figure 22: War Posters in Coventry c.1918, probably in Broadgate  
in the city centre 
 
             Source: Anon (undated) Wartime Photograph Album, Coventry Central Library 
 
Success in this war of attrition would come to the nations who could effectively 
mobilise their full manpower and industrial might. With the Ministry of Munitions, 
(begun in 1915), the apparatus was in place, and gradually through 1916 and 1917 it 
extended its tentacles of government intervention to cover two-thirds (or possibly more) 
of all employed workers in Britain153. This was achieved through a system of controls, 
controllers, and ‘priorities’ and, to give an example, the British economic historian Sir 
John Clapham stated that by the end of the war common bricks appeared to be under 
two or three separate controls 154. Furthermore by 1918 98 percent of all steel supply 
was being controlled through the apparatus of the Ministry of Munitions155
                                                 
153 May (1996) An Economic and Social History of Britain 1760-1990.  
. This then 
was the level of invention and control which covered all British imports, exports, 
industry and labour force towards the end of the war. 
154 Ibid, p335. 
155 Glasgow Digital Library (see bibliography web based sources) 
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To overcome the stalemate on the Western Front Britain looked to develop potentially 
war-winning weapons such as improved aeroplanes and aero-engines. She also looked 
to develop something which could breach the masses of barb-wire and the muddy 
trenches and was impervious to shell or machinegun fire. The tank was seen as the 
potential weapon to achieve this. It had been under secret development as early as 1914, 
but was not sufficiently developed to be used in combat until September 1916 at the 
Battle of Flers-Courcelette. By 1916/17 Britain fully appreciated the scale of total war. 
The shell and fuse supply problems had largely been resolved as sufficient quantities 
had been realised through the many government factories and also through greater 
control of industry through “controlled establishments”, economic legislation and the 
process of labour dilution outlined earlier.  These achievements were added to on the 3rd 
November 1916 with an order to prohibit the manufacture or assembly of motor 
engines, cycles and vehicles and on the 6th January 1917 by the Motor-Engines and 
Vehicles Order156
 
. This legislation made it now impossible for firms to manufacture any 
kind of vehicular transport unless it was for military use or if they received a special 
permit to do so.  
There was thus a change in emphasis for armaments and munitions production by 1917, 
especially for the country’s engineering firms. Coventry’s cycle or motor vehicle firms 
could no longer produce any of their peacetime products and also with a national 
programme of 218 shell and fuse factories now in full production these works could 
often produce shells and fuses more cheaply than the adapted engineering firms. In 
Coventry this meant the cluster had to partially adapt to producing potentially war-
winning weapons such as aeroplanes, tanks and machine guns in large quantities for the 
remainder of the war. By 1918 these weapons were being mass-produced largely 
through the adoption of standardisation and the inter-changeability of parts, increasing 
firms' productivity and expanding their physical capacity and also by implementing a 




                                                 
156 H.M.S.O. (1920) History of the Ministry of Munitions, Appendix Chapter III, p32 & p58. Summaries 
of both Acts are reproduced in Annex 6. 
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5.10 Geography and Cluster Structure 
 
Map3 (overleaf) depicts the late war cluster of armament and munition firms and the 
support institutions and infrastructure serving their needs by November 1918. It is 
further complemented with Table 10 which provides a summary of each firm, their 
address and the munitions157
 
 they were producing at this time. In addition, the key 
support institutions and infrastructure, serving their needs are outlined: 
























                                                 
157 If this information came to light and additionally if firm’s munitions production had changed, since 
table 12, any new products are also listed. 
0
0
Table 10: Coventry’s Armaments and Munitions Cluster by November 1918
Firms
No Firm Name Address Principal Trade Wartime Work Undertaken
1 Aircraft Motor & Engineering Works Shackleton Road (East-side 4th Property) Engineers Sub-contracting small aeroplane parts
2 Albion Drop Forgings Co. Ltd. Spring Road, Foleshill Drop Forgers Drop Forgings for Aircraft, Aero-Engines, Automobiles & Agricultural Manufacturers
3 Arden Motor Co. Kenilworth Road & Blacksmith's Corner Motorcycle Manufacturers Munitions, possibly manufacturing fuses (Unable to locate Kenilworth Road premises and Blacksmith's Corner premises are too distant to depict on this map
5 Astley, John & Sons, Ltd. 18a Butcher Row Rope & Twine Manufacturers Equipments for troops
6 Auto Machinery Co. Ltd. Hood Street & Read Street Ball Bearings and Component Manufacturer Ball Bearings primarily for Rotary Aero Engines & Shell Driving Bands
7 Blakemore D., & Sons, Ltd Godiva Street (North-side between 92-94) Mudguards, wings valances, petrol tanks Ammunition boxes for machine guns
8 Bluemel Brothers Wolston, near Coventry Motor & Cycle Accessories Supplying T Friction Tubes to C.O.W.
9 Bramco, Ltd. St. Nicholas Street, East Side Aluminium Founders Aluminium Magnalite Pistons most likely for aero-engines
10 Brett's Patent Lifter Co. Ltd. Foleshill Works, Spring Road Drop Hammer Manufacturers Patent Hammers, Power Presses, Furnaces & other installation plants together with accessories and spare parts for Motorcar Manufacturers, General Engineers, Stamping Companies, Signal Manufacturers,  Locomotive & Wagon builders, Arsenals & Government factories, Ordnance & Gun Works including Dudley National Projectile Factory.
11 Brett's Stamping Co. Ltd 57 Harnall Lane Drop Forgings Drop Forgings in Iron, Carbon Steels & Alloy Steels of every kind and for AEC Lorries
12 Britannia Foundry Co. 32 Cox Street & Well Street Aluminium Founders & Engineers Delicate Aeroplane Cylinders, 15-inch Shells, Aluminium Parts for Submarines,  Phosphor Bronze Gun-Carriage Bearings and numerous other castings for the Admiralty & War Office 
14 British Chuck & Piston Ring Co. Holbrook Lane, Foleshill Chuck & Piston Ring Manufacturers Mass Producing Piston Rings for Motor Vehicles & Aero Engines & also Piston Castings, Shackle Bolts &Gudgeon Pins.
15 British Petroleum Co. Petrol Depot, Holyhead Road Petroleum Manufacturers Filling tanks with petrol for Government Motor Transports
16 British Thompson-Houston Co. Ltd. Lower Ford Street (North-side after Hood Street) Magneto's & Electrical Engineers Magnetos for vehicles, aeroplanes and also Gauge Manufacture
17 Broadhurst R. & Co. 130 Queen Victoria (East-side) Wholesale Ironmonger, Tool Dealer & Motor Accessories Motor Lamps, Tools & Accessories
19 Burbidge, H. & Son Victoria Works, Vecqueray Street Wood Turners Wooden Transit Plugs (Fuze Hole 2") for 18pdr & 4.5 H.E. Shells
20 Bushill T. & Sons Ltd. 10 & 17 Cow Lane & Little Park Street Printers & Box Makers Paper cartons for food supplies sent to troops
21 & 22 Calcott Bros. Ltd. 165 Far Gosford Street & 132-134 Much Park Street Cycle & Motorcar Manufacturers 18hp Chassis for Ambulances & some Motorcars also supplied to the Army
23 Charlesworth Bodies Ltd. 128 & 129 Much Park Street Motor Body Builders
Rebuilt the commandeered Coventry Buses into War Department Lorries and did this also for numerous other towns Commandeered Vehicles. 
Also Manufacturing 100s of Ambulance Bodies, Staff Cars, Field Kitchens, Lorries for British & Allied Governments. 
Also built Motor Bodies for Austin cars for the Russian Government. Ambulance Bodies for Napier chassis and others. 
24 Challenge Cycle & Motor Co. Ltd. Challenge Works, 201-269 Foleshill Road Cycle & Motorcycle Manufacturers Unknown
25 Condor Motor & Fittings 182-184 Broad Street Garage Engine /Aero Engine Valves Aero Engine Valves & Aero parts since August 1914
26 Conner Magneto & Ignition Ltd. Copeswood Grange, Stoke Magnetos & Electrical Engineering Magnetos
27 Coundon Small Arms Ammunition (SAA) Factory (formerly Buckingham’s Engineering) Dover Street & Farmers Yard, Spon Street Sidecars, cars & Engineers Incendiary Bullets for use in Machine Guns primarily for aircraft to defeat the Zeppelin menace
28 Coventry Acme Motor Co. Ltd. Osborn Road, Earlsdon Motor Body Builders & Rex Motorcycles Stokes Trench Mortars
29 Coventry Aluminium & Refining Co. Ltd. Nelson Street Aluminium Founders Castings in Gun Metal, Phosphor Bronze, Aluminium, & Brass etc
30 Coventry Aviation Co. Ltd. 34a Earl Street Manufacturers of Metal Parts for Aircraft Hinge Pins, Nuts, Washers, Wire Ferrules, Pins, Fork Ends, Metal Thread Screws, Wood Screws for Aircraft
31 Coventry Chain Co. Ltd. Chain Works, Spon End Transmission Chains & Accessories 4 Different Types of Chains used in Tanks, 18pdr & 2.75-inch Shells for the Coventry Armaments Output Commitee & 1000s of Fuses & Wooden Transit Plugs (Fuse hole 2-inch) No.3 mk.II From October 1915
32 Coventry Gauge & Small Tool Co. Ltd. Warwick Street, Earlsdon Gauge & Machine Tool Makers Gauges & Machine Tools
33 & 34 Coventry Eagle Cycle & Motor Co. Ltd 4 Lincoln Street & 201-269 Foleshill Road Bicycles & Motorcycles Unknown
35 Coventry Engineering & Pattern Co. Ltd. Godiva Street (North-side after bridge) Pattern Makers Patterns for all kinds of Motor & Aircraft
36 Coventry Magneto Co. Ltd. 15a Union Street & Fleetwood Works, Greyfriars Lane Magnetos est. 1914 Magnetos, including repairing
37 & 38 Coventry Metal & Iron Co. Ltd. Meadow Street & 8 Trafalgar Street Metal Manufacturers Unknown
39 Coventry Motor Fittings Co. 104-105 Far Gosford Street & Croft Road Motor Accessories Manufacturers Cast Aluminium Radiators for Heavy War Transport Vehicles
40 Coventry Motor Foundry Co. Read Street, (North-side) Manufacturers of Motor Castings Unknown
41 Coventry Motor & Sundries Co. Ltd. 34 Spon End (South-side before railway arches) Motor Body & Motor Hood & Screw Manufacturers Unknown
42 Coventry Movement Co., Ltd. Spon Street (South-side) Watch Movements (supplied W & P in Boer War) Delicate Aeroplane Parts, Motor Switches, Taps, Petrol & Oil Indicators, Grease Cups, Nuts & Bolts & other components
43 Coventry Munitions Ltd. Gosford Street (South-side next to Hotchkiss) Munitions, only seem to be in existence 1916-18 Shells & fuses, possibly filling.
44 - 46 Coventry Ordnance Works Ltd. Ordnance Works, 11 Ordnance Road Armaments & Small Tool Manufactures
Filling empty primers manufactured through the C.A.O.C. & directly for the M.O.M. Howitzers, Naval Guns, Shells & Fuses, Fuse Heads & armour plate for Tanks. 
R.A.F. R.E.8 & Sopwith Snipe Aeroplanes. 130H.P. Clerget Cylinders under Contract 87/E/1039, Aeroplane Undercarriages of the "V" type, Metal Fittings for main & body struts and wheels for Sopwith 
Snipes. Also supplying Swarf Metal to Rudge Whitworth.
47 Coventry Packing Case Co. Holyhead Road (North-side) Carriers & Packing Case Manufacturers Tin lined Packing Cases
48 Coventry Plating & Presswork Co. Ltd. Lower Ford Street Platers, Polishers & Pressworkers  Most likely undertaking the Presswork, plating & polishing  for Radiators for Army vehicles for Coventry Radiators
49 & 50 Coventry Premier Ltd. 10 Read Street, Hillfields & 8 Lincoln Street Cycles, Motorcycles & Motorcar Manufacturers Motorcycles to Russia, 2.75 High Explosive Shells for the Coventry Armaments Output Committee between February 1916 and 1917 and also 600 Hotchkiss machine gun cradles and deflectors between 1917 and 1918.
51 Coventry Radiator Co. Ltd Raglan Works, Raglan Street Motor Vehicle Radiators Making heavy type Radiators for Army vehicles
52 Coventry Repetition Co. Ltd. Raglan Works, Canterbury Street Component Manufacturer Turnbuckles, pins, stream line wires, fork ends, eye bolts, Universal joints & propeller bolts. Small screws, studs, nuts, washers, special bolts, including the many important parts of an engine, such as connecting-rod bolts.
53 & 165 Coventry Simplex Engines, Ltd. (renamed Coventry Climax 1917 onwards) Payne's Lane Works Engine Manufacturers 100s of Simplex Engines used for generating sets to operate Searchlights & Admiralty War Contracts so ceased making commercial engines by 1915
54 Coventry Stamping Co. Ltd. Holbrook Lane, Foleshill Drop Forgers Head Forgings for 6-inch & 60-pdr High Explosive Shells from June 1916 onwards. Base Plate Stampings for 6-inch High Explosive Shells from July 1916 onwards. Suppliers to Armstrong Whitworth, Triumph, Arrol-Johnston, Crossley Motors, Coventry Ordnance and others.
55 Coventry Swaging Co. Ltd. White Friars Mills (Needle), Whitefriars Lane Spokes, Nipples & Sewing Machine Needles Unknown
56 Cramp Engineering Co. Ltd. 12 Union Street Ball Bearing Grinders & Polishing Lathes Machining, Castings, Forgings & Stampings
57 & 58 Crouch Motors Ltd. 34 Bishop Street & Tower Gate Works, Cook Street Motorcar Manufacturers 'Military contracts'
59 C.W. Walker Progress Works, 123 Allesley Old Road Toolmaker & Engineer Small tools, gauges and jigs.
60 & 61 Daimler Co. Ltd. Motor Mills, Sandy Lane & Radford Works Motorcar, Commercial Vehicle & Engines Cars & Lorries of all types for Military use. Aeroplanes including R.A.F. R.E.8 & Airco Ameins III, Aero-engines R.A.F.4a/d. Tank Engines & Gearboxes, 12" Shells, Bentley BR2 Rotary Aero-engines
62 Dingley Brothers Viaduct Works, 74 Spon End Cycle & Motorcycle Manufacturers Hotchkiss machine gun cradles and deflectors
63 Doherty Motor Components Ltd. Palace Yard, Earl Street Sheet Metal Workers & Component Manufacturers Unknown
64 Duggans Ltd. Henry Street (South-side) Malleable iron founders Malleable Iron Castings for
65 Dunlop Rim and Wheel Co. Ltd. Alma Street North-side Wheel & Rim Makers Starter Units for Rolls Royce Eagle Aero-engines & Cylinders for Gnome Rhone Mono Solpape Aero-engines.Tyres & Rims for British Army Vehicles & 4.5 H.E. Shells for the C.A.O.C
66 Dunlop Rubber Co. Ltd. Alma Street, (South-side) Motor Accessories Manufacturers Specialist Types of Tyres & Rims for Aircraft and military vehicles
67 Engineering Accessories Co. Ltd. 2 Hill Street Aeroplane Fittings Manufacturers Motor Car Valves, Pistons,
68 Excel Radiator & Sheet Metal Co. 133 Foleshill Road, Foleshill Sheet Metal Workers Sheet Metal in Copper, Brass,
69 Farmer & Son 116 Queen Victoria Road (Right-hand, East-side) Engineers & later Press Tools & Pressings 18-pounder H.E. shells for C.A.O.C & Laminations for Magnetos
70 Fowler & Smith Coventry Copper Works, 44 (back of) Bayley Lane General Coppersmiths Brazing on Empennages, Elevators, Fins, Rudders for Aeroplanes. Brackets, Steering Rods and other parts for Motor Lorries
71 Geo. Taylor & Sons Payne's Lane (West-side) Engineers & Machine Tool Makers Air & Oil Pumps for Aeroplanes
72 George Wilson Gas Meters, Ltd Foleshill Road, Foleshill Gas Meters, Thermal Heaters, Gas Stoves & Accessory Manufacturers Non-ferrous castings in aluminium & gun-metal specialised in and made for motor, aeroplane engines, gun fittings, shell parts & mines
73 Globe Foundry (Coventry) Ltd. Leicester Place, Leicester Street Iron founders Unknown
74 Gloria Cycle Co. Ltd Between 12-13 Much Park Street Cycle & Sidecar Manufacturers Supplying Sidecars for Triumphs & also supplied for the War Dept. Gloria Pigeon carrying Sidecars for use in communications
75 Guest James J. & Co. The Charterhouse Works, Northfield Road Engineers & Machine Tools Grinding Machines
76 & 77 Herbert Alfred Ltd. St. Thomas Villas, The Butts & Edgwick Works, Canal Road, Foleshill Machine Tool Makers & Iron founders Machine Tools of all types, but predominantly the No.4 Capstan Lathe
78 Hazlewoods Ltd. Albion Mills, 52 West Orchard Motorcycle & Combination Manufacturers Combination Motorcycles and sidecars mainly for military forces in British Colonies
79 Hill, Rowland & Sons Ltd. Albion Foundry, King Street Aluminium & Gunmetal Founders & Pattern Makers Aluminium Castings for mainly Aero Pistons, but also for Submarines, Airships, Ambulances & Transport Vehicles
80 Hillman Motor Co. Ltd. Humber Road Motorcar Manufacturers Unknown
81 Hillman Shell Factory Lower Ford Street Shell Producers High Explosive Shell Cases.
82 Holley Bros 147 Holyhead Road Carburettor Manufacturers From 1917- produced Carburettors for M.O.M, Vaporizers & Shell Sockets & Zennith Carburettors for Siddeley-Deasy’s Puma engines
83 - 85 Hotchkiss et Cie Artillery Works, Gosford Street Machine Gun Manufacturers Machine Guns in Tanks, Cavalry Aircraft, AA-Guns & Trench Warfare for the Admiralty, War Office, Air Board & M.O.M & also supplied Machine Guns to Allied Countries
86 Humber Ltd. Humber Works, Stoke Cars, Motorcycles, Engine Manufacturers 4.5" H.E. Artillery Shells, French Mortar Bombs, Field Kitchens, Artillery Draught Poles, Aeroplanes in the form of the Avro 504a/k Bentley Rotary Aero Engines BR1 & BR2. Also 100s of 'wicked-looking steel darts for throwing from aircraft'.
87 I.F. Forester "Halvetia", Albany Road (South-side) Watchmakers Chronometers for the Admiralty
88 Kalker, E. & Co. 23 Much Park Street (East-side) Wire & Electric Cable Manufacturers Shells from mid 1915 likely for the C.A.O.C., No. IIA Special Magneto cables and Armoured Electric Lighting and High & Low Tension Ignition Cables For Automobiles & Aircraft
89 Lawton Tube Co. London Road Mills, London Road Makers of Solid Drawn Tubes Brass & Copper Tubes for Motor Cars & Aeroplanes
90 Lea Francis Ltd. Between 9-10 Lower Ford Street & Much Park Street Cycle, Cars & Motorcycles Manufacturers Range-Finding Gear & Sundry Instrument Manufacture for the Admiralty
91 Lee F. & Co. 7 Dover Street, East side 1st & 2nd properties Watch & Electrical Jewel Manufacturers Jewels for torpedoes, ships compasses & electrical meters
92 Martino's Treating & Testing Works (Spring 1916 onwards) Sandy Lane Right hand East-side after bridge Testing Laboratories Annealing, Case-hardening & Heat-Treatment of Steels; Mechanical Testing & Chemical Analysis of all materials in Aircraft & Engineering Construction
93 & 94 Matterson, Huxley & Watson Ltd. Hales Street (Showroom), & Lion Foundry, 17 Cross Cheaping, both West Orchard Engineers, Builders, Castings & Constructional Steelwork Kynoch cartridges & guns
95 Maudslay Motor Co. Ltd. Parkside & Quinton Road Cars & Commercial Vehicles Type ‘A’ Subsidy Lorries for the War Office, Post Office, The Great Western, Great Eastern, Midland & Great North of Scotland Railway Companies, Lever Bros. and others & Aero Engine Components
96 Middlemore & Lamplugh Ltd 87-89 Little Park Street Cycle Saddle & Mudguard Manufacturers Supplying Leather items to War Office & Admiralty & Foreign Governments
97 & 98 Mills-Fulford Ltd. Crown Works, Stoney Stanton Road & Progress Works, 287 Stoney Stanton Road Cycle & Sidecar Manufacturers Supplying Sidecars for Officer Transport for the R.F.C. & also 'Armaments'
99 Monk Engineering Co. Ltd. 21 High Street South-side between Banks Engine Makers & Experimental Engineers Motorcar & Aeroplane Engines, Gear Boxes and Rear Axles, Steering Gear, Diesel Engine Parts, Control Clocks, Gun Sighting Gear and Firing Mechanisms.
100 Montgomery Sidecars Between 9-11  Lower Ford Street Sidecar Manufacturers Sidecars for the Military & Triumph
102 Morton & Weaver 137 & 139 The Gear Works, Cox Street Engineers and Machine Tool Makers, and Early Aeroplane Manufacturers Gauges, machine tools, small tools and gear cutting for the Allies Victor Engines as auxiliaries in aeroplanes and bombing sights for aircraft
103 ML Magneto Syndicate, Ltd. (formerly Morris & Lister) Victoria Works, West Orchard Magneto Manufacturers Magnetos for Vehicles & Aeroplanes
104 Omega Cycle Works Croft Road (North side 2nd property along) Cycles & Motorcycles Hotchkiss machine gun bodies
105 Parc Ltd. Lockhurst Lane & Branch Works in Earlsdon Tool Makers & Engineers Jigs, Gauges, Milling Cutters, Reamers, & Tools for Capstan Lathes. For Automatics Box Tools, Knee Tools etc.
106 & 107 Pass, Thomas Ltd. 48 West Orchard & 101-102 Little Park Street Motor Body Builders Government Transport Wagons, 5 Ton Self Contained Trailers, Ambulances & Service Cars. Also Bodies for Maudslay Motor Lorries
108 Phoenix Castings Ltd. Phoenix Foundry, Grove Street from April 1915 Aircraft, Motorcar & General Engineering Castings Unknown
109 & 110 Pistons Ltd. Far Gosford Street (North-side 1st property) & Far Gosford Street (South-side after Bramble Street) Pistons & Gudgeon Pins Making same for Aeroplanes, Motor Lorries, Motorcars & Motorcycles in Iron, Steel or Aluminium
111 Priory Accessories (Spencer Bros from 1918 onwards) Priory Mill, Priory Street Reed, Slay, Harness & Motor Accessories Manufacturer Heavy-pattern steel slays for military web equipment
112 & 113 Randle Radiator Co. Nelson Street (1914) & Mile Lane, Cheylesmore Radiator Manufacturers Radiators for Maudslay's Lorries, all other Motor Vehicles,  for Agricultural Tractors, Stationary Engines, Electric Lighting Sets & Aeroplanes
114 Reliance (Coventry) Ltd. Nelson Foundry, Trafalgar Street Sheet Metal Workers Unknown
115 Rex Motor Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Earlsdon Works, Osbourne Road Car & Motorcycle Manufacturers Stokes Trench Mortars & Turning Bomb Tubes
116 - 118 Riley Motor Co. Ltd City Works, St. Nicholas Street & Cunard Works, Aldbourne Road Motorcycle & Motorcar Manufacturers
119 Nero Engine Co. (Subsidiary of Riley Motor Co.) Durbar Avenue, Foleshill Aero Engines & Aero Engine Components
120 & 121 Rotherham and Sons Ltd. Gosford Street Works, Bayley Lane & 27 Spon Street (South-side) Watch Manufacturers, Engineers & Motor Components Supplying T Friction Tubes to C.O.W. Rifle Clips for cycles, Motor taps, Aeroplane parts, Mechanical Clockwork fuses, delicate fuse work for Singers, scientific instruments & their components
122  - 126 Rover Co. Ltd. & Rover Cycle Co. Ltd. New Meteor Works, Rover Road. Helen Street, Foleshill. Fleet Works & St. John’s Works, & Foundry at 42 Spon Street Motorcycles, Motorcar & Cycle Manufacturers
Maudslay Lorries & Sunbeam Staff Cars, Stokes Trench Mortars, Gas Shells, Fuses and Tank Transmissions. Bicycles for the War Office & Post Office. 
18pdr Shells 4.5-inch H.E. & S.K. Lachrymatory Shells Also manufacturing Aircraft Parts from 1916 onwards including Gnome Aero-engine Piston Castings
129 S. Alexander & Sons 61 Allesley Old Road Wholesale Watch Manufacturers Watches for the Admiralty, War Office & Royal Aircraft Factory
130 Samuel Yeomans 48a Spon Street (South-side Court 14) Watchmakers Making Steel Hammers for Fuze No.106
131 Selson Engineering Co. Ltd. St George's Road Machine Tools & Engineers Shaping  & Radial Drilling Machine Tools
132 Sherbourne Plating Co. 143 Lower Ford Street Platers & Polishers Chromium, Nickel, Silver, Copper, Brass & Tin Plating. Polishing, Enamelling. Silver & Copper Oxidizers. Bronzing & Lacquering
133 & 134 Siddeley-Deasy Motor Co. Ltd. 51 Parkside & 128 Much Park Street (Experimental aeroplane design work at Charlesworth Bodies) Motorcar & Engine Manufacturers R.E.8 & Airco Ameins III Aeroplanes & Puma Aero Engines & over 1,000 propellers manufactured. Stoneleigh Lorries, Field Kitchens & Siddeley-Deasy 18hp Ambulances & Cars for the War Office
135 Singer Motor Co. Ltd. 50-54 Canterbury Street, Hillfields Motorcycle, Cycle & Motorcar Manufacturers Hispano-Suiza Aero-engines and 100,000s Fuses No.80 & 131.
136 & 137 Smith's (Thomas) Stamping Works Ltd. Red Lane Works, Red Lane & Aircraft Works, Ribble Road & Gosford Green Drop Forgers 1,500 Components for the Associated Equipment Company’s 3ton Lorries. Paravanes for Minesweeping for the Admiralty. Forgings for the Aeronautical Dept. & Admiralty Air Dept. also.
138 - 142 Standard Motor Co. Ltd. Cash's Lane Works, Bishopgate Green Works, Widdrington Road Works & Canley, near Coventry Cycles & Motorcar Manufacturers 18pdr High Explosive Shells for the Coventry Armaments Output Committee and Fuses. Sopwith Pup, R.A.F. R.E.8 & Bristol F2b Aeroplanes
143 Star Foundry (Hadley A.E.) 121 Cox Street (West-side) Aluminium, Gun Metal, Bronze & Phosphor Founders 'Many important Government Contracts have been carried through, and at present their energies are concentrated on War Work"
144 Sterling Metals Ltd. Northey Road, Foleshill & 1 George Street Iron Founders Castings for Army Vehicles & Aeroplanes and also castings  and Swarf for Fuse 103 for the Rudge Whitworth Company
145 & 146 Swift Cycle Co. Ltd. Cheylesmore Works, Cheylesmore Street & Quinton Works, Quinton Road 
Cycle, Motorcar, Motorcycle Manufacturers 
& Motorbody builders
18pdr. & 4.5-inch High Explosive Shells for Coventry Armaments Output Committee, Pipe Boxes, Flanges & Fuselages for Vickers bombers & Hispano-Suiza Aero-engines. 
1,750 Hotchkiss Machines Filling Ammunition Feed Strips or Belts between 1917 and 1918
147 Tooby, Adkins & Co. 41-42 Bishop Street Leather Factors for the Motor Trade Leather equipments for troops
148 & 149 Triumph Cycle Co. Ltd. Triumph Works, Priory Street, Much Park Street & Dale Street Cycle & Motorcycle Manufacturers Gauges & 30,000 Motorcycles for the British Army 2 ¼ inch Fuse-Heads and Primers & 2 ¾ inch large Shell Noses Friction T. Tubes Mk.IV From August 1915
150 Turner, W.E. & Co. (1916-) Bridge Works, 151-152 Far Gosford Street Engineers, Machinists & Machine Tool Makers Experimental Engine work & Jigs, Tools, Gauges & Machine Tools
151 & 166 Valves, Ltd. Jordan Well Valves, Guides & Inserts for Engines Manufacturers Manufacturing Valves, Guides & Inserts for Engines for the Admiralty & the War Office
152 Van Raden & Co. Ltd. 567 Foleshill Road Motor Ignition & Electrical Storage Battery Manufacturers Coil, Accumulators & Batteries for the Post Office, Admiralty, War Office & Colonies
153 Vulcan Patternmaking Co. Ltd. (1917-) Carlton Works, Much Park Street Pattern Makers Motor & Aero Patterns. Also Jigs, Machine Tools & Patterns for all the Engineering Trades. Castings in all Metals
154 Ward, E. J. Smithy, Spon End. Blacksmiths Producing 1000s of horse shoes for the Army
155 Waygood Otis Ltd. (Clarke & Mote from 1916 onwards) Vulcan Iron Works, Well Street Aluminium Founders Unknown
156 Webster & Bennett Ltd. Northey Road Works, Foleshill Machine Tool Makers Duplex Milling and Boring Machines and Lathes and also Cutting-Out Tables for Aeroplane work
157 & 158 W. Edwards and Sons Victoria Works, Gulson Road (Shut-lane Mill South-side) & Day's Lane (South-side) Paint-Mill Manufacturers & General Engineers Machine Tool Firm supplying railway companies, motor and paint manufacturers.
159 White, Joseph & Sons 58a Earlsdon Street Engineers, Machinists & Watch Chronometer Manufacturers Wooden Transit Plugs (3 five hole) for  18pdr & 4.5-inch High Explosive Shells
160 & 161 White & Poppe Ltd. Lockhurst Lane, Foleshill & National Fuse & Filling Factory No.10/21, Holbrooks Lane Engine Builders & Motor Engineers Fuze 80 Bodies, 18pdr. Shell Sockets, rings, caps and base plugs. Subsidy Engines for Lorries. Fuze 100. Fuses, Gaines & Detonators. Manufacturing Wings and top and bottom Aerofoils for Aeroplanes. Also supplying Swarf Metal to Rudge Whitworth.
162 W.H. Jones & Sons Ltd., Holbrooks Lane Building Contractors Erected many building extensions for local munitions firms & 1000s of Ammunition Boxes & also laminations for magnetos
163 Williamson, A. & Co. Ltd. 77 Moor Street Engineers Armaments & War Equipment
164 Williamsons, H. & Co. Ltd. Errington Watch Factory, Lower Holyhead Road Watchmakers Large contract for Wrist Watches for Military Officers & Pocket Watches for other ranks
165 Coventry Climax Engines Ltd. East Street Works Engine Manufacturers 100s of Simplex Engines used for generating sets to operate Searchlights & Admiralty War Contracts so ceased making commercial engines by 1915
166 Valves, Ltd. 133 Foleshill Road, Foleshill Valves, Guides & Inserts for Engines Manufacturers Manufacturing Valves, Guides & Inserts for Engines for the Admiralty & the War Office
Support Institutions and Infrastructure
Letter Support Institutions and/or Infrastructure Address Type of Institution or Infrasture
A Ministry of Munitions 14 Much Park Street (East-side) Local Coventry office for the Ministry of Munitions
B Aircraft Inspectorate Department 44 Bayley Lane Local Aero-engine and Aeroplane Inspection Office
C Cycle and Motor Cycle Manufacturers & Trader's Union Ltd The Towers, Warwick Road Pre-war Business Support Institution
D Labour Exchange Lower Ford Street Pre-war Labour Recruitment Infrastructure
E Drill Hall Queen Victoria Road Resident Battalions Army Hall
F Munition Works Bureau St Mary's Hall, Bayley Lane War-time office for Munition Worker Recruitment
G Munitions Inspection Dept. Office 10 Ordnance Road Local Munitions Inspection Office
H Coventry Chambers of Commerce 9 Masonic Buildings, Little Park Street Pre-war Business Support Institution
I Radford Aerodrome Aircraft Acceptance Park No.1 Next to Daimler's Radford Factory Aerodrome and proving ground for city’s Aeroplanes
J Whitley Abbey Aerodrome South of Whitley Common Aerodrome used for storage purposes for the R.F.C.
K Drapers Club Drapers Hall, Bayley Lane Established Private Social Club
L Coventry & County Club Queen's Road Established Private Social Club
M Coventry Armaments Output Committee The Towers, Warwick Road Local Co-operative Munitions Committee
Cycle, Motorcycle & Motorcar Manufacturers 
New Entrants = 4, Total = 34,
Component Manufacturers 
New Entrants = 14, Total = 50
Machine Tool Manufacturers 
New Entrants = 8, Total = 16
Armament Manufacturers 
New Entrants = 2, Total = 5 
Metal Working Firms 
New Entrants = 21, Total = 32
Support Institutions and Infrastructure 
New Entrants = 5, Total = 10
The Complete Late-War Armaments and Munitions Cluster 150 Firms and Support Institutions or Infrastructure
Gauges, Wire wheels for Daimler, Vauxhall, Crossley staff cars and others Aero Engines & Components inc Pistons, Riley Engines for Generators. 
£15,000 contract for Riley Aero Engines, £17,000 contract from Vickers & Government contracts for shells 
& fuse heads & Ambulance Stretch Carriages Gaines & Adapters No.4  mk.I  30th October 1916-1917
127 & 128 Rudge-Whitworth Ltd. Rudge Works, Crow Lane, 34 Spon Street & 36 Hertford Street Cycle & Motorcycle Manufacturers
Fuses, Rifle Bullets, Sidecars to the Belgian Army, Fuse caps, Sidecar Bodies for Italy to use as mountain lifts to supply troops. Aerial Torpedoes of various sizes and capacities from 500lbs to 50lbs. 
Floating Mines for use at sea, Artillery shells, and Machine-gun shields. Barbed Wire Cutters, Carburettors in aluminium most likely for aeroplanes. Water Pumps, Landing Gear and any metal fittings for 
the B.E.2 aeroplane. Detachable Wire Wheels for use in Crossley Ambulances, Staff Cars and Aeroplanes
Sources: See bibliography
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By November 1918 as many as 137 armament and munition works were operating 
within an expanded cluster covering an area of around 13sq.miles. This represents a 
growth of 49 firms or around a 40 percent increase when compared to the mid-war 
cluster. This shows that the major growth period of the cluster was in the mid-war 
period with the initiation of the Ministry of Munitions. Out of the total of 137 firms 
forming the late-war cluster, 61 percent were cycle, motorcycle and motorcar 
assemblers and their component suppliers. This was a continuance of the early and mid-
war firm typology and demonstrates how the city's core sector continually formed the 
nucleus of armaments and munitions firms within the cluster. Despite this, 
proportionally the number of late-war new entrants that originated as cycle, motorcycle 
and motorcar firms had declined when compared to the mid-war period. Therefore new 
entrants into the cluster were increasingly from other engineering sectors. Following 
and increasing upon the mid-war pattern, these emerged mainly from the metal working 
sector, which between the mid and later-war cluster, had almost trebled from 11 to 32 
firms involved in munitions.  
 
Some of these metal working new entrants were small firms such as Fowler & Smith 
[70] who described their activities as: ‘brazing is continually being executed for 
Aeroplane parts, including Empennages, Elevators, Fins and Rudders etc. [and] also 
Brackets, Steering Rods and other parts for Motor Lorries’158
 
. Due to firms of this 
nature only requiring modest premises they were still able to find vacant premises in the 
city’s core. Other larger new entrant metal working businesses were forced to locate 
outside the city’s boundary such as the Coventry Stamping Company Ltd. [54] to the 
north of the city. It was noted earlier how firms such as ML Magneto [103] and 
Hotchkiss et Cie. [83, 84 & 85], during the mid-war period, could still acquire vacant 
premises in the city’s core to expand their manufacturing capacity. It would appear by 
the late-war period the available stock of vacant factories in the city’s core had been 
utilised and firms now had to look elsewhere in order to expand. This pattern can be 
observed for both a new entrant and an established firm within the cluster.  
                                                 
158 Coventry and its Industries Official Handbook 1918 pp79-80 
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The Standard Motor Company had been operating from a collection of scattered small 
and medium sized premises in the northern Foleshill district of the city [138, 138, 140 & 
141].  Upon receiving large aeroplane contracts they were forced to relocate their main 
activities to a new purpose built works outside the city boundary. For this they chose to 
erect a large new factory at Canley, South West of the city, which proved ideal for 
aeroplane manufacture with the firm’s wartime output reaching nearly 1,600 aeroplanes 
in only 2 years [142]. Figure 23 depicts some of this production: 
 
Figure 23: Sopwith Pup Aeroplanes under construction at Standard’s Canley 
Works 1916-1918 [142]                                
 
                      Source: Davy (1967) The ‘Standard’ Car 1903-1963 
 
Similar to the relocation of Standard, during 1916, the Manchester firm of Peel Conner 
wished to establish a large new factory in Coventry. They chose land to the East of the 
city in the area of Stoke for the magneto factory of Conner Magneto & Ignition Ltd. 
[26]. These two examples highlight how the cluster was becoming constrained within 
the existing city limits and new entrants had to continually locate outside the existing 
city boundary, especially if large modern premises were desired.  
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Areas devoid of any munition firms included land near to the central railway station, 
just South East of Alfred Herberts [76] factory. Furthermore only works such Daimler’s 
Radford premises [61] the National Fuse & Filling Factory No.10/21 [161] and the 
Ordnance Works [44, 45 & 46] had a direct link to the city’s rail network to despatch 
their completed munitions.  This suggests that many of the firm’s outputs would have 
been packed and despatched to be stored within the large marshalling yards around the 
main rail station and that is why no firms where located in that area. Another reason was 
because the late-war cluster was now served by two aerodromes. Radford Aerodrome 
[I] was where the city’s completed aeroplanes departed between 1915 and 1918. These 
would leave the factories by road (such as Siddeley-Deasy’s Parkside or Standard’s 
Canley works), with their wings detached, and then final assembly, testing and flying 
being conducted there. Towards the end of the war this was added to with Whitley 
Aerodrome [J] for the Royal Flying Corp. There is no evidence flying occurred there 
during the war and it was merely used for storage purposes. This suggests that it could 
have provided additional flying capacity for the city if the war had continued on into 
1919.  
 
Between 1916 and 1918 further support institutions were setup within the cluster in 
order to cope with the vast quantities of munitions the city was producing. These 
included offices for the Aircraft Inspectorate Department (A.I.D.) [B] and Munitions 
Inspection Department [G]. These were necessary to offer inspection, for any 
armaments and munitions produced, particularly for the smaller factories as most of the 
larger firms had their own on-site inspection capabilities or where strict quality 
standards need to be adhered to e.g. aero-engines. 
 
5.11 Ownership and Control 
 
The Coventry Armaments and Output Committee (C.A.O.C) continued to co-ordinate 
munitions supply within the late-war cluster, however its role had evolved. It was noted 
in section 5.7 that it was tendering directly to the Ministry of Munitions (M.O.M.) for 
contracts which, if accepted, could then be dispersed throughout the cluster along co-
operative lines.  
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By 1916 onwards, this situation had reversed and it was now the Ministry itself who 
instructed the Committee to place contracts with firms. Furthermore the Committee’s 
official history acknowledges how they found it increasingly more difficult to co-




Alongside the Armaments Committee, other important committees were established 
within the late-war cluster to serve the needs of munition firms. One such body was the 
Coventry Local Advisory Committee instigated by the Ministry of Labour, and tasked 
with particularly looking after welfare issues for the many women now working in the 
city’s munitions factories160. Another was the Coventry Local Munitions Tribunal 
which operated between 1915 and 1918. This was used to prosecute any munition 
workers in contravention of the Munitions of War Act of 1915161. If the worker was 
from a “controlled establishment” firm this gave the Tribunal even greater scope for its 
powers as labour within such firms was under tighter regulation. Misdemeanours 
included such things as petty theft, poor time keeping, too much sickness or to being 
caught sleeping when employed upon a night shift. This Tribunal was also used for 
arbitration between munition workers and their employers for matters such as pay and 
conditions or being denied a leaving certificate if the munition worker wished to work 
for another firm162
 
. With these committees operating (amongst others), this 
demonstrates how comprehensive the control and organisation of both firms and their 










                                                 
159 NA MUN5/363/1121.24/4 A greater discussion of the late-war activities of the C.A.O.C. is given in 
Chapter 6. 
160 See NA LAB2/321/ED27846/1918 for the minutes and composition of this Labour committee. 
161 See Annex 5 for a summary of this Act. 
162 See NA LAB2/53/MT145/1 & LAB2/61/MT145/6/1917 
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5.12 Armaments and Munitions Production  
 
Manufacturers that were machining shells, manufacturing fuses or components of either 
had slightly increased by 1918 to 40 firms. One such late-war firm, which turned to 
manufacturing fuses for the first time was the Singer Motor Company [135].  
The following table 11 (overleaf) summarizes Singer’s fuse production between 1916 
and 1919 and also the frequent changes in contracts; the scaling up of production as 
they became accustomed to their manufacture; and also the gradual decrease of the 
contact price from initially 13 shillings and 3 pence per fuse in 1916 to 8 shillings and 
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Table 11: Singer & Co. Ltd. Fuse Production 1916-1919 
 
Contract 
Date Contract Number Product Quantity 
Rate Per 
Week 









28/04/1916 94/F/585 Fuse No.80 MkVII 100,000 1,500-2,000 13s. 3d. 01/05/1916 31/08/1916 
30/11/1916 94/F/1017 Fuse No.80 MkVII continuous 20,000 11s. 6d.* 01/08/1916 31/03/1917 
01/04/1917 Continuation for 94/F/1017 Fuse No.80 MkVII ¢ continuous  11s. 6d. 01/04/1917 30/04/1917 
 Continuation for 94/F/1017 Fuse No.80 MkVII ¢ continuous  9s. 6d. 01/05/1917 30/06/1917 
 Continuation for 94/F/1017 Fuse No.80 MkVII ¢ continuous 25,000 9s. 01/07/1917  
01/01/1918 
2 Month Extension and 
Termination for 
94/F/1017 
Fuse No.80 MkVII ¢ 250,000 25,000 8s. 2d. 01/01/1918 28/02/1918 € 
07/02/1918 P.M./F/4365 Fuse No.131 MkIIIC continuous rising to 50,000    
22/03/1918 Continuation for P.M./F/4365 Fuse No.131 MkIIIC continuous     
15/06/1918 Continuation for P.M./F/4365 Fuse No.131 MkIIIC continuous     
13P/1243 Termination for P.M./F/4365 Fuse No.131 MkIIIC 
Total to be 
delivered not to 
exceed 501,856 
   06/03/1919 
Notes: * For any fuses delivered after 13/11/1916 
 ¢ Fuses could now be made if the M.O.M. so required in cast iron, steel or malleable iron instead of just brass, likely due to shortages of  the 
    later. 
 € It was noted that Singer did not meet this deadline as it was heavily engaged in switching production to the  No.131 fuse and thus only around 
    120,000 Type No.80 fuse had been produced for this contract by the end of February 1918.  
Sources:   NA MUN4/5302/ODE71 and MUN7/16 
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Despite there being a greater number of firms like Singer manufacturing shells and 
fuses within the late-war cluster, by January 1917, shell production had already peaked. 
This was mainly due to the fact that Coventry firm’s output now switched to the 218 
national shell and fuse factories the Ministry of Munitions had in operation for just such 
production163. This shift in emphasis for the late-war cluster, moving away from purely 
shell and fuse contracts, isn’t easily observable within Table 12 as the percentage of 
firms undertaking shell and fuse manufacture only declines by one percent. This can be 
accounted for by Coventry remaining a national centre for shell and fuse component 
manufacture, despite many local firms no longer assembling the complete item. To say 
that complete shell and fuse manufacture was winding down within the cluster would be 
misleading as this work was still being undertaken by many of the larger firms such as 
Daimler164, Humber and Standard, amongst others, but it was now no longer the 
manufacturing receiving their greatest attention. This can even be seen even for the 
National Fuse and Filling Factory [161], managed by White & Poppe, who reduced 




What the late-war cluster began to switch over to producing is described by the editor of 
Coventry and its Industries Official Handbook as: ‘Aeroplane production has been 
undertaken on a big scale, and many completed machines, built from wing to tail tip in 
the city, are [now] being produced’166
 
. This increase being noticeable within Table 12: 


















Cluster 88 29 33 25 28 
Late-War 
Cluster 137 44 32 44 32 
                                                 
163 This is compared to just 4 of these national factories in place in 1914. Glasgow Digital Library (see 
bibliography web-based sources) 
164 For example, Daimler between 1916 and 1918 had peaks of 2,000 12-inch shells per week. Ultimately 
they produced more of this type of shell than any other commercial firm in Britain; Frost (1920) and 
Thoms & Donnelly (1985) p74. 
165 The Limit No. 8 February 1919 ‘Exeunt Aeroplane Wings’ & Hassell (2003) 
166 Coventry and its Industries Official Handbook 1918.emphasis added. 
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Some motor firms in the late-war cluster responded by entering into aeroplane and aero-
engines manufacture for the first time. For example, Humber [86], Maudslay [95], Swift 
[145 & 146], and Singer [135] all entered into aero-engine manufacture from 1916 
onwards. However, the significant change was the vast quantities of aeroplanes and 
aero-engines Coventry firms were now asked to manufacture. Daimler [60 & 61] was 
discussed in section 5.4 as having entered aero-engine and aeroplane manufacture for 
the first time receiving a contract for 200 B.E.2c reconnaissance and artillery 
observation machines. Whereas now, within the late-war cluster, they were being tasked 
to build 1,500 R.E.8 general purpose aircraft.  
 
The need to manufacture in larger quantities also applied to aero-engine firms within the 
late-war cluster. Siddeley-Deasy [134 & 134], who had received an order to 
manufacture 300 R.A.F.1a engines in 1915 were now receiving total orders for 11,500 
puma aero-engines, some of which are shown in Figure 24 (overleaf). These engines 
cost around £900 each and took 1,380 man-hours to manufacture167.  The fact Siddeley-
Deasy decided to dedicate its energies towards aeroplane and aero-engine manufacture 
(particularly the puma aero-engine), transforming it from a modest company employing 
400 workers in 1914 to one with 6,000 by December 1918 working across a hugely 













                                                 
167 Flight 1st April 1943 p337. (see bibliography web-based sources) 
168 Flight 12th December 1918 p1418 
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Figure 24: Ten days average output of Siddeley-Deasy ‘Puma’ aero-engines 
awaiting dispatch from the Parkside Works [133] October 1918 
                 Source: The Employers Quarterly p48 
 
According to section 5.9 tanks were now seen as potentially war winning weapons and 
therefore hundreds were needed and this requirement was also placed upon firms within 
the late-war cluster. The Coventry Chain Company [31] became the main firm 
producing the tracks which transmitted their power onto the ground. They also 
manufactured the smaller chains used inside the tanks engine, gearbox, clutch and 
driveshafts169. Daimler [60 & 61] designed and manufactured the early tank engines by 
adapting their 105hp sleeve-valve motor vehicle engines, and along with Rover [122-





                                                 
169 The Link (1919-1921) p62. 
170 Frost, (1920)  p176 and Robson (1988) 
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By the end of hostilities the Ordnance Works [44-46] had assembled 111 complete 
Mk.IV tanks, but at their Scotstoun Works in Glasgow, although much of the armour-
plate was produced in Coventry171.  The main machine gun selected for use in British 
tanks was the British-made French Hotchkiss machine gun and it was the Coventry 
works which produced these, as well as supplying French, Belgium, Romanian, 
American and Russia requirements. It is noted that the Hotchkiss Artillery Works [83, 
84 & 85] at the beginning of 1916 were only averaging around 30 complete guns per 
week. By the end of 1918 this figure had rose dramatically to 420 machine guns per 
week172.  The total output of Hotchkiss machine guns from the end of December 1915 
(during which month the first 9 guns for the British Government were delivered) to the 
close of 1918 was 35,381173. From this total 26, 000 were delivered between February 
1917 and November 1918, demonstrating how productivity had increased and also how 
standardized mass-production had swept aside small batch production which prevailed 

















                                                 
171 Bacon (1920) Appendix IV pp384-386 and Childs (1999) Part1: Chapters 2 & 4 and Nowell (1927) 
172 MUN5/377/1410/4 
173 MUN5/377/1410/3 p1 
174 H.M.S.O. (1920) The History of the Ministry of Munitions Part V Chapter 3 pp19, 22-23. From 1916 
onwards Hotchkiss turned to local sub-contracting as another means to increase output. 
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Figure 25: The Hotchkiss et Cie. Artillery Works [83, 84 & 85],  
Far Gosford Street c.1918, looking South 
 
                 Source: Hotchkiss (c.1920s) A Souvenir of a Visit to the Hotchkiss Works 
 
A final sector within the late-war cluster which continued to growth was that of the 
city’s electrical engineering firms involved in magneto production. As noted in section 
5.4, ML Magneto was one such firm which immediately turned to producing them 
within the early war cluster. According to section 5.8 they continually expanded their 
manufacturing capability which necessitated moving to larger premises (figure 20). An 
indication of the growth of this firm; the expansion of this sector within the late-war 
cluster; and also the rise of a British magneto industry, is given by examining their 
production figures. During October 1914 they were producing just eight magnetos per 
week; by October 1918 this was now 800 magnetos per week in a variety of types175
                                                 
175 Flight 20th February 1919 p257. 
. 
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5.13 Summary of Coventry’s Armaments and Munitions Cluster 1914 - 1918 
 
This chapter has discussed and mapped the armaments and munitions cluster for 
Coventry during the First World War. Three different time periods were examined in 
detail and all the firms and institutions that could be identified as internal to the 
armaments and munitions cluster were tabulated and mapped. Table 13 (overleaf) now 
provides an overall summary of the changing patterns within this cluster through the 
First World War. 
 
By comparing column 2 (early war cluster) with column 4 (mid-war cluster), the cluster 
expanded at its greatest rate between December 1914 and December 1915.  This is 
quantified as the cluster more than tripled in size as a result of the ‘Shells Crisis’ and the 
setting up of the Ministry of Munitions and the Coventry Armaments Output 
Committee. Furthermore when comparing the growth between the early and mid-war 
cluster with that of the mid-war and late-war cluster the number of new entrant firms 
slowed down towards the end of the war by a factor of half. In other words, the cluster 
was expanding at twice the rate during mid-war period when compared to the late-war 
period. This suggests that both positive and negative factors need to be identified which 
may have either enticed new entrants into the cluster at specific time periods or may 
have hindered them joining. Perhaps Swann’s ideas (addressed in chapter 2) such as 
congestion effects may have been at work within the cluster. Another pattern which 
emerged by the mid-war period and continued to increase in the late-war cluster was the 
rise in stamping, pressing and forging firms. Table 13 shows this sector changed from 
zero firms within the early war cluster, to have by the war's end, 32 firms serving the 
cluster and national requirements. Therefore clearly the demands for munitions 
provided a major impetus for firms of this sector.  
 
 
Another observation is of a more general nature: that of the adaptability of the cluster. It 
was noted in all three clusters that at each time the main armament or munition tasked to 
produce changed in emphasis.  
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Cycle, Motorcycle & 
Motorcar Manufacturers 9 21 30 4 34 
Component 
Manufacturers 11 25 36 14 50 
Machine Tool 
Manufacturers 4 5 8 8 16 
Pressing, Stamping & 
Foundry Firms 0 11 11 21 32 
Armament 
Manufacturers 1 2 3 2 5 
Total Factories = 25 63 88 49 137 
Support Institutions and 
Infrastructure 5 5 10 3 13 
Total Cluster = 30 68 98 52 150 
    Increase (+)  327%  Increase (+ ) 153% 
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At the beginning of the war it was vehicular transport. By the mid-war period many 
engineering firms were tasked to produce shells and fuses - products which would have 
been alien to many. By the end of hostilities mass-production of war-winning weapons 
such as aeroplanes, aero-engines, tanks and machine guns was being asked of the 
cluster. This rapid adaptation and switching of production suggests that the city’s 
industry was highly receptive to any new wartime demands placed upon it. However, 
what is left unexplored is how and what mechanism(s) firms used to achieve such a 
rapid and harmonious transition under wartime conditions. Also how local businesses 
and the Ministry of Munitions played a role in bringing about these changes and how 
this evolving armaments and munitions cluster can be conceptualised in relation to the 
ideas discussed in chapter 2.  
 
These questions demonstrate the need for a further more intensive and qualitative 
examination of some of the constituent parts of the cluster, namely particular key firms, 
support infrastructure and institutions and the linkages or relationships between them. 
For this a smaller range of these shall be examined for each of the three time periods in 
order to understand ultimately how the clusters operated and why was it largely 
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The previous chapter highlighted the existence and evolution of a local industrial cluster 
of armament and munition firms in Coventry between 1914 and 1918. This final 
analysis chapter explores the processes underlying these patterns, and in so doing, 
conceptualizes the types of industrial clustering exhibited by the armaments and 
munitions sector in Coventry.   The chapter begins by discussing the significance of 
Daimler in the early war cluster. In addition, the roles of some of the early-war business 
support institutions are discussed. This enables the type of cluster that characterised the 
early development of the armaments and munitions sector to be revealed.  The second 
part of the chapter examines the impact the Ministry of Munitions played upon and 
within the cluster from mid-1915 onwards.  In particular the significance of the local 
armaments committee in shaping this mid-war cluster is shown. The third and final part 
discusses the late-war form taken by the armaments and munitions cluster with a 
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Part A – The Early War Cluster: August 1914 to Spring 1915 
“Nucleated Hub-and-Spoke” 
 
6.1 Recapping the main features of a hub-and-spoke cluster 
 
Before discussing the type of cluster model which typifies the early war phase, it is 
timely to summarise the key constituent features of a hub-and-spoke cluster. 
 
     Table 14: ‘Idealized’ Features of a                   Figure 26: A Typical Hub- 
            Hub-and-Spoke Cluster                 and–Spoke Cluster   
 
1. Business structure dominated by one or 
several large, vertically integrated firms 
surrounded by suppliers. 
2. Substantial intra-cluster trade amongst 
dominant institutions and suppliers. 
3. Key investment decisions made locally, 
but spread out nationally. 
4. Long-term contracts and commitments 
between dominant firms and suppliers. 
5. High degrees of cooperation and linkages 
with firms both locally and externally. 
6. Labour market internal to the cluster and 
less flexible. 
7. High rates of labour in-migration, but less out-migration 
8. Evolution of unique local cultural identity and bonds 
9. Specialized sources of finance, technical expertise and business services which are 
dominated by large firms. 
10. Absence of trade associations that provide shared infrastructure – management, 
training, marketing, technical or financial help, i.e., mechanisms for risk sharing 
and stabilization. 
11. Strong local government role in regulating and promoting core industries in local, 
provincial and national government. 
12. A high degree of public involvement in providing infrastructure. 
                          Source: Summarized from Markusen (1996) p297, Figure 1, p298 Table 1 and pp302-304 
 
In what follows, these general characteristics are related to the early war armaments and 
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6.2 Daimler August 1914 to Spring 1915 – An example of an early war “hub” firm 
 
This section shall begin by examining the city’s largest motor firm of Daimler which 
was one example of a “hub” firm. This firm is chosen for detailed analysis partly due to 
the evidence available, but also because it began producing a range of munitions 
immediately war was declared. As may be recalled from the previous chapter, Daimler 
was immediately involved in producing staff cars, lorries and ambulances (including 
requisitioned, converted and newly manufactured). They also entered into 
manufacturing aero engines (based on licensed French designs) and aircraft (based on 
standardised Royal Aircraft Factory designs) for the first time in 1914. 
 
In 1910 the Birmingham Small Arms (B.S.A) rifle firm had merged with Daimler as the 
former had entered into motorcar production but with limited success176. As a result 
B.S.A. placed two directors of its own on the board of Daimler and for Daimler, both 
Edward Manville and Percy Martin, became leading figures on B.S.A’s board. Within 
four years a profit of £430,000 was generated and Daimler was therefore in a strong 
financial position at the beginning of hostilities to risk entering into the uncertain 
manufacturing of aero-engines177
 
. Daimler also had financial security as it could rely on 
the support of its parent firm. Despite this merger, Daimler was largely still self-
managed with key investment decisions made within the cluster and thus confirms to 
the third idealized feature in the proceeding table 14.  
It is likely Daimler would have been encouraged to enter into aero engine manufacture 
as shortly after the amalgamation with B.S.A (between 1910 and 1911) the later had 






                                                 
176 For a greater discussion on this merger see Lloyd-Jones & Lewis (2005)  
177 Arms & Explosives, November 1913 as cited in Trebilcock (1969) p. 489. 
178 Montagu & Burgess-Wise (1995) Daimler Century, Chapter 5 Sleeve Valves Go To War, p163. 
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This shows that Daimler had acquired some limited pre-war experience with aero-
engine development (through B.S.A.), and in this instance relied upon long-term 
specialized and external sources of technical expertise from Lanchester, which it then 
attempted to perfect and make a commercial success179
 
. These features confirm to the 
fourth, fifth and ninth idealized features in the proceeding table 14. 
In addition, Daimler also enjoyed the engineering influence of B.S.A. who were said to 
have ‘perfected the repetition system’, which meant the firm found ‘itself in a pre-
eminent position in whatever industry it desired to participate’180
 
. This meant that, 
between 1910 and 1914, B.S.A.’s influence had spread to Daimler and in particular 
when Edward Manville, Chairman of Daimler, acquired the rights to manufacture the 
American designed ‘Silent Knight’ engine, it was largely through B.S.A. engineering 
practices which Daimler could perfect its manufacture and ultimately achieve financial 
profitability. This again reinforces the fifth point in table 14 that Daimler had a high 
degree of co-operation and linkage (in this instance the diffusion of engineering 
practices) with its external parent firm. 
Furthermore the experience gained from the successful manufacture of the Knight 
automotive engine eased the transition for the immediate manufacture of the Gnome 
aero-engine in 1914 as ‘many of the operations – including making the cylinders – 
involved turning relatively large components’ which the firm had perfected in the 
manufacture of the sleeves for the Knight engine181
 
. Daimler was therefore a firm which 
showed a continued path dependency – namely repeating the successful 
knowledge/technological acquisition from external firms or individuals. With the 
declaration of war, they once again were able to rely on this practice and secure the 
exclusive rights to manufacture the Gnome engine in Coventry through the French 
firm’s London agents.  
                                                 
179 Frederick Lanchester was Daimler’s consulting engineer for 20 years and also the owner of a motorcar 
manufacturing business in Birmingham of the same name.  
180 Ibid, Trebilcock (1969) p489. B.S.A. had been producing guns and ammunition since 1861 and 
certainly followed American practices in this respect with the inter-changeability of parts and repetitious 
production. 
181 Montagu & Burgess-Wise (1995) p164. 
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This section discussed how Daimler had substantial long-standing external linkages to 
other regional engineering firms, namely B.S.A.; for management, capital and 
engineering practices; further linkages to Lanchester in Birmingham for design work, 
and finally to American and French firms for their initial technology acquisition. These 
reasons explain to some extent why motor vehicle firms such as Daimler were able to 
enter into armaments and munitions production as soon as war commenced. Similar 
reasons therefore could apply to other motor firms within the city and highlight the 
complexity of factors which might have facilitated entry into the early war cluster. 
Having demonstrated how Daimler at the beginning of the war conformed to points 
three, fourth, five and nine in table 14, the next section will highlight other reasons as to 
why it was a “hub” firm. Additionally it will give examples of what are termed in 
Figure 26 as ‘small, local firms’ which help supply the “hub” firm in some capacity. 
 
6.3 Daimler August 1914 to Spring 1915 – A “Hub” firm situated within a network 
of key local suppliers 
 
Another way Daimler may be viewed as an early war “hub” firm situated within a hub-
and spoke cluster can be drawn from its position within the supply chain of the cluster. 
Before the war, it had made substantial investments into some key local suppliers. Two 
of these large investments were due to the fact that Daimler wished for an increased 
supply of chains and forgings182. Thus in 1907 Daimler financed, to the degree of 
£30,000, the relocation and reformation of the Coventry Chain Company from their 
original small Dale Street premises to a large purpose-built factory at Spon End183
 
.  
Daimler also placed two representatives of their own on Coventry Chain’s board and 
therefore maintained a controlling influence there. Coventry Chain also formed a 
subsidiary company that of Coventry Repetition which also became a supplier of items 
such as nuts and bolts to Daimler. 
In the same year Daimler also invested in Albion Drop Forgings who were able to use 
this capital for new machinery to increase their output.  
                                                 
182 Lloyds Bank Archive (LBA) B379a.16 6th February 1907 as cited in Beaven (1994) 
183 Tripp (1956) Renold Chains p88 & Ashby (2003) Spon Street & Spon End p135. 
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As a result, between 1909 and 1912, Albion’s turnover increased from £9,000pa to 
£30,000pa184 and by 1914 this had again increased and stood at £60,000, all largely 
through the increased demands placed on them by Daimler. Close geographical location 
also seemed a factor in this decision to invest in this key local supplier as Albion built 
their new factory in 1906 close to Daimler’s Radford factory and during the war the two 
were set on either side of the Radford Aerodrome185
 
. 
In this new factory Albion continually invested in new larger machinery, for example a 
25cwt ordered from the local heavy machine tool firm of Brett’s Patent Lifter and which 
was described by them as ‘far in advance of anything we had used before’186. This 
shows the presence of some intra-cluster trade between different supplier firms and this 
confirms with the 2nd feature in table 14. Between 1906 and 1913, Albion further 
increased its plant with an additional 15 drop hammers and again the firm opted for ever 
larger plant this time up to 45cwt. By 1913, the firm continued this trend by installing 
larger 3 ton batteries designed to produce such work as ‘motor crankshafts and front 




These constant additions to plant, accruing from Daimler contracts, meant the firm, 
when describing its history, could state that ‘this constant progress and installation of 
up-to-date equipment meant that in 1914 the company was an important member of the 
drop forging world and able to make a very good contribution to the war effort’188
                                                 
184 LBA B379a/18 9th August 1909 as cited in Beaven (1994) 
. So it 
would seem one crucial early-war factor for entry into munitions was the possibility of 
firms possessing modern, recently installed plant which they then needed to keep fully 
occupied. Also this highlights the strong backward linkages between this local drop 
forging firm and motor car assembler. Therefore if a “hub” firm such as Daimler 
entered into munitions production during 1914 it is likely it would also entice its heavily 
dependent key local suppliers along with it.  
185 See previous chapter, map 3 and the close proximity of factories 2 Albion Drop Forgings and 
61Daimler.  
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This helps to suggest one reason at least as to why as many as 25 firms were noted in 
chapter 5 section A entering into armaments and munitions immediately during 1914. 
This examination of Daimler and some of its key suppliers demonstrates that Daimler 
was a “hub” firm embracing some vertical integration through backward linkages to key 
suppliers such as Coventry Chain and Albion Drop Forgings. It also highlights the 
existence of these smaller, local firms which were heavily dependent through financial 
and managerial linkages to their “hub” firm. Furthermore their own growth and 
profitability was heavily associated with their strong linkages as key suppliers to 
Daimler. All of these features conform to points one, two and four in table 14.  
 
Having now identified the existence of two types of firms, the linkages between them, 
and having revealed some of the reasons for entry into the early war cluster, it is also 
important to note that other entities played an active role within the cluster’s operation. 
Feature 10 in table 14 suggests an absence of trade associations within a hub-and-spoke 
cluster and this is where the early war Coventry armaments and munitions cluster 
differs from Markusen’s (1996) model. The next section will therefore examine the role 
of two early war support entities, one being a trade association which worked alongside 
some of the 25 munition firms and the other being the city’s own branch of the 
Chambers of Commerce which was involved with the majority of firms. 
 
6.4 Support Institutions within the Early Cluster – “Business As Usual” and  
“Hub-firm” led 
 
This section shall explore the operations of two of the early war support institutions 
operating within the cluster. This is necessary as trade associations are additional 
entities which affect the linkages between firms and therefore the clusters form and 
operation. This relates to features 10 and 11 in the proceeding table14.  
First the role of the Cycle and Motor Cycle Manufacturers and Traders Union Limited 
(C.M.C.M.T.U.) will be analysed and secondly the Coventry Chambers of Commerce 
(C.C.C.). What shall be revealed is how these local support entities operated alongside 
early munition firms and if these confirm to what is expected to be found in a hub-and-
spoke model.  
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The Cycle and Motor Cycle Manufacturers and Traders Union Limited 
(C.M.C.M.T.U.) 
 
One of the leading trade associations for Coventry firms was the nationally recognised 
C.M.C.M.T.U, founded in 1890 and by 1914 still based in the city centre189
 
. Its 
membership included nearly all the city’s cycle, motorcycle and related component 
manufacturers and by the wars beginning totalled 272 firms from all the leading cycle 
and motorcycle manufacturing centres of Britain such as Wolverhampton, Birmingham, 
Nottingham and London. Its function before the war was to organise trade fairs, 
stimulate export trade and promote co-operation amongst the trade generally. The 
following Table 15 lists the Coventry based members by September 1914: 
Table 15: Coventry based members of the Cycle and Motor Cycle Manufacturers  
& Traders Union Limited (C.M.C.M.T.U.) September 1914 
Firm Name Firm Name Firm Name 
Bayliss, Thomas & Co. Gloria Cycle Co., Ltd. Rex Motor Manufacturing Co., Ltd. 
Bluemel Bros., Ltd. Hazlewoods, Ltd. Rotherham & Sons., Ltd. 
Bramble Manufacturing Co., 
Ltd. Hobart Bird and Co., Ltd. New Rover Cycle Co., Ltd. 
Calcott Bros., Ltd Humber Ltd. Rudge-Whitworth, Ltd. 
Centaur Co. Ltd. Lea & Francis Ltd. Singer & Co., Ltd. 
Clark, Cluley and Co. Middlemore & Lamplugh, Ltd. 
Sparkbrook Manufacturing 
Co. 
Coventry Chain Co., Ltd. Mills-Fulford, Ltd. Sterling Metals, Ltd. 
Coventry Plating & 
Presswork Co., Ltd. Montgomery, W. & Co. Swift Cycle co., Ltd. 
Coventry Swaging Co. Ltd. Monopole Cycle & Motor Co., Ltd. Triumph Cycle Co., Ltd. 
Dingley Bros. Premier Cycle Co., Ltd. Williamson Motor Co., Ltd. 
Notes: Firms given in bold represent the ones holding central positions in this association's 
management structure, namely Harry Smith from Rover was President and Siegfried Bettmann, 
representing Triumph, was Vice-President. Furthermore the second Vice President was a Mr C.A. 
Hyde, representing B.S.A., Daimler’s parent company. In addition Alfred Bednell, a local 
manufacturer’s agent, was the secretary of this union.  
Source: MRC. MSS.204/3/1/2 
 
 
                                                 
189 See Chapter 5 maps 1, 2 & 3 marked as C. 
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An example of how this Union co-ordinated the early war cycle and motorcycle 
manufacturers is revealed for the Russian motorcycle orders that some Coventry firms 
succeeded in capturing in the first few months of war190
 
. During the negotiations this 
Union instructed its members; when a second Russian order was seen to be imminent, 
the conditions by which they should proceed: 
1. Each manufacturer to make his own quotation for 
machines, accessories and spares, according to his own 
ideas on what he can get for his particular type. 
2. Payment to be in cash sterling after inspection at makers 
works and before packing. 
3. The quotation should be handed to the Secretary [Alfred 
Bednell] of this Union who would negotiate for and on 
behalf of all manufacturers tendering.191
 
  
Importantly point 1 reveals the Union did not attempt any form of price fixing across 
the whole trade, but rather wished to co-ordinate, as an intermediary, their tendering, 
ordering and delivery for this war order to Britain’s ally. This highlights that some 
manufacturer’s trade unions were important in helping firms obtain their first munitions 
contracts and firms which were members could perhaps become ‘first movers’ in 
moving away from supplying their private customers and instead working for the War 
Office or a foreign allied power within only a few weeks of war having been declared.  
This therefore is something which goes against feature 10 in table14. In this early war 
armaments and munitions cluster, the C.M.C.M.T.U. was an example of a trade 
association which had a strong local presence that provided assistance with management 






                                                 
190 Unfortunately the telegrams between the Union, the Coventry manufacturers and a Colonel Starr in 
London all seem to have been destroyed and only letters and part transcripts remain. 
191 MRC. MSS.204/3/1/2, Untitled Letters dated 19th and 27th October 1914. Emphasis added. 
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The Coventry Chambers of Commerce (C.C.C.) 
 
A second and more encompassing support institution was the city’s Chambers of 
Commerce based in the city centre192
 
.  This Chamber represented nearly all the factories 
in the city and also commercial businesses such as shopkeepers. It therefore was the 
main forum for manufacturers and traders to discuss any problems arising from the 
pressures of wartime. Within only a matter of weeks of the declaration of war, a 
Coventry Emergency Committee (C.E.C.) was formed and its composition is given 
below:  
Table 16: The Coventry Emergency Committee (C.E.C.) September 1914 
Appointed Candidate Positions Committees 
Councillor Siegfried 
Bettmann 











Alderman Drinkwater  Representing the Distress 
Committee Mrs. S. A. Griffiths  
Councillor Barnacle Chairman 
Representing the Board of 
Guardians Mr. H. R. Farren Vice-Chairman 
Mr. E. A. Evans Clerk 
Councillor Jones Chairman 
Representing the Education 
Committee Councillor Bates Vice-Chairman 
Mr. F. Horner Clerk 
Mr. W. J. Wormell  Representing the Coventry  & Warwickshire Hospital 
Mr. Edward Manville  
(Daimler Chairman)  
Representing the Coventry 
Chambers of Commerce 
Councillor Wale Vice-Chairman Representing the Insurance 
Committee Mr. J. C. Lee Gordon Clerk 
   
   
                                                 
192 See Chapter 5 maps 1, 2 & 3 marked as H. 
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Councillor Instone  
Representing Employers of Labour 
Councillor Pugh   
(Rudge-Whitworth)  
Admiral Bacon 
 (Coventry Ordnance)  
Messrs. J. Cramp 
 (Engineers & Machine 
Tools) 
 
Alfred Herbert   
(Machine Tools)  
Edward M. Iliffe  
(Newspaper  Magnate)  
Messrs. T. P. Jackson President of the  Trades Council 
Representing Trade Unions  
(Entitled to 3 more members not yet 
appointed) Mr. J. Chater Secretary 
Mrs. Bettmann Mayoress 
Representing Special Women's 
Organisations 
Miss Crabb Nursing Institute 
Mrs. H. E. Givens  
Mrs. M. A. Keene  
Miss Seymour  
Mrs. Wyley  
Mrs. Cuffee  
For the Soldiers & Sailors Families 
Association 
Mrs. Ewan Rotherham  
Hon. Mrs. Hood 
G  
 
Miss Helen Rotherham  










Golden Cross Society  
Chapelfields Society  
Earlsdon Society  
Hillfields Society  
Stoke Society  
Foleshill Society  
Great Heath Society  
Mr. F. Cunliffe  
Representing the Coventry Co-
operative Society Mr. J. Crompton  
Mr. T. Harris  
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Rev. Canon Baillie 
Other Members 
 
Rev. R. B. Littlewood  
Rev. T. Goodman  
Rev. R. P. Rea  
Mr. H. Sims  
Mr. J. S. Bold  
Mr. W. Carson  
Mr G. G. Beagley  




All Saint's Ward   
Bablake Ward   
Cheylesmore Ward   
Foleshill Ward   
Greyfriars Ward   
                Source: Coventry Herald (C.H.) 4-5th September 1914 
 
The C.E.C. was formed partly through the amalgamation of the Coventry Chambers of 
Commerce and the Coventry Corporation (the town council) and it may be seen as the 
first major step towards greater local control of the city during war-time. In relation to 
the Coventry Corporation’s early involvement in starting this committee, this conforms 
to feature 11 in table 14, whereby there is expected to find, in a hub-and-spoke cluster, a 
strong local government role in regulating and promoting core industries locally, 
regionally and nationally – in this instance Coventry’s engineering sector. Furthermore 
the composition of this committee is largely made up of local councillors and alderman 
and not engineering employers. For a city with the manufacturing capacity of circa 330 
engineering firms, this demonstrates minimalist employer representation and as a result 
little early war co-operation between manufacturers, the War Office or local 
government ensued.  
 
Upon examining the role of this committee it was initiated to deal with any immediate 
disruptions of a general nature caused by the outbreak of war. For example, one policy 
it negotiated was for support to be offered to women & families suffering financial 
hardship due to their husbands having enlisted.  
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As a result, many of the city’s leading manufacturers, including Triumph, Maudslay, 
and the Coventry Ordnance, had to ‘fall in line’ and offer seven shillings per week, per 
dependent, and one shilling extra per child under 14193. This committee was also 
instigated in an advisory capacity to help manufacturers with information such as the 
changes in shipping matters or the avoidance or suspension of patents and licences to 
subjects of states at war with this country194
 
. 
In relation to the hub-and-spoke cluster as a whole, the C.E.C. can therefore be seen as a 
local advisory and organisational actor which had weak support from new wartime 
legislation. For instance it possessed little power to direct labour or material supply and 
had no financial inducement mechanisms to encourage new or increased munition 
production. Furthermore both the C.E.C. and the Chambers of Commerce were merely 
forums for the many new wartime problems to be discussed, such as the city’s railway, 
housing or labour difficulties. They can both thus be seen as a continuation of the pre-
war “business as usual” attitude which persisted in the early war cluster where the 
emphasis to mobilise for war production remained with the respective firm, its directors 
or an entrepreneur. Furthermore section 6.3 demonstrated that leading “hub” firms (such 
as Daimler) were also crucial to encouraging other firms to become early munitions 
producers. 
 
One final observation of both the C.M.C.M.T.U. and the C.E.C. is the dominant part 
played within them by the large “hub” firms of the cluster. For example, Edward 
Manville (Daimler Chairman) was elected President of the Coventry Chambers of 
Commerce in October 1913 and continued in this position right throughout the war and 
thereby represented the Chamber on the 1914 Emergency Committee. Admiral Reginald 
Bacon (Managing Director, Ordnance Works.) was Vice-President of the Chamber and 
represented employers concerning labour issues on the Emergency Committee until he 
was recalled to active military service in early 1915. The same can be seen within the 
C.M.C.M.T.U. where the Vice-Presidents were Mr C.A. Hyde from B.S.A./Daimler and 
the 1914 Mayor Siegfried Bettmann from Triumph and involved with Standard also.  
                                                 
193 C.H.14/15th, 21st/22nd & 28th/29th August 1914. 
194 C.H.28/29th August 1914 ‘Coventry Chamber of Commerce Emergency Committee And Its Work’ 
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This ‘strength’ in terms of the involvement of the larger “hub” firms in these support 
entities is more associated with an Italianate Marshallian cluster than a hub-and-spoke 
cluster195
 
. In these Italianate clusters trust is central to firms being able to co-operate 
and act collectively (Harrison 1992 and Saxenian 1994). It is likely this trust was also 
present in wartime Coventry as it was still essentially a large provincial town, where 
nearly all the business leaders socialized or knew of each other. It may have also been 
driven by patriotism engendering collective activity and also a sense of embeddedness 
to wider structures and contexts. For example, the urgent needs of the Russian 
government in 1914 for immediate motorcycles, regardless of type, seems to have led 
them to approach a Colonel Starr in London, who in turn approached the C.M.C.M.T.U. 
directly, rather than any single contractor. This then provided an opportunity where 
several firms could come together to supply the same allied power very rapidly and 
offer mutual assistance. 
This first section has now discussed the form and complexity of Coventry's early war 
















                                                 
195 For a discussion of the Italianate, Marshallian cluster type see Chapter 2 
 
 - 126 - 
6.5 Summary of the early war hub-and-spoke armaments and munitions cluster 
 
The early war Coventry munitions cluster may be summarized by the following table: 
 
Table 17: The Early War Cluster August 1914 to Spring 1915 
 
• The dominant cluster model which characterized the early war phase of 
armaments and munitions production in Coventry was a nucleated hub-and-
spoke cluster. 
• It was nucleated as the cluster comprised a series of “hub” firms, with Daimler 
being one such example discussed, with Alfred Herbert Ltd. and the Coventry 
Ordnance Works being two others. 
• ‘Spoking’ out from these hub firms there was a series of small local supplier 
firms with strong linkages between themselves and their larger “hub” firm. 
• The “hubs” firms also had important linkages to firms external to the cluster such 
as Daimler with B.S.A. and Lanchester. 
• One area where the early war Coventry cluster departed from a typical hub-and-
spoke model was it had a far stronger local trade association presence which was 
also “hub” firm led. 
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Figure 27: The Coventry Hub-and-Spoke Armaments and Munitions Cluster  
August 1914 – Spring 1915 
 
 
Having now analysed the cluster between August 1914 and the early Spring of 1915, the 
second part of this chapter will now examine the mid-war cluster between late Spring 
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Part B – The Mid War Cluster: Spring 1915 to December 1915  
A “State-Anchored/Centred Cluster” 
 
6.6 Recapping the main features of a “State-Anchored/Centred Cluster” 
 
Before discussing the type of cluster model which typifies this mid-war phase, it is 
timely to summarise the key constituent features of a state-anchored/centred cluster. 
 
Table 18: ‘Idealized’ Features of a State-Anchored/Centred Cluster 
1. Business structure dominated by one or several large non-profit entities, such as 
government institutions, military bases, a weapons laboratory or a large 
university and is surrounded by suppliers and customers 
2. Substantial intra-cluster trade amongst dominant institutions and suppliers, but 
not among others 
3. Key investment decisions made at various levels of government both internally 
and   
externally 
4. Short-term contracts and commitments between dominant institutions and 
suppliers and customers 
5. Low degree of cooperation among local private-sector firms to share risk, 
stabilize market, share innovation 
6. Labour market national in scope for professional/technical and managerial 
workers 
7. High rates of labour in-migration, but less out-migration unless government is 
withdrawing or closing down 
8. Evolution of unique local cultural identity and bonds 
9. No specialized sources of finance, technical expertise or business services 
10. Weak trade associations to share information 
11. Weak local government role in regulating and promoting core activities. 
12. A high degree of public involvement in providing infrastructure 
                                       Source: Summarized from Markusen (1996) p299 Table1 & pp306-307. 
 
As discussed in chapter two this type of cluster is more difficult to represent in 
diagrammatic form.196
 
 This is why no cluster diagram can be given at this stage, but one 
shall be developed during the course of this mid-war analysis. In relation to the main 
characteristics in table 18, the mid war armaments and munitions cluster shall now be 
discussed.  
                                                 
196 See chapter 2 for a further discussion on a state-anchored/centred cluster. 
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6.7 ‘Anchoring’ and ‘Centring’ the mid–war Armaments and Munitions Cluster 
 
As highlighted in chapter 5, after the spring of 1915, the Coventry cluster went through 
many rapid changes during the course of that year, including 63 more firms entering 
into armaments and munitions production. These firms, along with the 30 already 
manufacturing from 1914, were now tasked to produce an increasing variety of 
munitions such as shells, fuses, aero-engines, aeroplanes and components such a high 
tension magnetos. Furthermore the number of local support institutions also doubled. 
By this same time the cluster became heavily influenced by external governmental 
pressure, brought about by the ‘Shells Crisis’. As a response one prominent 
organizational change within the cluster was the formation of a local armaments 
committee (the C.A.O.C.) which was central in adapting and co-ordinating the 
engineering firms. In this respect, it was this armaments committee which became the 
main non-profit ‘anchoring’ and ‘centring’ entity within the cluster.  
 
Before this committee was in operation central government began its involvement in the 
mid-war cluster through surveying the local engineering firms and trying to entice firms 
into shell and fuse production directly through local exhibitions. After this is briefly 
discussed, this section shall move onto the main way in which the mid-war cluster was 
successfully anchored and controlled, through the apparatus of the Armaments 
Committee. It shall also be shown how the Committee’s Engineer and Secretary were 
also central to the cluster's operations during this time. This will demonstrate, in relation 
to table 18, how features 1-3 were present and also how and why feature 9 in this mid-
war cluster differed somewhat. After this, the next section shall outline the direct ways 
in which the Ministry of Munitions anchored, expanded and co-ordinated the mid-war 
cluster through the provision of capital for firms and also by upgrading and 
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6.8 The Beginnings of State Control – Surveys and Local Exhibitions 
 
One of the first policies initiated in the cluster was a national census of machinery 
conducted jointly by the Home Office, the Board of Trade and the War Office over the 
winter of 1914-1915. This was to assess the types and numbers of machinery, 
particularly lathes, which local engineering firms possessed. These same firms also 
supplied the inspectors with the numbers being utilised presently for War Office, 
Admiralty, Allied foreign power or private contracts. They also recorded the number 
and classes of skilled men they employed on these different types of work197. In 
addition to this survey, the Board of Trade and the War Office instigated a series of 
munition exhibitions at local labour exchanges and drill halls. These were conducted on 
the 10th of March 1915 at London, Birmingham, Coventry, Leeds, Sheffield, 
Manchester, Liverpool, Newcastle and Glasgow. The articles exhibited were 13-pdr, 15-
pdr, 18-pdr, 4.5in shells and No.100 fuse. The last three of these Coventry manufactures 
would go on to produce in great quantities.198
 
 Photographs of munitions exhibitions in 
the city’s Drill Hall (figure 28 overleaf), at around this time, also reveal that it was not 
just shells and fuses that local manufactures were being enticed to produce, and perhaps 










                                                 
197 Surviving completed forms for local firms were looked for as a further means to determine which 
firms became armaments and munitions manufacturers and to also reveal information on the size of these 
firms and the numbers they employed. However, these completed census sheets appear not to have 
survived.  
198 H.M.S.O. (1920) Official History of the Ministry of Munitions, Industrial Mobilisation 1914-15 Pt.III 
Ch.1 Beginnings of Local Organization pp8-9 
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Figure 28: Munitions Exhibitions – Coventry Drill Hall c.1915 
          
Source: Coventry Photographic Collection ‘Pictures of Coventry’ (see bibliography web-based sources) 
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Although these exhibitions were an important first step in educating firms, it seemed 
that a different approach was needed to fully mobilise the engineering sector for 
munitions production. That change came in April 1915 when areas of Britain were 
formed into what were known as “A” areas. Coventry was one such area, designated 
area number 4 and centred around the Ordnance Works.199
 
 This form of national 
division now made it possible for the city to be treated as a single district which could 
then be mobilised and adapted for munitions production. This was encouraged by the 
creation of a new local armaments committee. 
6.9 The Coventry Armaments Output Committee (C.A.O.C.) – The main non-
profit ‘anchoring’ and ‘centring’ entity 
 
The most important support entity in the city during wartime was one instigated during 
the spring of 1915 in direct response to the national shells crisis. It became known as the 
(C.A.O.C.) and can be considered as the main non-profit entity ‘anchoring’ and co-
ordinating the mid-war cluster as outlined in feature 1 table 18. The beginnings of this 
committee originated from a general meeting in March 1915 of the city’s Machinery, 
Tool and Engineering Association which passed a resolution to ‘offer every support and 
assistance to the Government in the organisation of the engineering industry’200.  A 
preliminary step towards greater co-operation between the city’s manufacturers came 
into being when nine of the leading federated firms formed a joint-committee.201
 
  
This high degree of co-operation between firms to form a joint-committee is a feature 
(according to table 18 feature 5) not readily identifiable within a state-anchored/centred 
cluster. However, this cluster differed in this respect due to the wartime pressures that 
these manufacturers were facing.  
                                                 
199 Who was the principal War Office contractor. H.M.S.O. (1920) Official History of the Ministry of 
Munitions 
200 This was some two months before the setting up of the Ministry of Munitions and before the shells 
crisis dominated public opinion suggesting that partly it was the city’s manufacturers who were pushing 
for greater organisation of armaments and munitions production which national events merely 
accelerated. 
201 This comprised the Ordnance Works, Daimler, White & Poppe, Alfred Herbert’s, Webster & Bennett, 
Selson Engineering, Siddeley-Deasy, Maudslay and Coventry Chain. NA MUN5/363/1121.24/2 p2. 
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For example, the onset of war brought with it the greater restriction of foreign markets; 
higher labour competition from firms already producing munitions who could offer 
workers, particularly women, higher wages; restrictions on materials such as castings, 
including steel motor vehicle wheels, and also a sense of patriotism propelling the firm 
owners themselves202
 
. This is therefore a new context that Markusen’s model omits – 
namely the creation of a state-anchored/centred cluster as a result of wartime pressures 
which engendered a greater level of co-operation due to firms facing a series of ‘crises’ 
which they needed joint-action to overcome. 
Returning back to how the C.A.O.C. was formed, it was the above preliminary joint-
committee which Alfred Herbert represented when he was invited to the War Office to 
state the position of Coventry manufacturers on the 15th April 1915. During this 
meeting, a Mr Booth203
 
 informed Mr Herbert as to what was being done in other 
industrial centres such as Newcastle and Birmingham and suggested: 
The formation of a strong local committee, to be made at a 
representative meeting of the principal manufacturers – both federated 
and non-federated – which should investigate and report. Information 
as to the existing facilities in Coventry, obtained by the Home Office 




Throughout this meeting Herbert was ideally placed to understand what Coventry firms 
would be able to manufacture and he immediately asked for samples, plans and 
specifications for 4.5-inch, 8-pdr. shells and No.100 fuses and for a letter from Mr 
Booth empowering Herbert to proceed with all haste.  
 
                                                 
202 For example, there were discussions in the Coventry Chambers of Commerce about the “impossible” 
wage competition occurring within the city for the textile firms and the building trade, both suffering 
from munition manufacturers offering higher wages for girls. Also that as early as December 1914 steel 
castings and road wheels were virtually unobtainable, at any price, for the city’s motor manufacturers. 
See C.C.C Minutes: 11th December 1914 p33, Vol.9 December 1915, No.1, Vol.2 December 16th 1916 
and Annual Report 1916-17 p5. 
203 Who was a member of the Central Armaments Output Committee, Whitehall. See H.M.S.O. (1920) 
Official Ministry of Munitions Appendix VIII. 
204 Ibid, Ministry of Munitions. Chapter X, General Organisation: Midlands p101,emphasis added. This 
information was likely the detailed industrial surveys conducted by those government departments in 
early 1915 and discussed in section 6.8. 
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Resulting from this meeting another in Coventry was undertaken on the 20th of April 
1915 between the city’s manufacturers where the following resolution was passed ‘That 
while the Coventry engineering employers are at present time largely engaged upon the 
production of war material, they pledge themselves to use every effort to assist the 
Government for increased output of munitions of war’205. From this meeting and 
declaration the Coventry Armaments Output Committee (C.A.O.C.) was formed, which 
was one of the first of its type in the country206
 
. The following table 19 outlines its 
members and their respective firms once it was in full operation by the summer of 1915:  
Table 19: The Coventry Armaments Output Committee C.A.O.C. July 1915 
Appointed 
Candidate Representing Principle Trade Position 
Mr. Alfred Herbert* Alfred Herbert, Ltd. Machine Tool Makers & Iron founders Chairman 
Mr. C. Vernon Pugh* Rudge-Whitworth, Ltd. Cycle & Motorcycle Manufacturers  
Mr. Alex Craig* Maudslay Motor Co., Ltd. Cars & Commercial Vehicles  
Mr. P.V. Vernon* Coventry Chambers of Commerce & a Director of  Alfred Herbert, Ltd.  
Mr. A. Bednell* Manufacturing Agent & Secretary of the Cycle & Motor Cycle Manufacturers & Traders Union Ltd Secretary 
Mr. W. Cannell*  Engineer 
Mr. A. S. Hill Coventry Chain Co., Ltd. Transmission Chains & Accessories 
 
Mr. W. C. Macartney Coventry Ordnance Works, Ltd. 
Armaments & Small Tool 
Manufactures 
 
Mr. Percy Martin Daimler Co., Ltd. Motorcar, Commercial Vehicle & Engines 
 
Mr. Rogers British Thomson-Houston Co., Ltd. 
Magneto's & Electrical 
Engineers 
 
Mr. A. Lord Selson Engineering Co., Ltd. Machine Tools & Engineers 
 
Mr. J. D. Siddeley Siddeley-Deasy Motor Co., Ltd. 
Motorcar & Engine 
Manufacturers 
 
Mr. A. E. Bennett Webster & Bennett, Ltd. Machine Tool Makers  
Mr. A. J. White White & Poppe, Ltd. Engine Builders & Motor Engineers 
 
Mr. W. Radford Swift Motor Co., Ltd. Cycle, Cars, Motorcycle Manufacturers 
 
Mr. Harry Smith Rover Co., Ltd. Cycle, Cars, Motorcycle Manufacturers 
 
Mr. A. H. Niblett Humber, Ltd. Cars, Motorcycles, Engine & Bicycles 
 
Mr. F. Keegan Dunlop Co., Ltd. Wheel & Rim Makers  
                                                 
205 Ibid. 
206 Ibid. Note also this committee was sometimes referred to as the Coventry Board of Management, 
which was merely the management sub-committee of the C.A.O.C. empowered to act on its entire behalf. 
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Mr. R. W. Maudslay Standard Motor Co., Ltd. Cycles & Motorcar Manufacturers 
 
Mr. Kevitt Rotherham Rotherham & Sons 
Watch Manufacturers, 
Engineers 
& Motor Components 
 
Mr. C. A. Clarke Smith's Stamping Co. Drop Forgers  
Mr. W. E. Bullock Singer Cycle Co., Ltd Motorcycle, Cycle & Car Manufacturers 
 
Mr. J. Calcott, Junr. Calcott Bros. Cycle & Motorcar Manufacturers 
 
Mr. C. W. Hathaway Triumph Cycle Co., Ltd. Cycle & Motorcycle Manufacturers 
 
Notes:  Marked in blue are the manufacturers already munitions producers before the committee was 
 initiated and marked in red are the manufacturers which became new entrants throughout the 
 course of 1915. 
 * = Members of the Management Sub-Committee 
Sources: Anon (undated)‘King’s Visit 1915’ Offprint CA 623.4 box-file, NA MUN5/363/1121.24/4 p3, 
C.H. 23rd/24th April 1915 &. M.D.T.21st April 1915. 
 
Where this committee differed from similar armament committees in midland cities, 
such as Derby or Leicester, was it was not used to start latent capacity within the local 
trade. Instead it was used more to ‘organise total effort’ from the spring of 1915 
onwards207. In other words, its role was to fully mobilise the city’s entire engineering 
cluster and convert it from a ‘business as usual’ to a ‘total war’ footing by particularly 
adapting firms for new shell and fuse work which was urgently needed. It was through 
pursuing this change in emphasis that the committee became the dominant ‘anchoring’ 
entity within the business structure of the mid-war armaments and munitions cluster. 
Alongside the Ministry’s influence into this cluster, through the committee, there was 
also a greater concentration of governmental offices initiated within the cluster at this 
time208. These changes taken together, but in particular the C.A.O.C, is what Markusen 
would describe as a unique local governance structure209
 
.  
Having identified how this committee came into being and also its composition and 
functionality this section shall move onto the ways in which the C.A.O.C. began to 
‘anchor’ firms and the mid-war cluster as a whole.  
                                                 
207 Ibid, Ministry of Munitions Chapter X, Pt. II, Midlands p101. 
208 See Chapter 5 map 2 and table 9. 
209 Markusen (1996), p307. Governance structure being defined in this context as a hierarchy which 
clearly states the positions of individuals and firms and also who is responsible for decision-making and 
accountability. This hierarchy also being the apparatus to allocate resources and co-ordinate and control 
armaments and munitions production.  
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Upon initiation one of the first actions of the committee was to remove the government 
placed sample shells, fuses and specifications, from the local Labour Exchange, to its 
own offices at “The Towers” Warwick Road ‘where anybody interested can see 
them’210. Another way it immediately began to organize was to assist one firm in the 
acquisition of lathes to undertake such shell work211. No doubt having Alfred Herbert as 
Chairman of the Management Sub-Committee, and also in charge of the Ministry’s 
Machine Tool Department from the 27th April, 1915, was a distinct local advantage in 
this respect212
 
. As a result of Herbert taking up this wartime post, and being based at 
Whitehall, whenever a meeting was convened between the Ministry and the C.A.O.C., 
Mr. Alex Craig (Maudslay), acted in his capacity as Chairman during 1915 and 1916.  
Despite beginning to spend most of his time at the Ministry, Alfred Herbert was 
instrumental in negotiating the C.A.O.C.’s first munition contract of 100,000 18pdr 
shell cases213. These shells were selected by Herbert and the Committee as they were 
‘particularly suitable to local machinery and the suitability and quality of local labour 
for the purpose is undeniable’214. This last point related to the city’s already high 
proportion of semi-skilled labour and high usage of general-purpose, readily-adaptable 
machine tools which could be easily adapted to produce these shells215. This was also 
confirmed by a preliminary census the committee took of firms and their plant with a 








                                                 
210 C.H. 23rd & 24th April 1915. See positions D & M on Map2 in Chapter 5. 
211 NA MUN5/363/1121.24/2 p3. 
212 Herbert, ‘Memories 10’ in Machine Tool Review, March-April 1955 p26.   
213 See Chapter 5 section 5.7 for more details on this first C.A.O.C. shells contract. 
214 Anon, Letter to the Midland Daily Telegraph likely from the C.A.O.C. Secretary Alfred Bednell, 
reproduced in the M.D.T. 3rd June 1915  
215 This high proportion of semi-skilled labour was discussed in Chapter 4, section 4.3, as something 
already in place in Coventry’s engineering labour force by 1914. 
216 C.H. 11th & 12th June 1915. 
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Despite not having the minutes of this armaments committee to ascertain its complete 
day-to-day ‘anchoring’ role with firms, what can be noted from its composition in table 
19 is that three manufacturers represented on the management sub-committee were all 
involved in armaments and munitions production from the very outbreak of war  
(Herberts, Rudge-Whitworth & Maudslay) 217
 
. It is therefore likely their early 
experience with munitions would have been invaluable to other local manufacturers 
who were now seeking advice. In terms of stimulating other manufacturers to take on 
this munition work, marked in red in the same table, are eight new manufacturers which 
had become munitions producers through the course of 1915 and who were now also 
involved in the committee’s co-ordinating activities.  
A further way this committee ‘anchored’ the mid-war cluster was by acting as a conduit 
for financial support as the Treasury deposited with a local bank, £15,000 free of 
interest to help cover all preliminary work needed within the city and to enable prompt 
initial payment to be made – something capital restricted small firms often desired218
 
. 
Having speedy access to this capital and also a definite order for 100,000 18pdr. shells, 
at a guaranteed price, all seem to have been crucial in persuading the city’s smaller 
firms to take on shell manufacture during 1915. This suggests the committee was a 
source of financial assistance for firms and is one way this wartime cluster doesn’t 
conform to feature 9 in table 18 for an idealized state-anchored/centred cluster.  
Further functions for the Committee were to co-ordinate transportation, inspection 
gauging and the warehousing of the completed shells and fuses locally, relieving these 





                                                 
217 See MRC MSS.204/3/1/50 which was originally the minute book of the C.A.O.C. and in 1940 the 
minutes pasted into the volume were torn out so that it could be re-used. For a summary of the C.A.O.C. 
between 1915 and 1917, see NA MUN5363/1121.24/2, MUN5363/1121.24/4 and the edited version in 
the H.M.S.O. (1920) Official History of the Ministry of Munitions Chapter X, Pt.II p101-103. 
218 C.H. 11th & 12th June 1915 and MUN5363/1121.24/4 p9. This amount was later recovered from the 
invoices for the last 20,000 shells produced. 
 
 - 138 - 
For example, during 1915 whilst undertaking the first shell contract, an important part 
of the committee’s time was dedicated to management in settling the matter of renting a 
local bonded store for no less than fourteen days output of shells219 and also for the 
preliminary expenses incurred in equipping it with a hydraulic banding presses and 
other necessary plant220. Before local firms where in a position to undertake this first 
contact, representatives of the Committee221
 
 were invited to inspect how shells were 
produced at Woolwich Arsenal on June 4th 1915 where they: 
Received the greatest attention from the Government officials 
who received and conducted them through the shell and 
inspection departments of the Arsenal, whilst the fullest 




It would seem that this overt government policy of rapidly sharing manufacturing 
information helped to impart tacit knowledge of shell production to the Committee’s 
engineer Mr Cannell. Therefore by the time the first shell contract was being worked on, 
Mr Cannell, was in a position to be ‘advising local manufacturers as to methods of 
manufacture and as to the adaptation of their existing machinery to this [new munitions] 
work’223. It was also noted that this first shell contract proved of great educational value 
to local contractors, for the committee’s engineer was in constant attendance upon the 
manufacturing, process by process, and saw to the proper interpretation of drawings and 
specifications, and ultimately inspection224
 
.  
The complete managerial and organizational ‘anchoring’ role the committee played in 
the mid-war cluster is revealed in an interview with Mr P.V. Vernon given to the 
Midland Daily Telegraph. In this, he describes the activities as follows: 
 
                                                 
219 The costs of which amounted to £50-£55 per week and were the main expenses. 
220 MUN5363/1121.24/4 p5, 7 & 9. This bonded store was provided by the Coventry Corporation and was 
used for final assembly and despatch of the shells. Unfortunately its location could not be found. After the 
31st March 1916 the costs of this bonded store were taken over directly by the Ministry of Munitions. 
221 Specifically Mr Alex Craig representing Maudslay, Mr P.V. Vernon representing Alfred Herbert Ltd. 
and the armaments committee’s engineer Mr W. Cannell. 
222 M.D.T. 5th June 1915 
223 M.D.T. 3rd June 1915 and also C.H. 11th & 12th June 1915 emphasis added. 
224 Ibid, Ministry of Munitions, Vol.1 Appendix IV and Morewood (1999) ‘Pioneers and Inheritors’ 
pp37-38. 
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In the first place there were the negotiations necessary for 
obtaining the contract. Secondly time had to be spent in 
ascertaining the sources of supply of material and in obtaining 
them at a reasonable rate of delivery…..As soon as the 
manufacturer receives his order for shells [through the C.A.O.C.] 
he has to make special tools and appliances for turning them 
out…In many cases manufacturers are rearranging the machines 
in their workshops for the purpose….Before a single shell can be 
turned out each manufacturer must have gauges, and before 
gauges can be made in quantities for the various manufacturers, an 
original set has to be made, submitted to, tested and passed by 
Woolwich. From this original set, which is kept for reference, the 
gauges used by the various manufacturers are made.225
 
 
It was not just help with gauging the Committee provided; it also solved the problem of 
inspection for firms. At first, it was intimated that this would be done in Sheffield by 
the War Office and would involved chemical analysis of the material to be used in the 
rough shell forgings, which would then, once passed inspection, be supplied to 
Coventry for machining. The C.A.O.C. suggested that to save time it ‘arranged with the 
steel manufacturers to put their testing apparatus at the disposal of the Government 
inspector on the spot’. The War Office then accepted the committee’s suggestion for 
this local inspection instead.226 Local Inspection is confirmed as a munitions inspection 
office was located (position G on maps 2 and 3), near to the Ordnance Works, who 




One way the committee exercised its power for greater mobilisation was via sending 
letters to the various editors of the local newspapers, to then be published. These letters 
were used as a means by the committee to instruct manufacturers by appealing to their 
patriotism. One such letter, shortly after the committee was formed, instructed:  
 
                                                 
225 M.D.T. 10th June 1915. A gauge being simply an instrument used for measuring precise conformity, in 
this instance, measuring the shell case dimensions after machining. These gauges were used in ever 
increasing quantities within the engineering industry during the war to implement accurate repetitious 
production and to jointly assist the inter-changeability of parts and the increasing use of ‘diluted’ semi-
skilled labour.  
226 M.D.T. 24th June 1915 and C.H. 25th/26th June 1915. 
227 One example of this assistance was the Coventry Ordnance Works helping with inspection and 
gauging for the Singer Motor Company when they first entered into the manufacture of No.80 fuses. 
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It becomes the clear duty of every manufacturer who has even a 
single machine tool suitable for any part of this work to use it to 
augment the output. It is equally clear that every manufacturer 
should lay aside his private or civil contracts if by doing so he can 
produce shells…..Public opinion will undoubtedly view the 
manufacturer who gives preference to his private work in the same 
way as it looks upon the young able-bodied shirker.228
 
 
It would appear the committee and the aims of the Ministry of Munitions were largely 
successful within the city as even in its formative stages it was described by Mr P.V. 
Vernon that ‘there is a great spirit among the local manufacturers - a keen desire to help 
each other in this work’229
 
. The press also confirmed this opinion by stating: 
No more highly skilled work has been employed anywhere in the 
country than in the local factories, and it is gratifying to add that 
probably in no engineering centre in Great Britain has there been less 
friction in the readjustment of wages to meet increased war costs of 
living, or a more general and hearty co-operation between 




One example of this successful adaptation was the small firm of Farmer and Sons. Prior 
to the war they described themselves as ‘doing general engineering work on a small 
scale’231. By 1915 they commenced the manufacture of 18-pounder H.E. shell cases and 
so smooth was this firm’s adaptation that Boards of Management from other districts 
were sent to their works in Coventry, to ‘see what could be done in a small shop’232. It 
wasn’t just the machine tools possessed by firms which the committee adapted for this 
shell work, as even the engineering workshop at the Coventry Technical College was 
pressed into service producing 180 shells a week233
 
. This reinforces how widespread 
and dominant the committee’s mid-war activities became in accord with feature 1 in 
table 18. 
                                                 
228 Anon, Letter to the Midland Daily Telegraph likely from the Coventry Armaments and Output 
Committee Secretary Alfred Bednell, reproduced in the M.D.T. 3rd June 1915 Coventry and Munitions of 
War. 
229 M.D.T. 10th June 1915. 
230 C.H. 11th & 12th June 1915. 
231 Coventry Industries Handbook c.1920 p68. 
232 Ibid, p68. 
233 C.H. 25th/26th June 1915. 
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As well as a high degree of co-operation an ‘open-door’ policy also seems to have 
characterised Coventry firms during this period as William Hillman, speaking in 
September 1915 about his small shell factory and the leading role women played, 
suggested:  
 
‘If anyone else is prepared to follow my example I am prepared to 
show him that women can make these things and make them 
properly. He can come and see every operation in making the shell 
from the beginning to the end.’234
 
 
This willingness to be overt and to co-operate among adapting firms by sharing shell-
making methods and to help breakdown any stereotypes surrounding the use of female 
labour in engineering shops, are features not readily identifiable with a state-
anchored/centred cluster. In fact, according to feature 5 in table 18, a low degree of co-
operation among firms is usually the case. However, it must be understood that these 
munition producing firms were being propelled by expediency and patriotism and less 
thought given over to pure profit making. Also these firms were working directly for the 
same customer and not competing against one another under normal market conditions. 
This appears to be a new context which has not been considered by Markusen or 
subsequent literature in relation to these idealized cluster models. 
 
Returning back to the activities of the committee and the firms it directed, it was noted 
at a meeting between the committee’s board of management and a Ministry 
representative, that as early as January 1916: ‘there was a general feeling among the 
members of the board that, as the contractors had learnt their work, it was questionable 
whether they were justified in maintaining a staff which included a consulting engineer 
at a salary of £600 per annum and a secretary at £300’235. Subsequently Mr Cannell’s 
services were arranged to be no longer needed in Coventry236
                                                 
234 C.G. 17th Sept 1915. 
. However, the secretary, 
Alfred Bednell, seems to have served in his position for the war's duration and it is to 
the important role this man performed in forming the linkages between the Ministry of 
Munitions and firms that this section now turns to. 
235 MUN5363/1121.24/4 p6. 
236 Ibid. p6-7. This highlights how successful the committee was in its ‘anchoring’ role to mobilize, adapt 
and educate the city’s manufacturers for new armaments and munitions production. 
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Alfred Bednell was noted in the early-war cluster as the secretary of the national Cycle 
and Motor Cycle Manufacturers and Traders Union Limited which was headquartered 
in the city237. He was in fact, by trade, a manufacturer’s agent before, during and after 
the war, which meant he would work on behalf of firms to secure contracts. In today’s 
terms he would be considered a free-lance business representative who was approached 
in order to utilise his extensive business contacts. These contacts stemmed from him 
having long standing ties with the city’s cycle and motor industry including him being 
involved, as early as 1889, to form once such cycle firm of Messrs. Taylor, Cooper and 
Bednell. Even at this early time he was employed ‘as a representative of the firm…but 
his intimate acquaintance with the cycle industry is well known among those who have 
any connection with it’238
 
.  
By 1915 Bednell’s importance as the secretary of the newly formed C.A.O.C. can be 
considered partly why adaptation and the growth in the number of firms was achieved 
with such ease. This was due to his intimate knowledge of the manufacturing 
capabilities and inner workings of many of the firms across the entire city. This was the 
case as the business community in which the local cycle and motor manufacturers 
operated in continued to hold an emphasis on personal relations throughout the war.  
The most important location where these were forged was the Coventry and County 
Club, the unofficial centre of the city’s engineering industry239
 
. This club was created 
on the 3rd of January 1899 by a group of Coventry industrialists. Entry into this private 
social club was highly restricted since the election of members was largely vested in the 
club committee. Prospective members could be refused entry if they were ‘black balled’ 
in the ballot, or if an existing member objected within two weeks of new names 
appearing on the club’s notice board.  
                                                 
237 See section 6.4 of this chapter. This meant Alfred Bednell had experience in co-ordinating local 
manufacturers and with dealing with the War Office from the very beginning of the war. 
238 Cycle Record 3rd Jan 1891 in ‘Lowe’s Cuttings’ Vol.18 (1890-1891) pp77-78. 
239 See Chapter 5 Maps 2 & 3 position L. Beaven (1996) p25 and Storey (1985) ‘Percy Martin’, pp167-
168. 
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In its early life this club was dominated by the ‘new’ industrialists including Alick 
Sargeant Hill240, who chaired the early meetings, George and William Du Cros (Dunlop 
& Swift,) J.K. Starley (Rover) and Alfred Bednell, gentlemen all with strong links with 
the early cycle and motor industries241. However, despite the exclusivity of the club, it 
did not exclude gentlemen of fairly small firms within the city.242
 
 It also allowed 
membership to important managerial staff such as Oscar Harmer and H. Grinyer, both 
from Alfred Herbert, or Harry Smith from Rover. In addition to this club acting as a 
‘hub’ for creating business contacts between manufacturers and suppliers, it also linked 
entrepreneurs with agents, solicitors and local bank managers.  
By 1915 the membership of this private club was increasing, despite the local cycle and 
motor trade being almost put on hold for the duration of the war. In the first year of the 
war alone, membership increased from 222 to 235 members243. This increase was partly 
due to the fact that by January 1915 ‘all officers of the Army and Navy, stationed at, or 
on leave in, Coventry be [now] honorary members of the club’.244 The club further 
resolved by June of the same year this offer be extended to Allied officers as well.245
 
 
This meant that members could also socialise in military circles as well as business ones 
throughout the war. The number of members also grew as entrepreneurs saw 
membership as an opportunity to make new contacts that could potentially lead to 




                                                 
240 Coventry Chain Company, Coventry Repetition Company, Thomas Smith’s Stamping Works and also 
Mayor of the city 1916-1917. See Former Mayors and Lord Mayors of Coventry in Bibliography web-
based sources. 
241 CA PA578 Coventry & County Club, Minutes of General Meetings, 3rd Jan 1899. 
242 For instance C. Foster  (Coventry Magneto), B. Riley (Riley Motor Co.), J, Calcott Jnr. (Calcott Motor 
Co.), S. White (White, Joseph & Sons, watchmakers), W.A. Oubridge (British Piston Ring) and W.J. 
Grindlay (Coventry Motor and Sundries) were listed, amongst others, as members during the war. CA 
PA578 General Meetings 1914-18 & PA578/22/1 Coventry & County Club, Reports & Accounts, 1913-
15. 
243 Ibid, Statement of Accounts ending 31st December 1915. 
244 CA PA578/19/2 Coventry & County Club, Minutes of General Meetings, 19th Jan 1915. 
245 Ibid, Minutes 15th Jun 1915 emphasis added. 
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Crucially this was the part Alfred Bednell played in creating the linkages in the mid-war 
cluster as Harold Nockolds vividly describes his wartime activities there: 
 
Bednell, who had been the Ministry of Munitions representative 
in Coventry during the war and knew everyone worth knowing 
in the district, operated largely from the bar at the County Club, 
which was the unofficial head-quarters of the motor industry in 
Coventry and where all the real business was done between 




Bednell, it seems, was able to operate from the County Club during the war as it was 
just around the corner (five properties along in fact) from where the Cycle and Motor 
Cycle Manufacturers and Traders Union Ltd. held its offices, where he was also 
secretary.247 Furthermore this Union relinquished this office space to the Coventry 
Armaments Output Committee during the summer of 1915.248
This meant that between 1915 and 1918 his day-to-day activities were highly localised 
and this is likely why he could spend his time dealing with munition contracts from the 
bar of this private member’s social club. One noticeable example of how important 
membership was to a club, such as the one described above, can be seen in the difficulty 




 had in turning to munitions.  
According to a taped interview with the founder’s son, Mr Leonard Pelham Lee: 
Mr Lee:  ‘When the 1914-18 war came….business stopped overnight and it was 
a long, long time before he was able to get any more 
contracts….eventually he got contracts to make shells [not until 1917 
it would appear] and then when things got more organised he was able 
to get contracts for producing petrol electric generating sets which 
were used for searchlights…[by which time] he was virtually standing 




                                                 
246 Nockolds (1976) Lucas Vol.1 p176. 
247 See maps 2 and 3 in chapter 5. 
248 MRC Letter dated 22nd June 1915 from Alfred Bednell to the Management Committee 
249 From 1917 onwards it was renamed Coventry Climax Ltd. the same name which 50 years later, as an 
engine supplier to many Formula One World Champions,  the company became world famous. 
250 Richardson tapes, No.32: Me Leonard Pelham Lee and Miss Morris, emphasis added, Lanchester 
Library.  
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Upon describing his father’s involvement within the business community during the war 
he and his wife added: 
 
Mr Lee: ‘He wasn’t a man interested in any of the local activities such as 
engineering associations or the council [Coventry Corporation], or golf 
or any of the clubs…and for that reason he didn’t meet these people 
socially’. 
Dr Richardson: ‘He was not a member of the Draper’s Club?’251
Mr Lee: ‘No’ 
 




This highlights the importance for Coventry firms to be well connected or networked 
within the local business community. By 1915 firms such as Complex Simplex were 
disadvantaged as they did not have the informal access to Alfred Bednell, via being 
members of the Coventry and County Club. This resulted in them struggling to gain 
contracts for munitions work, and in fact, it took them a further two years to do so.  
This reinforces the dominant position that the C.A.O.C. held within the mid-war cluster 
and also that firms with easier access to its secretary could potentially become munition 
producers early on in 1915. More could be written of the many contracts that Bednell, 
acting on behalf of the Committee, succeeded in tendering for and helped assist 
manufactures with. However, the key insight, which the available evidence suggests, 
was the C.A.O.C., (through its secretary and engineer) played the dominant part in 
allowing the mid-war armaments and munitions cluster to adapt and grow into a state-
anchored/centred cluster. This was achieved largely through channelling assisted 
contracts, giving technical and financial support and also by organising many 





                                                 
251 See Chapter 5 Maps 2 & 3 position K. The Draper’s Club was another private members club within the 
city where it was described by a contemporary that ‘all your top industrialists and professional people 
went’. See Beaven (1996) Re-constructing the Business Community, p25. 
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In essence the committee was the key non-profit entity (feature 1 table 18) which central 
government (external to the cluster) could affect local change and manage and co-
ordinate firms, utilising local knowledge and business and social networks, particularly 
through the Coventry and County Club. The five members of the management sub-
committee included Alfred Bednell, but also Alfred Herbert and Mr. P.V. Vernon, (both 
from Herbert Ltd.). Therefore this machine tool firm was also at the forefront of 
adapting and co-ordinating the Coventry engineering sector for national interests. This 
was also formulised by Herbert being immediately empowered to do so by the War 
Office and also by the Committee being allowed to appoint its own dedicated engineer 
and secretary, (both paid for out of management fees charged on contracts).  
 
The committee was therefore a governance structure which allowed the coming together 
of these individuals to offer firms the necessary advice, both technical and 
administrative, who wished to turn to munitions production for the first time. This 
largely addressed this need which other support institutions (e.g. the Coventry 
Emergency Committee or existing local trade associations), were unable to provide in 
the early war cluster. This is another feature which, according to table 18, is not to be 
expected in an idealized state-anchored/centred cluster. This pattern of identifying 
cluster features not expected to be found in a state-anchored/centred cluster is perhaps 
due to the underdeveloped nature of these cluster models and that they have not been 
tested before empirically in a wartime economy such as this.  
 
So far this section has discussed how the mid-war cluster was ‘anchored’ and ‘centred’ 
upon a local armaments committee and in particular the key roles played in this by its 
engineer and secretary. This was in relation to the idealized features 1, 5 and 9 in table 
18. It shall now move onto briefly examining the provision of capital (for firms and the 
cluster as whole) which were jointly needed to facilitate expansion. This discussion 
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6.10 Anchoring the Mid-War Cluster – The Provision of Capital for Firms 
 
The most direct way in which the mid-war cluster was anchored by the Ministry of 
Munitions was through financing expansion for local munition firms and upgrading the 
city’s infrastructure. First some examples of the large sums which Coventry firms were 
advanced by the Ministry are given. Second the investment which the Ministry 
allocated for improving the city’s power facilities to cope with a much expanded 
munitions industry, shall be discussed252
 
. The following table 20 (overleaf) summarizes 
just a few of the many large sums which the Ministry of Munitions advanced firms to 
increase their plant and machinery to undertake or increase their new munitions work: 
 
Table 20: Ministry of Munitions Capital Investment in  
Coventry Firms 1915-1918 
Date Firm Expenditure Purpose of the Investment 
29/11/1915 Hotchkiss et Cie £45 ,000 
To expand plant and machinery to 
increase machine gun output to 50 guns 
per week 
May-1916 Hotchkiss et Cie £15, 000 
To increasing plant and machinery for 
the manufacture of spare machine gun 
barrels 
Mid-1916 Coventry Ordnance Works £188, 000 
Extension of plant and machinery for the 
relining  
and repair of guns 
Jan-1916 Coventry Ordnance Works 
75% 
increase 
 on gauges 
Assisted contracts for gauge production 
No. 94/G/1367 
Mar-1916 Coventry Ordnance Works 
75% 
increase 
 on gauges 
To increase plant and machinery for 
gauge manufacture 
28/04/1916 Singer Co. £12,000 
For plant and machinery needed to 
manufacture  
20,000 No. 80 fuses per week 
03/05/1916 Humber Ltd. £50,000 
For plant and machinery necessary to 
manufacture  
4,000 4.5” H.E. howitzer shells per week 
                                                 
252 A second example was the Ministry also advanced the Coventry Corporation  many thousands of 
pounds for the construction of new housing, but space precludes being able to go into detail here. See 
H.M.S.O. (1920) History of the Ministry of the Munitions  
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15/06/1916 Daimler Co. £254,000 
For plant and machinery necessary to 
manufacture  
12-inch H.E. howitzer shells 
30/11/1916 Singer Co. £6,000 
To convert and alter the above machinery 
and tools to manufacture 50,000  No.131 
fuses per week 
09/01/1917 Coventry Ordnance Works £89, 000 
Extension of plant and machinery for 
increased  
production of 4-inch naval guns 
Late 1915-
31/03/1918 
White & Poppe 
National Shell 
Filling & Fuse 
Factory No.10 / 21 
£813, 400 Total capital expenditure for building and equipping this national factory 
Sources: CA PA699/63, NA MUN 5/377/1410/3, MUN5/189/1410/23, MUN7/167, 
MUN7/180, MUN7/182, MUN4/5302/ODE71, MUN4/427, MUN5/373/1200/1 and H.M.S.O. 
(1920) History of the Ministry of the Munitions, Appendix IV 
 
Despite the Ministry providing substantial investment, it was also left to firms to use 
their own capital reserves. Rover, for example during November 1915 placed an order 
of £14-£15,000 for machinery to undertake shell manufacture (this contract being for 
the C.A.O.C.) and noted this had to be paid for by the end of that year. This expenditure 
the firm appeared to obtain from a £30,000 reserve fund their board had sanctioned for 
just such wartime eventualities253. Another way that munition firms could meet the 
capital requirements was to increase their share capital. In a letter to his shareholders, 
the Managing Director of Coventry Chain, Alick Sargeant Hill, explained this was how 
they planned to finance their wartime expansion. He explained to them, with Treasury 
approval, the firm was to increase share capital from £150,000 of 1913 to £250,000 in 
July 1915. This was due to the firm being ‘urgently pressed for maximum possible 
output in the shortest possible time’254
 
.  This suggests in relation to feature 3 in table 18 
(key investment decisions) that it was both the firms themselves and the Ministry of 
Munitions (directly or indirectly through the C.A.O.C.) who provided the investment. 
Thus these decisions were carried out both internal and external to the cluster itself and 
could also be dependent upon the type of munition contract entered into.  
 
                                                 
253 C.H. 12th & 13th November 1915. 
254 M.D.T. 19th July 1915.  
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For example, upon examining table 20, apart from Hotchkiss, all the other firms 
receiving direct external investment were ‘controlled establishments’ and therefore 
undertaking munitions contracts directly for the Ministry of Munitions or the 
Admiralty. This form of direct control facilitated the investment to come from the 
Treasury as ‘controlled’ firms were not allowed to take on any private work and 
therefore any such investment could not be used by the firm for any other purpose. In 
contrast, if firms took on contracts through the armaments committee (such as Rover 
did during 1915 for shell making in table 20), then the firm themselves had to finance 
the necessary plant to undertake the contract. Alongside investment allocated to 
munition firms, the Ministry of Munitions also upgraded the city’s infrastructure to 
allow an enlarged state-anchored/centre armaments and munitions cluster to operate. It 
is to this further investment that the following section now addresses. 
 
6.11 Increased need for Power Supplies for Armament and Munition Production 
 
With increasing munition production one of the greatest pressures engineering firms 
created was on the city’s existing power facilities. For example, shortly after the 
outbreak of war there was an abnormal increase from the Daimler Company which 
needed an additional 600K.W. of power added to an immediate prospect for a further 
500K.W. needed by the Ordnance Works. It was later agreed that the Ordnance Works 
supply could only be given if there was an agreement by them to suspend or reduce the 
load between 4:30 and 5:30p.m. on working days255. This suggests that even in 1914 the 
city’s power system could not cope with just a few of these larger firms needing more 
power.Despite these power restrictions in the early cluster, still greater capacity was 
needed by 1915. This was because the ever increasing demand for armaments and 
munitions production, both day and night, meant that ‘Coventry firms were [now] 
threatened….with serious inconveniences arising from shortage of electric power’256
One solution was implemented by firms themselves with Rudge-Whitworth building 
and equipping their own electrical sub-station supplying 1,000h.p. alongside 162 other 
electric motors within its works
.  
257
                                                 
255 CA PA1/4/21/1/3 Coventry Electric Light Committee Minutes 12th November 1914. 
.  
256 NA MUN5/363/1121.24/2 & MUN5/363/1121.24/4 emphasis added. 
257 Rudge Record 
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To relieve the situation for the entire cluster the Coventry Corporation Electricity Works 
placed an order with the British Thompson-Houston Co., Rugby for delivery of a 
3,000K.W. turbo alternator. However, by March, they were informed that delivery was 
indefinitely held up as the Admiralty had commandeered all blading work for Chatham 
Dockyard.258 As a result, the firms most in need of this additional power259 were 
informed that unless the decision of the Admiralty could be reversed the Coventry 
Corporation would be unable to meet their needs for increased power and it suggested to 
these firms they themselves should apply pressure to the Admiralty to resolve the 
issue260
 
. Thus it would seem these Coventry firms had little support from the local 
council and were in fact left to remedy the situation by themselves. This is evidence of 
feature 11 in table 18 of ‘weak local government role in regulating and promoting core 
activities’ and according to Markusen (1996) is typical for clusters ‘anchored’ by the 
state. 
Shortly after these instructions both the Ordnance Works and White & Poppe wrote to 
the War Office pointing out how serious any shortage of electricity would be, and as a 
result a meeting was held in Coventry between representatives of the Admiralty, the 
British Thompson-Houston Company and the Coventry Corporation. Such was the 
national importance of the leading Coventry firms outputs that it was then satisfactorily 
settled that the blading would be redirected by the Admiralty to be delivered in May 
and the situation resolved.261 For these additions the Ministry of Munitions loaned the 
Coventry Corporation the money needed to implement them, the loan to be repaid at 4.5 
percent interest.  By December 1915, the agreement was increased with a further loan 
of £30,278 at 4.75 percent interest advanced to the Corporation262
                                                 
258 Ibid MUN5/363/1121.24/2 & MUN5/363/1121.24/4 
. These key 
investment decisions (feature 3 table 18) made between external government 
departments, (the Treasury and the Ministry of Munitions), and internally with the town 
council (the Coventry Corporation), is an additional idealized feature found in a cluster 
‘anchored’ by the state. 
259 The Ordnance Works, Daimler, Alfred Herbert and White and Poppe, including the new shell and fuse 
factory they were now laying down and managing on behalf of the Ministry 
260 Ibid PA1/4/21/1/3 12th April 1915. 
261 NA MUN5/363/1121.24/2 & MUN5/363/1121.24/4 
262 Ibid, H.M.S.O. (1920) History of the Ministry, Ch. IV. Pt.III Control of Industrial Equipment p96. 
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Overall, electricity consumption increased three-fold in the city during the war due to 
the additions to existing factories, the greater application of machine tools throughout 
many of these firms and also the construction of new works.263 According to the 
Official History of the Ministry as of June 1914 Coventry possessed electric plant to the 
capacity of 12,000KW. During the course of the war the Ministry installed or 
authorised an additional 13,200KW by October 1918.264 Despite this, by the end of the 
war, power supply, was once again becoming a restricting factor on the cluster 
expanding still further and may be one of the reasons why there was a drop in the 
number of new entrants towards the end of the war.265 This is an example of a 
congestion effect as identified by Swann (1998) in chapter two.266
 
 
Having now outlined how the Ministry expanded the city’s power facilities, one 
additional example of how the Ministry was at the centre of expansion was to increase 
accommodation and the instigating of official billeting in the city for munition workers, 
however, space precludes discussing this in-depth267
 
. Suffice to say both examples 
demonstrate that the cluster had very high levels of labour in-migration and also that 
this labour market was national and international in scope. These two features relate to 
points 6 and 7 in the proceeding table 18, and the Ministry’s investment in housing is an 
additional example of key investment decisions (feature 3) being undertaken by central 
government, external of the cluster itself. 
6.14 Direct control – Key Coventry firm’s become “Controlled Establishments” 
 
One final complication to the mid-war cluster was the Ministry of Munitions not only 
exercised control through the local armaments committee, it also commandeered the 
most important firms and made them ‘controlled establishments’.  
                                                 
263 Hannah (1979) Electricity Before Nationalization p59. 
264 Ibid, H.M.S.O. (1920) History of the Ministry, Ch. IV App. XVII p105. 
265 See previous chapter 5 p.104 Table 13. 
266 An additional late-war congestion effect was the shortage of food within the cluster by 1917/18. This 
was brought on by the city’s rapid population increase - from an expanding munitions cluster - and food 
allocation was based on pre-war population levels. The situation was compounded by rationing due to the 
German unrestricted submarine warfare by 1917/18. For a further discussion on this problem see Bryant 
(1987) ‘Politics of food during the First World War: Birmingham & Coventry’ Warwick University 
thesis. 
267 See H.M.S.O. (1920) History of the Ministry for a greater discussion on the housing expansion 
instigated in Coventry from 1915 onwards. 
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According to chapter 5 by the end of 1915 some 48 local firms were taken over in this 
manner with the Ordnance Works and Alfred Herbert Ltd being some of the first in the 
country268
For example, Daimler whilst manufacturing 12-inch H.E. shells for the Ministry 
directly, relied upon at least 17 different national firms for the original shell forgings 
which they then machined and despatched for filling or into storage
. One of the main changes this meant for “controlled” firms was they now 
became linked to an ever wider network of regional and national suppliers and 
customers, particularly for sub-contracting out work to help increase their outputs.  
269.Another example 
is provided by the Ordnance Works who on the 14th July 1915, in response to a request 
from the Ministry of Munitions, sent a list of all of their sub-contractors who were then 
assisting them with the manufacture of their 4.5-inch field howitzers. This list included 




These lists included several motor and cycle firms (it is likely some of these were 
Coventry based), and those named included the Metropolitan Carriage Wagon 
Company, the London & North-Western Railway Company and also four other railway 
companies272. Considering the Ordnance Works was manufacturing a large range of 
munitions273
 
 this high number of 168 sub-contractors for just one of their contracts 
indicates the complex supply chain these “controlled establishments” were now 
embedded within. Additionally many of these national suppliers and customers were 
new to them and this suggests they could no longer rely upon only local firms for their 
needs. Effectively the demands of such firms like the Ordnance Works had gone beyond 
the capacity of local mid-war supplier firms. In turn this meant “controlled” firms were 
more externally orientated than in the early-war period.  
                                                 
268 See Appendix for a complete list of all ‘Controlled Establishments’ in Coventry between 1915-1918 
including the exact dates they were taken over and the trade group assigned to them.  
269 NA MN7/180 ‘Shell Forgings up to June 30th 1918’. 
270 Such items as various stampings, steel tubes, bolts, locks, castings, springs, screws, timber and leather 
items 
271 The included forging and pressing steel, making nuts, parts of mechanisms, screws and axletrees 
272 NA MUN5/373/1200/5 pp63-64. Unfortunately the original list supplied by the firm could not be 
located. 
273 See previous chapter 5 table 8. 
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The complex nature of how a “controlled establishment hub” firm may have appeared 
by the mid-war period is revealed in Figure 29 (overleaf). Here the Ordnance Works 
along with some of its known mid-war suppliers and customers are shown:  
 
Figure 29: An Example of a Mid–War “Controlled Establishment Hub” Firm:  
Coventry Ordnance Works 1915 – 1916 
Sources: NA MUN5/373/1200/5, Warren (1998) ‘Steel, Ships and Men’, Bacon (1940) ‘From 1900 
Onward’, Frost (1920) ‘Munitions of War’ and Coventry Ordnance Works Brochures  c1908 & c1910  
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An associated feature with Coventry firms becoming “controlled establishments” was 
that some of them leant Chairman and Directors to work for the Ministry of Munitions. 
According to Hinton (1973) this resulted in the Ministry of Munitions being ‘from first 
to last a businessman’s organisation, intended to liberate the munitions industries from 
military direction, and the restrictions of established official routine, and to hand over 
the task of guiding and coordinating these developments to prominent businessmen 
familiar with industrial problems’274
 
. It would seem this task was keenly taken up by 
many of the business leaders in Coventry with the following table 21 (overleaf) 
outlining some of the most significant recruited to work for the Ministry: 
Table 21: Principal Ministry of Munitions Employees from Coventry  
or Associated Firms 




Positions held within the Ministry of  
Munitions  








Additional Gun Repair Section (01.02.1917); 
Deputy Director-General Gun Forgings 
(08.07.1917); 












Controller of Munitions Inventions  
(12.01.1918  - 31.03.1919); 
Ministry Representative on Committee on 
Awards for Inventions (16.06.1918) 
Ellis, Sir Charles, 
K.C.B. 1917 
G.B.E. 1919 





Deputy Director-General (D), Munition Supply 
Department (19.07.1915);  
Director-General of Ordnance Supply 
(03.10.1916);  
Acting Member of Council A (--.11.1917);  
Head of Paris Establishment (13.12.1917);  
President of Commission Anglaise de 
l'Armament  
(--.12.1917);  
Liquidator of Contracts in France, Italy & 
Switzerland (1919) 
                                                 
274 Hinton (1973) The First Shop Stewards Movement p29. 
 




Messrs. Alfred Herbert 
Ltd. 
Head of Machine Tool Section at War Office 
under Sir Percy Girouard and Mr Booth 
(27.04.1915); 
Director of Machine Tools (03.06.1915); 
Deputy Director-General (14.08.1916);  
Controller (--.11.1917);  
transferred to Engine Branch Aeronautical 




Messrs, Iliffe & Sons, 
Ltd. 
Machine Tool Department (07.07.1915);  
Assistant Controller (1917);  
(Controller (23.03.1918); 
Liquidator of Machine Tool Contracts  
(04.01.1919 - 30.06.1919) 
Larke, W.J. 
 C.B.E. 1920 
British Thompson 
Houston Co. Ltd. 
Labour Supply Department (--.06.1915); 
Director of Dilution and Allocation 
(08.01.1917); 
Special Service in connection with 
Demobilisation and Reconstruction 
(15.03.1918); 
Director-General of Raw Materials, Disposals 
Board (01.03.1919 onwards) 
Martin, Percy 
Birmingham Small 
Arms Co.  
& Daimler Co. Ltd. 
Controller of Petrol Engine Supply and Member 
of Air Board (06.02.1917); 
Director-General of Mechanical Transport 
Supply and Petrol Engines (26.02.1917); 
Controller of Mechanical Transport Supply 
 (16.05.1917 - --.01.1918) 
Nicol, Sir T.D. 
K.B.E. 1920 
Messrs Cammell, 




Finance Department (07.03.1917); 
Director of Mechanical Transport Contracts; 
Controller of Aircraft Contracts (01.11.1917); 
Chairman of Liquidation of Aircraft Contracts 
Committee  
(22.11.1918 - --.06.1920) 
Charles Clarke Smith’s (Thomas) Stamping Works 
Steels Committee of the Institution of 
Automobile Engineers & Chairman of Sub-
Committee for Drop Forgings for Aircraft 
Smith, Owen H. British Thompson Houston Co. Ltd. 
Controlled Establishments Division 
(21.06.1915); 
Assistant General Secretary (11.04.1916 - 
31.10.1918) 
Sources: H.M.S.O.(1920) History of the Ministry of Munitions Appendix VIII ‘List of some of the 
principal officers’ pp260-275 & Muir (1958) p47                  
 
As table 21 highlights, many of the key positions within the Ministry, were in areas 
which reflect to some degree the types of armaments and munitions Coventry firms 
were tasked to produce. Therefore these firms were very well represented, at a national 
level, in machine tools, petrol engine supply, mechanical transport, gun repairing and 
gun forgings and also forgings, castings and stampings.  
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Through the Rugby & Coventry based firm of British Thompson Houston, its 
representative, W.J. Larke, was ideally placed within the Labour Supply and later 
Dilution and Labour Allocation Departments which of course were crucial to increasing 
munitions production from an engineering city such as Coventry. Towards the end of 
the war personnel such as Alfred Herbert, Percy Martin and Sir T.D. Nicol all became 
influential in the Air Board section, which the Ministry of Munitions absorbed by 1917. 
Indeed, Herbert & Martin were both heavily involved in aero-engines which by 1918 
Coventry was manufacturing more of than any other British city. In relation to the mid-
war cluster as a whole, what these Ministerial appointments meant was that some 
Coventry firms also had ‘their finger on the industrial pulse’. One outcome of this is 
revealed in the following section where some Coventry firms were able to capture large 
orders for gauge making. 
 
6.15 Gauge making in Coventry during wartime 
 
Gauges275 were something extremely vital to the armaments industry where inter-
changeability of parts was already adopted by firms such as Birmingham Small Arms 
Company276, following American practices. During wartime they were needed in ever 
increasing quantities due to the number of new firms now undertaking armaments 
production.277 So important where gauges to war production, that a separate 
department was formed at the Ministry of Munitions on the 16th May 1916. At that 
time, it was known that the existing gauge manufacturers were working to the limit of 
their capacity. This Gauge Department therefore ‘had to persuade a number of new 
firms to turn their energies to gauge making’.278
 
 Among some of these new firms 
were a number from Coventry, with the majority turning to gauge production for the 
first time. Table 22 (overleaf) summarizes some of these gauge contracts captured: 
 
                                                 
275 For gauge definition see Chapter 5 page 91. 
276 Daimler's parent firm 
277 This was because they facilitated the dilution of labour with semi and low-skilled workers and were 
used to measure for accurate repetitious production in items such as guns, shells, fuses or any components 
thereof. 
278 H.M.S.O (1920) History of the Ministry of Munitions Vol. III, Pt.III, p15. 
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Table 22: Initial gauge contracts placed with Coventry firms 1915 – 1917 







Fuse 100 gauges August 1915 50 £19.08 approx† 










January 1916 1000s produced under £4.5.0 
Contracts 94/G/1129, 94/G/1367 
& 94/G/2316  
Coventry 
Gauge &  
Small Tool 
Co. 










617C 11.1915 50 £1.16.0* 
18pdr. Shell 
617C 5.12.1915 200 £1.12.0 
18pdr. Shell 




H.E. 689C 14.01.16 30 £0.8.9 
Notes:  † The total order for 50 complete sets was £954.12.11   
* A Revision of Prices was carried out on the 01.10.15 and was for the lower price       
Sources: NA MUN5/377/1390/1 & H.M.S.O. (1920) History of the Ministry of Munitions Vol.VIII, 
Pt.III Ch.1 Apx.2 
 
The proceeding table notes the quantities given where the initial order quantity placed 
with each firm, however, these would have been added to by continuation contracts as 
firms became accustomed to gauge manufacture. The national figures give some 
indication of how busy Coventry gauge-making firms would have been after 1915.  
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The Gauge Department noted that nationally between August 1915 and December 
1917, approximately 760,000 gauges, comprising 14,500 different types, were 
delivered by all national contractors for testing to the National Physical Laboratory279
The same table also reveals that Alfred Herbert Ltd. were the first local firm to receive 
gauge contracts, (just one month after becoming a “controlled establishment” in fact) 
this was due to them already making gauges, but only in a small way
.  
280. Following 
this firm’s decision to develop and increase their gauge production, they were then in 
a position to accept ‘large orders’281. Furthermore, difficulties in obtaining the 
American precision machinery necessary to produce fine limit gauges, led to the 
development of the home market, and Alfred Herbert Ltd. also ‘gave help in this 
respect’, by designing and building the necessary machines.282
 
 This shows that Alfred 
Herbert Ltd. would usually be one of the first firm’s turned to when a new demand 
was being tasked of a British machine tool manufacturer.  
In addition, the prices this firm received for these early gauge contracts appear 
significantly higher than later contracts given to other local or national firms. This is 
partly explained due to a downward tendency in prices for all munition contracts as 
the war progressed and also as firms became experienced with production they were 
able to tender a reduced price. Therefore being one of the first firms to capture any 
gauge contracts would usually prove highly lucrative. This early capture would have 
also been aided by having Alfred Herbert, assisted by Mr P.V. Vernon, Mr. Joseph 
Pickin (both Director’s of his firm), and Edward Iliffe (‘an old friend who usually 
acted as Chairman in my absence’283), positioned in the Machine Tool Department 
which before 1916 dealt with gauges.284
                                                 
279 NA MUN5/377/1390/1 This national figure does not include rifle gauges which were sent to Enfield, 
lock and gun gauges, as well as certain gun ammunition gauges, which were sent direct to Woolwich 
Arsenal. 
  This may have also aided other local firms 
too and suggests the Coventry mid-war cluster held a distinct local advantage in 
capturing contracts such as this. 
280 Davies (1983) Social Relations, Herberts  1887-1922 p111. 
281 Ibid 
282 Ibid, p119. 
283 Herbert (1955) Machine Tool Review ‘Memories 11’ May-June p50. Iliffe taking up his appointed 
position on the 7th July 1915. See table 23 and the H.M.S.O. (1920) History of the Ministry of Munitions 
Appendix VIII ‘List of some of the principal officers’ p268.                  
284 Ibid Vol1.VIII  Pt.II, p115. 
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Table 22 also notes that Coventry Ordnance produced thousands of hardened gauges. 
Although they cost more to make (£2.2.0 each unhardened, compared to C.O.W.’s 
£4.5.0 for hardened), these gauges would keep their accuracy for much longer. In fact 
when used it was found that hardened gauges would last three to four times longer 
than unhardened ones, thus justifying their additional cost. This meant that the 
Ordnance Work’s gauge output was very important to the war effort as very few firms 
could undertake this hardening work due to them lacking ‘the necessary 
experience’.285
 
 Fulfilling large gauge contracts was therefore one important new 
demand the mid-war state-anchored/centred cluster was able to successfully produce 
alongside its primary role of shell and fuse production. 
Having now examined some of the additional ways in which the mid-war cluster was 
growing in complexity, both in form and the types of munitions it was being tasked to 
produce, it is important to reiterate that it was nevertheless a state-centred/anchored 
cluster which typified this mid-war period. The following section and table now 
summarizes the mid-war cluster. 
 
6.16 Summary of the mid-war state-anchored/centred armaments and munitions 
cluster 
 
Table 23: The Mid-War Cluster Spring 1915 to December 1915 
• The main cluster type which characterized the mid-war phase of armaments and 
munitions production in Coventry was a state-anchored/centred cluster. 
• This cluster centred on the dominant activities of an externally directed (by the 
Ministry of Munitions) local armaments committee (C.A.O.C.) and in particular 
this committee’s Chairman, Engineer and Secretary who were key actors in the 
‘centring’ of firms and the clusters activities. 
• The Ministry of Munitions also ‘centred’ the cluster through direct investment 
into expanding munition firms and also upgrading the city’s infrastructure. 
• The cluster also showed high levels of labour in-migration which is to be 
expected in this cluster type. 
                                                 
285 NA MUN5/377/1390/1 p25. 
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• The early war hub-and-spoke cluster persisted; however, it evolved through the 
creation of “infrastructural hubs”. 
• Key "hub" firms by the end of 1915 became "controlled establishments" and 
became linked to a multitude of new national suppliers and therefore where less 
locally and more nationally orientated 
 
These last features reinforce Markusen’s (1996) supposition that a state-
anchored/centred cluster is more difficult to conceptualize as ‘contingencies particular 
to the type of activity involved colour its operation and characteristics’286
 
. In 
Coventry’s mid-war cluster these contingencies included the rapid mobilisation and 
adaptation of the city’s entire engineering sector, largely dictated by the dominant 
activities of the local armaments committee; heavy government investment into plant, 
machinery and infrastructure; new legislative powers in the form of “controlled 
establishment” orders placed upon key munition firms; rapid labour in-migration, and 
also an increasing diversity in the range of armaments and munitions tasked to 
manufacture.  
The clearest way to summarize the mid war armaments and munitions cluster is in the 













                                                 
286 Markusen (1996) p306. 
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Figure 30: The Coventry State-Anchored/Centred Armaments and Munitions 
Cluster Spring 1915 to December 1915  
 
 
Having now in the second part of this chapter analysed the mid war cluster, the third 
and final part will examine how this cluster evolved by the late-war period.
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Part C: The Late War Cluster: January 1916 to November 1918  
An Innovative Milieu 
 
Before discussing what the late war cluster evolved into, it is appropriate to first outline 
how the mid-war state-anchored/centred cluster began to change. 
 
6.17 The Coventry Armaments Output Committee (C.A.O.C.) – late war  
        transformation 
 
During the last two years of war the armaments committee’s dominant role as the main 
non-profit entity to ‘anchor’ and organise engineering firms along co-operative lines 
had diminished. As early as 1916, it had transformed to become an entity which now 
placed entire contracts directly within the Coventry cluster with individual firms rather 
than sub-contracting the same contract across several. For example, by the beginning of 
1917 it had in place direct contracts for weekly outputs of 1,500 4.5-inch high explosive 
(H.E.) shell (500 with Dunlop Rim & Wheel and the remaining 1,000 with Swift), 1,000 
4.5-inch chemical shell (Rover), 2,000 2.75-inch H.E. shell (Coventry Premier), 500 18-
pdr shell (Standard) and, according to the Ministry’s official historian, perhaps the most 
valuable was a weekly output of a quarter of a million component parts, which Coventry 
possessed the national monopoly287
 
. 
By the end of 1917 it was noted that various mid-war contractors had dropped out of 
contracts entered into either on co-operative lines or those directly placed by the 
C.A.O.C. This resulted in the weekly output of shells dropping to 500 4.5-inch H.E. 
(one third of the Jan 1917 output), 2,500 18-pdr shells (this quantity having increased, 
however only Standard was still making them in the Coventry area) and finally 
component part manufacture remained the same.  This suggests it was from the autumn 
of 1915 until the beginning of 1917 when the Coventry cluster was producing its 
highest output of shells and after then many firms had switched munitions production.  
 
                                                 
287 H.M.S.O. (1920) Ministry of Munitions Ch.X, Pt. II, Midlands p103 & MUN5/363/1121.24/4 pp14-26. 
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The Board of management of the C.A.O.C. stated this dwindling in numbers [of 
contractors] was ‘greatly regretted’ and in 1916 they had approached the Ministry with 
the suggestion to disband themselves. They pointed out that ‘the contractors had now 
learnt their work and the Board had no longer scope for its powers’.  This idea was 
opposed by a Sir James Stevenson288 at the Ministry and the dwindling numbers were 
not seen as a poor reflection on the performance of the C.A.O.C. or its board of 
management. They felt merely the increasing tendency for Coventry contractors, ‘to 
approach the Ministry direct, as their work had [grown] in importance, must be regarded 
as a natural development of the munitions situation in Coventry’289
 
. 
In essence what had occurred was many Coventry contractors had initially tapped into 
the committees support network, (such as its managerial capability, labour organisation, 
adaptation and technical assistance), when first entering into shell, fuse or component 
production.  Once firms were experienced in their manufacture and nearing the end of 
their initial contracts; and then the question of negotiating continuation contracts had 
arisen, usually the Ministry expected a drop in the contract price. However, the 
C.A.O.C. still wished to charge management fees upon those contracts, despite their 
services no longer being needed as fully as it was back in 1915. Naturally firms saw this 
as an added drain on their profits and attempted to circumnavigate the committee as a 
source for contracts and to deal directly with the various departments of the Ministry 
directly.290
 
 Coventry contractors had therefore exploited the benefits brought about by 
greater direct governmental involvement, through the C.A.O.C. working as an 
intermediary; however by 1917 firms were attempting to shake-off some of this control. 
They now wished for greater freedom from the apparatus which had been setup to help 
ease their entry into the armaments and munitions cluster during 1915.  
According to the proceeding chapter, the late war cluster turned to war-winning 
weapons including: aero-engines, aeroplanes, tanks, machine guns and their associated 
component parts.  
                                                 
288 Who at this time was Director of Area Organisation at the Ministry of Munitions 
289 H.M.S.O. (1920) History Ministry of Munitions Chapter X, Pt. II, Midlands p103 emphasis added. 
290 For example the Trench Warfare Department, Mechanical Transport Department or the Air Ministry, 
which the Ministry of Munitions had absorbed by 1917. 
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From a purely militarist perspective it was these weapons which Britain and her allies 
were hoping could unlock the stalemate of trench warfare. From a business perspective 
Coventry firms also turned to these munitions as they would have been more lucrative; 
due to less firms nationally being able to undertake their more complex manufacture, 
when compared to fuses or shell cases. This meant local firms, particularly those 
connected with motor vehicles, were able to grapple back some of their bargaining 
power due to them possessing valuable pre-war experience in a closely associated trade 
(e.g. motor engines with aero-engines or motor body building with aeroplane fuselage 
manufacture).  
 
Consequently by 1917/18 the larger firms in the cluster, although still “controlled 
establishments”, were not acting in the same subservient role to the C.A.O.C. or the 
Ministry of Munitions as they were previously in 1915/16. In essence they wished for 
some of their autonomy back, and in so by doing, to enter into manufacture which might 
possibly leave them in a better post-war position, but at the same time they wished not 
to be seen as unpatriotic or profiteering. This late-war shift in the cluster is observed in 
the decreasing importance of the armaments committee who by the end of the war were 
no longer the dominant ‘anchoring’ entity it was during 1915. In addition to this decline, 
it seems new features emerged during the last two years of war which suggest that the 
Coventry armaments and munitions cluster not only continued to expand, but further 
increased in complexity. The first example of this was firms began to once again 
become more entrepreneurial and have one on eye on their future post-war position. 
 
6.18 The re-emergence of the entrepreneurial firm 
 
One example of a firm which began to consider its post-war position in the late-war 
cluster was that of Siddeley-Deasy. As discussed in the previous chapter this firm was 
heavily involved in aero-engine and aeroplane manufacture between 1915 and 1918291
However, during the end of this period, the firm's Managing Director John Davenport 
Siddeley (JDS) began to look at what market opportunities would present themselves 
when hostilities ceased, and to what types of cars to produce.   
.  
                                                 
291 See Chapter 5 tables 9 & 10 
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For this he looked to foreign deigns, and in particular to the United States of America. 
He decided to study the advances American motor technology had made in the three 
years since his firm, and the majority of the British motor industry, had produced a new 
car design. For this he decided to import a large and luxurious Marmon 5.5litre car 
through its British Delco agents292. With this car arriving during 1918, he was then able 
to divert some of his design staff to examine it piece by piece, with a view to turning out 
similar new designs in the post-war era. By this same time JDS had moved to Crackley 
Hall (now St Joseph’s Convent School near Kenilworth), from Hill Orchard near 
Meriden. It was here described that “men sworn to secrecy were transferred to the 
private residence of JDS where they set up a design office in the billiard room”293 
although the Marmon was probably dismantled quietly at the Parkside factory. This was 
due to the Ministry having strict controls on non-essential work. Considering at this 
time the firm was still a “controlled establishment” which was entrusted with much 
experimental aeronautical work294, and also the firm having recruited some of the best 
design staff from Farnborough295
 
, meant that the examination had to be done in secret. 
This example demonstrates one of the ways in which a Coventry firm was starting to 
contest the mid-war state-anchored/centred cluster.  
Other examples included Rover who were considered guilty in considering their post-
war automobile policy above national interests as by the end of the war296 and Triumph 




                                                 
292 Smith (2006) Armstrong Siddeley Motors Ch.4  p69 
293 Armstrong Siddeley (1956) The Evening and the Morning Note: According to Smith (2006) p69 JDS’s 
Grandson, Ernest Siddeley, suggested this work was never carried out in the billiard room, however, the 
works journal of Siddeley-Deasy, The Employee’s Quarterly shows a large billiard room for its workers 
and perhaps this work could have been done there at the Parkside factory. 
294 For example the re-design of the Beardmore Halford Pullinger B.H.P. engine, which later became the 
Siddeley Puma. 
295 Including, Major FM Green as Chief Engineer (who had worked for Daimler up to 1910), John Lloyd, 
Head of Stress and S D Heron an engine designer. See Flight 13th July 1933 p705 
296 NA MUN5/363/1121.24/4 p19 The situation got worse when the Ministry approached the firm in 
March 1917 for a repeat contract to make 4.5-inch SK lachrymatory shell. Rover flatly refused stating ‘its 
resources were taxed to the utmost on other government work and refused to continue manufacture of the 
lachrymatory shell’.  In fact, according to Morewood (1992), Rover’s management were already finding 
time to consider manufacturing cars once again 
297 Ibid, MUN5/363/1121.24/4 pp22-23 
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As already discussed in section 6.17, the role of the dominant ‘anchoring’ entity (the 
C.A.O.C.) had changed by the war's end and in addition this section has demonstrated 
that it was also the willingness of firms themselves which had changed. Alongside these 
changes Chapter 5 also outlined the cluster was still continuing to expand, albeit at a 
slower rate, by the wars culmination. It is to account for some of this continued growth 
that the following section now addresses. 
 
6.19 Recapping the main features of an innovative milieu 
 
Before the late-war cluster is discussed in relation to the innovative milieu concept, it is 
useful to firstly define and outline its key features. According to the research body 
GREMI, who originally developed this concept, an innovative milieu may be defined 
as: 
The set, or the complex network of mainly informal social 
relationships on a limited geographical area [therefore they are set 
within a cluster], often determining a specific external ‘image’ and a  
specific internal ‘representation’ and a sense of belonging, which 




According to chapter two, table 1 there appeared three main features which constituted 
an innovative milieu summarized below:  
 
Table 24: The three main features of an Innovative Milieu 
1. Effective actor relationships within a regional or local cluster  
2. Social contacts that enhance learning processes 
3. An image or sense of belonging 
Note: See Chapter 2 pp22-23 for a greater discussion on the innovative milieu concept.  
 
With the above features in mind the central role the late-war cluster played in 
developing and manufacturing innovative aero-engines shall now be discussed. 
 
                                                 
298 Camagni (1991) p3. 
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6.20 The development of the Bentley rotary aero engines through an innovative 
milieu  
 
Already an established motor engineer Lieutenant W.O. Bentley, Royal Naval Air 
Service, was instructed by a Commander Briggs at the Admiralty to study the 
overheating problems in rotary aero-engines in late 1914. Based on his pre-war racing 
experience in the application of aluminium-alloy pistons in cylinders he redesigned the 
Clerget aero-engine with the assistance of Gwynnes in Chiswick. This became termed 
the Admiralty Rotary 1 (AR1)299
 
. However it would seem both Bentley and Gwynnes 
did not see eye-to-eye when he wished to further improve this engine and what he really 
wished was to design a rotary engine of his own design incorporating all he had learned 
with the AR1 and from his pre-war motor racing experience. Briggs, accepting that a 
Bentley-designed aero engine had huge potential for aiding the war effort, carefully 
researched the firms which would be best suited to design, test and manufacture such an 
engine. In Briggs’s own words:  
You’re to take your bags to Coventry, Bentley…Humbers have got 
all the facilities you’ll want. They’re only churning out Army 
bicycles – thousands and thousands of them – and terrible things like 
travelling kitchens. I think they’re rather offended that they haven’t 
been given something more challenging to test their mettle, so they’ll 
welcome you with open arms.300
 
 
Upon arriving at Humbers in 1916 Bentley found Brigg’s assessment to be correct and 
that the firm was bored stiff with the commonplace trivialities on their production 
lines301
                                                 
299 Gunston (1995) World Encyclopaedia of Aero Engines p23 
. Bentley’s pleasure at being assigned to this firm can be imagined as he held a 
particular respect for this motor manufacturer as he had faced them in racing 
competitions before the war. Additionally he held personal friendships with some of the 
key personnel he was later to work closely with.  
300 Bentley (1958) W.O. The Autobiography of W.O. Bentley Chapter 5 p83. 
301 This friction between the firm and the Ministry is backed up by the Chairman of Humber, Mr Powell, 
who when visiting the Ministry on the 27th Jan 1916 to discuss the 4.5-inch howitzer shells the firm were 
also producing, is described as saying ‘that he would rather go his own way, and if the Government 
would allow him to manufacture motorcars he would much prefer it’. See NA MUN7/182. 
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First there was a F.T. Burgess, his 1914 TT rival; second there was Niblett, the Works 
Manager, and his assistant M.J.F. Crundle, who had ridden motorcycles for Humber 
and was now Chief Tester, and finally a Mr S.Wright, in charge of the fitting shop, who 
had been an acknowledged Humber driver also. It would seem Bentley was therefore 
well placed by the Admiralty into the perfect environment in which to perfect his design 
ideas. On the one hand he had at his disposal a large firm with an underused design, 
testing and manufacturing capabilities, and on the other, the staff there to assist him 
were either personal friends and/or came from a similar background to him in motor 
racing302
 
. This common ground and personal friendships helped to engender a high 
degree of mutual trust as Bentley would have been easily accepted into the Humber 
design team and his ideas and previous experienced not unduly challenged. This is an 
example of social contacts that enhanced learning process as outlined in feature 2 table 
24 of the innovative milieu. 
Having set to work during 1916 in this environment Bentley and Humber’s design team 
proceeded to incorporate all the ideas he wished to implement at Gwynnes.  What was 
produced was an engine fitted with aluminium cylinders with cast iron liners, and 
aluminium pistons and also dual ignition to improvement reliability303. This resulted in 
a new 1,055 cu in capacity engine which improved on the 130bhp Clerget he had 
developed with Gwynnes (AR1) and this time gave 150bhp and was termed the Bentley 
Rotary 1 (BR1)304. The work this involved is described in the Encyclopaedia of Aero 
Engines as ‘a complete redesign of the cylinder, with an aluminium barrel, cast-iron 
liner and steel head tied to the crankcase by four long bolts, with two valves operated 
by push rods’305
 
. This is believed to have been the first ever production air-cooled 
cylinder with an aluminium barrel.  
Another important development with Humber’s assistance was the BR1 was made 
considerably easier to manufacture and cost just £605 per engine, compared to £907 per 
AR1 engine at Gwynnes306
                                                 
302 Bobbitt (2003) W.O. Bentley The Man Behind The Marque, Chapter 3 p97 and Bentley (1958) p84. 
. 
303 Gunston (1995) 
304 Ibid, Bobbitt (2003) p98. 
305 Ibid, Gunston (1995) p23 
306 Gunston (1999) The Development of Piston Engines 
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 Incorporated into the design of the BR1 was the important part that other Coventry 
firms played in being able to perfect the widespread use of aluminium-alloys. 
According to the proceeding chapter, between December 1915 and November 1918 the 
number of metal working firms, inclusive to the cluster, had nearly trebled and this was 
partly due to the increasing need of aluminium alloys in aero-engines such as the 
BR1307. One local firm that Bentley and Humber turned to was Rowland Hill & Sons. 
This was an old established company who claimed to have the largest general 
experience in the production of motor castings as they had produced many of the 
cylinder and crankcase castings for the original Daimler cars at the turn of the 
century308
 
. In a joint research venture with this firm Bentley was able to perfect the use 
of very high quality aluminium alloys which was so successful to this engines reliability 
and high power-to-weight ratio.  
In describing the new high quality working practices which had to be devised in order 
to manufacture these alloys, Rowland Hill’s metal-mixing department had to accurately 
weigh all the various alloys to be used and these where then sent:  
 
...onto the foundries in complete charges ready for the furnaces. This 
work is very carefully done and checked so as to avoid any possibly 
of error in the composition of the alloys. In addition, many 
mechanical and chemical tests are carried out daily to ensure uniform 
high quality… All consignments of metal received by the firm are 
thoroughly tested and analysed before being passed through to the 
stores to ensure that no material faulty in any respect shall be used.309
 
  
This suggests the presence of feature 1 in table 24 in that spatial proximity promoting 
frequent face-face contact, between the designer and innovator (Bentley and his design 
and testing staff at Humber) with the manufacturer (the Works Manager and his staff at 
Humber) and then finally with a key local supplier (Rowland Hill & Sons),was 
facilitated within this later-war innovative milieu cluster.  
                                                 
307 Other reasons included munitions were needed in ever increasing quantities and manufacturers turned 
to drop-forging, stamping, forging and pressing firms to a greater degree than they had done so 
previously. 
308 Coventry and its Industries Official Handbook (1918) p64. 
309 Ibid, p64. 
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It also demonstrates the key actors involved were coming from different organisations 
and backgrounds and combined within this innovative milieu a collection of ideas and 
experience which had not before previously been associated. These ideas included:  
 
• W.O. Bentley providing new ideas from his previous motor-racing and aero-engine 
experience. He further added an air of authority and decision-making as he was put 
in charge of this development program and was still a commissioned officer under 
the Admiralty’s direction. This also addressed the need for accountability. 
• Humber’s staff provided their motor racing, motor vehicle and munitions design and 
manufacturing experience. They also provided a design office, testing facilities and 
manufacturing capabilities. 
• Rowland Hill & Sons provided metallurgical expertise and also the benefit of their 
strict quality standards. This was crucial when considering these aero-engines were 
using aluminium parts with very fine limits of tolerance and also this metal was not 
in widespread use in engineering to any great extent before the war. 
 
It was the coming together of these actors in space (the Coventry armaments and 
munitions cluster) and time (between 1916 and 1918) which produced these innovative 
rotary aero-engines. This was through the actors successfully combining 
complementary capabilities from differing fields of activity.  
These design ideas and experience were then formulised into new innovations, such as 
the aluminium barrel within the cylinder. These were then tested and perfected within 
the innovative milieu setting ultimately leading to the BR1 being approved to be 
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Figure 31: A BR2 rotary engine on a test bed likely taken at Humber’s factory  
 
Note: W.O. Bentley standing in the centre with what appears the inspector to the left possibly  
Sammy Davies of the A.I.D. 
Source: Smith & Fry (1997) Godiva's Heritage. Coventry's Industry 
 
During the course of this process Bentley also designed a completely new and larger 
1,522cu in capacity engine which he hoped would attain over 200hp. With the success 
of the BR1 engine proved, clearance was given to proceed with this larger BR2 engine 
(Figure 31) and the transition was eased as many of the parts were interchangeable. 
Three prototypes were ordered in April 1917 and by October it was ready to test in 
Coventry in front of the local Aircraft Inspectorate Department (A.I.D.) Admiralty 
Inspector S.C.H. ‘Sammy’ Davis. Davis was yet another motor racing friend of 
Bentley’s and also held long standing ties with Daimler310. In front of him and the 
A.I.D. the BR2 engine produced 234hp and proved an instant success311
                                                 
310 This again suggests Bentley was fortunate within the late-war cluster as he was surrounded not only at 
Humber’s, but also with the local A.I.D. by an ‘old boys' network’ of motor racing friends which eased 
his and his engines acceptance through a high degree of mutual trust. This is typical feature for an 
innovative milieu according to Chapter 2. Many of these same gentlemen would form the nucleus of what 
.  
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According to Bentley during 1918, when the widespread manufacture of this BR2 
engine was being adopted, this all became too big for Humbers to cope with and so he 
had to relocate his headquarters to the Daimler factory. Here he was able to jointly co-
ordinate the huge construction programme then being instigated which involved 
Daimler, Humber and Crossleys and amounted nationally to 30,000 engines312
 
. What 
resulted from this relocation was that the final product of the innovative milieu (the 
BR2 aero engine), upon needing to be manufactured in quantity, could now be 
seamlessly accomplished within the more entrepreneurial and experienced late-war 
armaments and munitions cluster (as discussed in sections 6.18 and 6.23). This meant 
that the late-war cluster and some of the leading firms within it were now operating at 
the peak of their wartime efficiency. This is demonstrated by returning to the BR2 story 
below. 
Daimler’s war history noted that they were put in charge of this BR2 engine program 
and this was a new form of decentralised technical control implemented by the Air 
Ministry. They suggested that: 
 
At the request of other firms the Daimler Company undertook the 
preparation and issuing of drawings from their own Drawing Office. 
Their chief engineer, [A.E. Berrimen], was made honorary Engineer-
in-Charge of the project. An engineering conference was established 
under his Chairmanship and at these meetings all technical difficulties 
were not only discussed but settled authoritatively…In this way it 
was possible to perform efficiently, under difficult circumstances, the 
true function of technical engineering.313
 
 
This was in marked contrast to Daimler’s previous aero-engine programs, where their 




                                                                                                                                               
became known after the war as ‘The Bentley Boys’ when racing at Le Mans in cars made by Bentley 
Motors, Cricklewood, London. 
311 Ibid, Gunston (1995) p23. 
312 Ibid, Bobbitt (2003) p101 
313 Ibid, Frost (1920) p161 
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This governmental/contractor relationship usually resulted in potential delays and 
confusion and it must have been with delight that Daimler was finally allowed the 
freedom as the leading British aero-engine contractor to manage this program without 
undue Ministry interference. So successful was this new system that production began 
in early spring 1918 and by the summer output was already around 120 engines per 
week314
 
. This then was the innovative environment which characterised the late-war 
Coventry cluster. Innovative agents, such as Bentley, were sent to the city in order to 
successfully implement their wartime ideas and experience into useful designs. Once 
there, from 1916 onwards, he was able to tap into the design expertise of firms 
(Humbers); the aero-engine production experience of other firms (Daimler), and further 
undertake collaborative research to overcome any technical problems that ensued 
(Rowland Hill & Sons). This is now summarized below: 
Figure 32: The Coventry Innovative Milieu through the design and manufacture 
of Bentley aero engines 1916-1918 
 
                                                 
314 Ibid, Bentley (1958) p87. 
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With the cluster having embraced all manner of wartime products, particularly during 
the mid-war period onwards, this gave Coventry manufacturers a distinct expertise in 
being able to readily adapt to any new innovation it was either tasked to help design or 
manufacture. One successful armament and munition which was designed and produced 
in quantity has now been discussed namely that of the late-war design and manufacture 
of Bentley rotary aero-engines315. When compared to the 80h.p. Gnome rotary aero-
engine built by Daimler in the early-war cluster (see Chapter 6 section A) then the 
progress in design that the BR2 represented can be seen. The Gnome weighed 3.26lbs 
per B.H.P. it produced, whereas the BR2 weighed only 2.165lbs per B.H.P. it produced. 
This was a power-weight ratio improvement in only 2-3 years of 30 percent316
 
.  
In terms of what these Bentley rotaries meant to the war effort they are now largely 
credited, when fitted to the Sopwith Camel, as winning back air superiority during 
1917/18 from the Imperial German Army Air Service. Furthermore, the Sopwith Camel 
is credited with shooting down 1,294 enemy aircraft, more than any other aeroplane 
type during the war317. A feat not possible without the light, powerful and reliable BR1 
aero-engine. The very fact that its larger brother, the BR2, is still considered the 
pinnacle of rotary engine development, and that it saw active RAF service until 1926, is 
testament to the success of the late-war Coventry cluster as an innovative milieu318
      
. 








                                                 
315 There are also other examples such as the development required to perfect the tank or incendiary 
bullets needed to defeat the Zeppelin menace both of which were engineering problems solved within an 
innovative Coventry munitions cluster 
316 Flight 7th August 1919 p1051 Another significant improvement was the reliability in British aero 
engines. 
317 Flight 22nd April 1955 
318 Ibid, Gunston (1995) p24. 
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6.21 Summary of the late-war armaments and munitions cluster 
 
Table 25: The Late-War Cluster January 1916 to November 1918 
 
• It would appear that no singular cluster form typified this later-war period. 
• The mid-war importance of the Coventry Armaments Output Committee as 
the dominant ‘centring’ entity had diminished. 
• Some firms such as Siddeley-Deasy, Rover and Triumph began to re-assert 
their entrepreneurialism and contest the mid-war state-centred/anchored 
cluster due to now having one eye on their post-war positions. 
• Some of the later war growth (as identified in the proceeding chapter) can 
be accounted for by new entrant firms acting as ‘branch plants’ such as 
Conner & Hotchkiss. This suggests that the late-war cluster contained 
elements of a satellite platform cluster, however these firms were 
exceptions. 
• The most distinct shift in the cluster was towards research and 
development and innovation and three examples were given: 
 i) The emergence of dedicated research and development establishments. 
 ii) Through a ‘learning by doing’ process some firms, such as Daimler, 
 were able to take a leading role in the development and manufacturing of 
 aero-engines. 
 iii) Collaborative innovation, such as in the design and manufacture of the 
 Bentley rotary aero-engines, was now possible within a successful late-war 
 armaments and munitions cluster. This was realised through an innovative 
 milieu that was open to outsiders and facilitated the coming together of 
 innovative agents with firms with distinct, however, complementary 
 knowledge and with the Admiralty and the Air Ministry to tackle new 
 engineering challenges both in design and manufacturing. 
 
Having now analysed Coventry’s early, mid and late-war armaments and munitions 
cluster in relation to the conceptual framework the next section wishes to summarize the 
contribution of this chapter. 
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6.22 Summarizing the contribution of the conceptual framework when applied to 
this armaments and munitions cluster 
 
This chapter identified and explained what type of cluster(s) Coventry’s armaments and 
munitions sector became during the First World War. It began by examining the early 
war cluster centred upon vehicular transport (identified in chapter 5) and found this took 
the form of a nucleated hub-and-spoke model which had a strong local trade association 
presence. As the war dragged on into 1915 this led to the setting up of the Ministry of 
Munitions (M.O.M.) and consequently of a local Coventry Armaments Output 
Committee (C.A.O.C.) shortly thereafter, which in turn made a greater number of 
Coventry firms switch to producing shells, fuses and component parts.  
 
This chapter was able to account for this evolution as by December 1915 the mid-war 
armaments and munitions cluster was seen to be mainly state-anchored and centred. 
This anchoring or ‘centring’ was achieved locally through the activities of the 
C.A.O.C’s Chairman, Engineer and Secretary and externally through large M.O.M. 
inward investment. To meet this shift and expansion the mid-war cluster also began to 
attract high labour in-migration particularly semi-skilled female machine operators. 
Further complications to this mid-war cluster were discussed including the persistence 
and evolution of the early war hub-and-spoke model whereby “infrastructural hubs” 
were created and that many key “hub” firms also became “controlled establishments” 
whereby the Ministry of Munitions exercised an even tighter control of their workforce 
and munitions production. The chapter revealed that these same “controlled 
establishments” became more nationally orientated through forming linkages with an 
ever greater variety of non-local suppliers. By the late period, Chapter 5 suggested the 
cluster continued to expand and turned to manufacturing war winning weapons such as 
aeroplanes and aero-engines in large quantities.  
 
This chapter demonstrated this was due to the Coventry armaments and munitions 
cluster continuing to evolve, however, no longer did one singular cluster model typify 
this late-war period as it had done in the early and mid-war periods.  
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By 1917 the importance of the Armaments Committee had diminished and its role 
changed and also some of the leading firms began to reassert their entrepreneurialism 
and contest the mid-war state-centred/anchored cluster due to them having one eye on 
their post-war prosperity. Additionally it was shown that some of the late-war growth 
could be accounted for by new entrant firms setting up ‘branch plants’ where they had 
minimal interaction with other munition firms within the cluster and were mainly 
externally controlled and orientated. This suggested that elements of a satellite platform 
cluster were emerging towards to the end of the war, but these firms were few in 
number. The most visible shift in the late war cluster was the moving away from 
manufacturing shells, fuses and component parts towards many new and existing firms 
concentrating on aeroplane and aero-engine manufacture.  
 
The chapter revealed this was achieved by the cluster becoming an environment for 
innovation and research and development. Three ways this manifested itself were: the 
setting up of local dedicated engineering research and development establishments; 
through a ‘learning by doing’ process firms such as Daimler were able to gain the 
confidence to develop and take on the manufacture of more complex aero-engines and 
to manufacture them in greater quantities, and lastly and perhaps the most important of 
all was under direction of the Admiralty and Air Ministry the cluster became a 
innovative milieu or environment which fostered and nurtured the coming together of 
outsiders, innovative agents and firms with distinct , however, complementary 
knowledge in order to overcome engineering challenges in the design and manufacture 
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The evolution of Coventry’s armaments and munitions cluster between 1914 and 1918 
is summarized overleaf: 
 
Table 26: The Changing Nature of Coventry’s First World War  
Armaments and Munitions Cluster 













Shells, Fuses  
& Component Parts 
Aeroplanes, Aero-
engines,  







No singular model,  
however elements of:  
Contested State 
Anchored/Centred,  




Having now analysed and explained the changing nature of Coventry’s 1914-18 










                                                 
319 Please note due to space restrictions a detailed examination of all three types could not be given, but 
two firms which exhibited many of the features associated with branches within a satellite platform 
cluster were Conner Magneto & Ignition and Hotchkiss et Cie. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The previous chapter identified the types of industrial clustering exhibited by the 
armaments and munitions sector in Coventry between 1914 and 1918. This chapter now 
wishes to summarize the research findings and also consider some of the implications of 
this wartime cluster to the development of the city in the first quarter of the twentieth 
century. The chapter begins by reflecting upon the aim and objectives (Chapter 1) and 
how the study has addressed these. Following this, the cluster’s overall contribution to 
the war effort is summarized and the types of cluster it became at the beginning, middle 
and late-war periods. Thirdly, considering these implications the next section outlines 
some of the positive and negative legacies this cluster left upon the city. Lastly, the 
chapter finishes by evaluating the conceptual framework and the methodological 
technique used and suggests directions for future research. 
 
The main aim of the study was: 
• To examine the historical geography of Coventry’s armament and munitions 
cluster between 1914 and 1918. 
 
In order to accomplish this aim the study was concerned with completing four 
objectives: 
 
• To identify the principal characteristics of the companies manufacturing 
armaments and munitions between 1914 and 1918. 
• To map the changing distribution of these firms across Coventry between 1914 
and 1918. 
• To examine some of the linkages between these firms to establish the type(s) of 
armament and munitions cluster(s) evident in the city at this time. 
• To develop an explanation as to why a successful First World War armaments 
cluster developed in Coventry and add to a broader understanding of the 
economic, industrial and urban development of the city in the first quarter of the 
twentieth century. 
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The research has highlighted the continued importance of theorising industrial clusters, 
with particular attention being paid to Markusen’s industrial district/cluster typology 
(Chapter 2). The usefulness of a complementary extensive and intensive research 
method to study a wartime cluster was also documented (Chapter 3). The identification 
and mapping of Coventry’s First World War armaments and munitions cluster provided 
an important case study of an industrial cluster successfully undergoing rapid change 
brought on by the pressures of wartime (Chapters 5). Lastly, by relating the conceptual 
framework in Chapter 2, and to examine some of the linkages between firms, the 
research findings highlighted what type(s) of cluster Coventry’s First World War 
armaments and munitions cluster was and further accounted for how growth and 
evolution was accomplished (Chapter 6).  
 
This now allows for a number of conclusions to be drawn from this study: 
 
7.1 Armaments and Munitions Production 
 
Coventry’s contribution to war production was significant with it being transformed 
into an arsenal of war for four-and-a-half years which led to three Royal visits. An 
enormous variety of munitions production was undertaken ranging from: tiny jewels 
used in instruments and torpedoes produced by Lee F. & Company, to the largest 100-
ton 15-inch naval guns produced at the Ordnance Works.The scale of production is 
evident from the Navy and Army, through the War Department, spending £40,500,000 
in Coventry during the war, or in 2007 prices over £1.3 billion320. By the end of the war 
the White & Poppe managed National Fuse and Filling Factory recorded 19,940,000 
fuses, 9,880,000 gaines and 31,060,000 detonators being filled. Additionally 13 million 
fuse-bodies, 6 million fuse-holders and shell sockets were manufactured on the same 
site and nearly 4,000 subsidy engines for Hallford and Dennis Brothers lorries from 
their Drake Street factory321
                                                 
320 Wilkins (1919) Celebration of Peace For the price conversion see Officer, L.H (2008) Measuring 
Worth: Purchasing Power of British Pounds from 1264 to 2007. See bibliography web-based sources. 
Note: It is not clear if this figure includes all money spent through the Ministry of Munitions. 
.  
321 The Limit (1918-1921) W & P War History and Hassell (2003) p21. 
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It was not just in production output which the Coventry cluster excelled, but arguably 
more important was its contribution towards British engineering in the form of 
designing and manufacturing engines, driveshafts, gearboxes and tracks for the first 
tanks. Additionally it was Coventry firms which perfected the design of some of the 
most significant British aero-engines during the war such as the Bentley Rotary 1 and 2 
and the redesign of the Beardmore-Halford-Pullinger which became the Siddeley-Deasy 
Puma. The cluster also became the leading centre for the fledgling British aeronautical 
industry which resulted in the city producing 25 percent of all aeroplanes and aero-
engines manufactured by Great Britain during the war322
 
. 
Chapter 5 identified their appeared three main phases to this armaments and munitions 
production in Coventry between 1914 and 1918: 
 
• The early-war period was dominated by vehicular transport requisition, 
conversion and manufacture which isn’t surprising considering Chapter 
4 highlighted the city was at the forefront of motor vehicle manufacture 
in Britain before hostilities began.  
• By the mid-war period many existing and some new entrant firms 
switched to producing huge quantities of shells, fuses and component 
parts in response to the ‘Shells Crisis’.  
• After 1916 the cluster once again adapted, but this time towards 
designing and manufacturing war-winning weapons such as tanks, 
machine guns, aeroplanes and aero-engines. 
 
The study also revealed that the area this cluster was spread  over more than tripled in 




                                                 
322 H.M.S.O. (1920) History of the Ministry of Munitions and Dewar (1921). In total the research was able 
to calculate 6,518 aeroplanes and 12,718 aero-engines were produced in the city during the war. This 
figure may have been even higher when spare and disassembled engines are taken into consideration. 
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Within this, there comprised no less than 137 firms (based in 166 factories) supported 
by 13 key support institutions and infrastructure by the cessation of hostilities, but it 
may have been as large as 200-300 firms323. The firms’ themselves ranged from the 
house-hold watchmakers of Joseph White & Sons working in a tiny shed-like munitions 
workshop with 3 workers to the massive 141.5 acre site of the National Fuse and Filling 
Factory employing 12,000 workers324. Resulting from the unprecedented levels of 
employment and the rate of expansion the population of the city rose from 118,000 to 
133,000 through the rapid in-migration from all parts of Britain of munition workers to 
serve this cluster. The total number of workers involved in producing munitions was 
estimated at 60,000 with 16,000 commuting in daily from Birmingham, Leamington, 
Warwick, Rugby, Bedworth, Nuneaton and Atherstone amongst other places325
 
 
By relating the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 2 the study identified three 
main cluster types were evident at each of these periods: 
 
The Early War Cluster – August to December 1914 
 
• This was typified by a nucleated hub-and-spoke cluster comprising 25 
firms taking the form of a series of ‘hub’ firms situated within, or 
‘spoking’ out to, a concentration of smaller local supplier firms.  
 
In relation to conceptualising the early war cluster as a nucleated hub-and-spoke cluster 
this suggested reasons as to why as many as 25 firms immediately entered into 
armaments and munitions production by December 1914. Using the example of 
Daimler, Chapter 6 suggested these included: financial security; linkages to its parent 
firm B.S.A., including the diffusion of engineering practices such as perfecting 
repetitious production; and also being able to rely upon external firms for successful 
knowledge and/or technological acquisition.  
                                                 
323 Nowell (1927) gave this as over 200 firms. Churchill stated in Parliament during the 1918 Embargo 
strike it was c.400 firms and Spennell’s 1919/20 Coventry Directory listed c.330 engineering firms 
present within the city c.1918/19 when the city would have been surveyed - see Annex 1 for this list. 
Suffice to say the figure of 200-300 is a conservative estimate.  
324 C.A. Building Plan 8280 5th June 1916 and Hassell (2003) p20. 
325 Nowell (1927); Bryant (1987) Chapter III p70; Carr (1978) p56, and Lancaster (1987) “Who’s a Real 
Coventry Kid?” p65. 
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Finally being situated within a web of linkages to smaller supplier firms suggested one 
more reason as to why the early war cluster took the form it did – namely these firms, 
through being heavily dependent upon the ‘hub’ firm, were also enticed into the early 
war cluster. One important departure from Markusen’s (1996) hub-and-spoke model 
was this early war cluster possessed a stronger local trade association presence that was 
also ‘hub’ firm led.  It would appear it was therefore a combination of all of these 
factors which enabled Coventry firms to rapidly form a successful armaments and 
munitions cluster by December 1914. 
 
The Mid-War Cluster - Spring to December 1915 
 
• The main cluster form which typified the mid-war period was that of a 
state-anchored/centred cluster, ‘centred’ on the dominant activities of 
the Coventry Armaments Output Committee.  
 
With regard to conceptualising the mid-war cluster as a state-anchored/centred cluster 
this suggested reasons why 63 more firms successfully adapted and entered into 
armaments and munitions production through the course of 1915. The most important 
entity which allowed this to happen was the Coventry Armaments Output Committee. 
Chapter 6 demonstrated how it was particularly this committee’s Chairman (Alfred 
Herbert), Engineer (Mr Cannell) and Secretary (Alfred Bednell) who were central to: 
securing the contracts with the Ministry of Munitions; organising and educating the 
city’s many varied engineering firms, and adapting their manufacturing capabilities 
towards shell and fuse production. The same chapter also showed it was Alfred Bednell 
who was at the centre of forming the linkages between the firms, the committee and the 
state (in this instance the Ministry of Munitions), through informal business networks 
formed through a private social club.  
 
Chapter 6 continued with an examination of the provision of capital for firms and the 
cluster in order to facilitate this adaptation and expansion.  
 
 
 - 184 - 
It was noted than mainly “controlled” firms were the recipients of many thousands of 
pounds of investment, however, firms taking on contracts through the armaments 
committee tended to have to use their own capital reserves or fund this through issuing 
more shares. At the same time, the Ministry also began to increase the city’s power 
infrastructure and it was noted by 1918 its capacity had more than doubled. There was 
also significant investment put into new permanent housing, and temporary 
accommodation such as colonies of hostels and ‘munition’ and ‘colony’ cottages. A 
further feature, which increased the complexity of the mid-war cluster, was the building 
of new infrastructure that became ‘hubs’ or focal points of activity such as Radford 
Aerodrome. Another was that many of the leading firms became directly “controlled” 
by the Ministry of Munitions and this meant they became more externally orientated 
towards a wider network of regional and national suppliers and customers. 
 
These many reasons taken together suggest how at the local level the Ministry of 
Munitions successfully and rapidly transformed the 1914 nucleated hub-and-spoke 
cluster into a state-anchored/centred cluster. They also reveal just how important local 
governance systems were to achieving this – namely the Coventry Armaments Output 
Committee operating through informal channels – the Coventry & County Club. 
 
The Late-War Cluster – January 1916 to November 1918 
 
• The study found that no singular cluster form typified the late-
war period. Despite this the cluster can be best interpreted as a 
territory or innovative milieu in which innovation was facilitated 
and encouraged.  
 
By the end of the war the study revealed the cluster had grown once again by an 
addition of 52 firms, but was also continuing to increase in complexity. Firstly the 
dominant role of the Coventry Armaments Output Committee diminished and some 
firms were reasserting their entrepreneurialism and contesting the state-anchored 
/centred cluster, setup to help encourage their entry during the mid-war period.  
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Furthermore some of the late-war growth was attributed to new entrants acting as 
“branch plants” forming elements of a satellite platform cluster to emerge. Despite these 
changes the most distinct shift was a cluster which became a territory for research and 
development leading to innovation for war winning weapons. Three ways the cluster 
responded to meet this need were: first new research and development establishments 
were built; second firms gained in confidence as the war progressed through a ‘learning 
by doing’ process leading to innovation; and third and perhaps most important, the 
cluster had partly evolved into an innovative milieu that facilitated collaborative 
innovation in both design and manufacturing between innovative agents, firms and the 
Admiralty or the Air Ministry. 
 
These many reasons taken together suggest how and why into the late-war period the 
city was able to maintain a thriving armaments and munitions cluster, despite 
particularly much of its shell and fuse work being switched to a series national factories 
built for such a purpose.  It was therefore due to Coventry firms being highly adaptive 
and receptive to change and the cluster and city as a whole remaining open to further 
new entrant firms and the expansion of existing ones. This undiminished willingness to 
take on new engineering challenges resulted in the cluster being at the forefront of a 
new British aeronautical industry and is even more remarkable when not a single 




Having described the forms that this cluster took at three key periods this realises 
objective three of the study. Considering the implications of Coventry’s wartime 
armaments and munitions cluster, the next section outlines some of the short and long-
term implications, both positive and negative, this had upon the economic development 
of the city during the first quarter of the twentieth century. 
 
 
                                                 
326 The Humber Motor Co. Ltd. before the war attempted to manufacture aeroplanes, but this they stopped 
in 1912 due to unprofitability. Coventry Ordnance and the Victor Moto Company were two other firms 
who experimented with aeroplanes pre-war, but only Humber tried to produce them on any kind of 
commercial basis. 
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As a result of the First World War new industries emerged within city such as the 
aeronautical industry with Daimler producing over 8,000 aero-engines, more than any 
other firm in the world at that time.327 Similarly the cluster became a centre for 
electrical engineering in the form of high-tension magnetos where from a pre-war 
position of importing nearly all Magnetos from Germany, to a wartime one where 
36,730 were being produced by B.T.H., with a further 20,000 on order, and 50,000 
manufactured by M-L Magnetos.328
This suggests certain local firms were, as a result of this successful cluster, propelled to 
the forefront of new embryonic industries associated with Britain’s second industrial 
wave.  
 Both of these new sectors helped to diversify 
Coventry’s motor vehicle centred engineering base and helped to counteract a continued 
decline in textiles and watchmaking.  
 
Existing sectors such as stamping, drop-forging and foundry firms also received a 
considerable wartime boost. For example Mr Bernard Brett, of Brett’s Patent Lifter 
Company writing in 1918 suggested ‘It is probably correct to state that the War has 
brought out the possibilities of drop forging more than anything else, as parts have now 
been made by thousands instead of tens.’329 Machine tool firms also received a boost 
with Alfred Herbert Ltd. increasing their pre-war output of machine tools by a factor of 
nine and its workforce of 2,000 in 1914 to 3,000 by 1918.330
                                                 
327 Nowell (1927) Coventry And The Great War. This figure may have included spare parts and 
disassembled engines also. 
 As the armaments and 
munitions cluster expanded, the city received considerable investment from the 
Ministry of Munitions for new housing, road-building and the upgrading of its power 
infrastructure and this was at a level far-beyond what the Coventry Corporation could 
have provided alone, even to meet the pre-war levels of demand.  
328 Anon (undated) B.T.H. Our Part In the World War p52 and The Autocar 1918, M-L Advert 
329 Coventry and its Industries 1918 p70. 
330 H.M.S.O. (1920) History of the Ministry of Munitions; Saul (1968) p42; Astrop (2003) p10 and Lloyd-
Jones  & Lewis (2006) p60. 
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The city was also left with two aerodromes which could potentially be beneficial to any 
local firm remaining in the aeronautical industry beyond 1918331
 
.  Upon reflection this 
successful munitions cluster also demonstrated to central government the flexibility and 
adaptability of Coventry engineering firms and its labour force when urgently tasked to 
manufacture a variety of new armaments and munitions in quantity day and night. This 
also allowed some firms to appreciate at least some of the benefits of mass-production, 
through large batch production of munitions to stringent government quality standards 
for the first time. 
Negative Effects 
 
A negative effect as a result of this successful armaments and munitions cluster was a 
loss of export trade, particularly for the city’s Motor manufacturers who had became 
embroiled in munitions production as early as 1914/15. Consequently particularly 
American motor vehicle manufactures penetrated their foreign and domestic markets 
due to themselves not entering the war until 1917. A second problem arose from the 
unchecked expansion of the city’s population which suffered overcrowding and 
hardship due to inadequate and expensive housing and from a shortage of food. This 
was compounded with a sense of ‘war wiriness’ due to working long hours with little 
time or facilities for recreation332. Resultantly workers within the city by the end of the 
war gained a reputation for striking and militancy with one official investigator noting 
in 1917 ‘the air is very highly charged here and very little will cause a great blaze’.333 
By August 1918 a Coventry journalist writing in his diary noted how the city ‘stinks in 





                                                 
331 Siddeley-Deasy, when merging with Armstrong Whitworth to become Armstrong Siddeley in 1919 
eventually based their activities at the former Whitley Abbey Aerodrome in 1923 as the Sir W. G. 
Armstrong Whitworth Aircraft Company. 
332 Carr (1978) pp64-74. 
333 NA MUN2/28 29th September 1917. 
334 Wilkins (c.1919) Journal of the European War p309. 
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Finally many smaller undercapitalised firms were forced to close as a result of this 
wartime cluster, for example, as early as 8th October 1914 Hobart Bird (cycles), Crouch 
Motors (motor vehicles), Bramwell Bros. (sidecars) and J & J Guest (engineers) were 
described as ‘having either the receiver in or in the actual process of being wound 
up’.335 This persisted into the mid-war cluster as small car firms such as E. J. West & 
Company ceased trading in 1915 due to not being able to capture any vehicle contracts 
for the War Office or any other munition contracts.336
 
 Many of these implications have 
already been considered by such authors as Richardson (1972) and Toms & Donnelly 
(1985; 1986 & 2000), however, this study also revealed the existence of other less 
tangible effects resulting from this successful wartime cluster. 
First it was shown that some engineering firms within this cluster were also tasked to 
exercise their ingenuity to solve engineering problems. It was these firms who were 
able to show an adaptability and resourcefulness towards designing and/or 
manufacturing novel wartime products, such as the aeroplane, tank or magneto. At the 
same time, these same firms were being exposed to a never-ending flux of change 
arising from the needs of the war. It was therefore their willingness to take on and solve 
new engineering challenges, despite the risks or hardships involved, which Coventry 
firms gained a creditable national reputation for. This fact resulted in Lord Weir (the 
wartime President of the Air Council) feeling compelled to visit the city in 1920 where 
he was given the opportunity to thank the city’s manufacturers personally stating 
‘Coventry may well be proud of her industrial achievements’.337
 
 
A second and equally important lesson was the value of inter-firm and firm-
governmental co-operation which for the first time in British history was demonstrated 
on a large scale. Despite the city’s labour force gaining a negative reputation towards 
the end of the war, the study showed how in the mid-war cluster many of the city’s 
manufacturers were able to work closely alongside the Ministry of Munitions through 
the apparatus of the Armaments Committee to achieve wartime aims.  
                                                 
335 Ibid, p41. 
336 Spicer, (2005) West Cars of Coventry 1904-1915  
337 C. C. C. Minutes, Annual Banquet 1920 p15. 
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With the late-war cluster the study also showed how firms and individuals were able to 
work closely together in order design and manufacture new innovative rotary aero-
engines. It would appear that a little over two weeks after the armistice, the 100 
members present at a meeting of the Rugby Engineering Society (which many Coventry 
engineers were also members), when already reflecting upon the war and suggested ‘the 
War had taught them two things, namely, the value of “engineering science” and co-
operation’.338
 
 Ultimately it is these two, perhaps less visible, outcomes of Coventry’s 
successful First World War armaments and munitions cluster, which should be 
considered as equally important legacies. 
7.3 Evaluation of conceptual framework and methodological techniques 
 
The extent to which the study has met the stated objectives is a key consideration in 
evaluating the success of the research. Three research strands were drawn together to 
provide a meaningful conceptual framework: i) Markusen’s (1996) industrial district 
models, ii) The more recent work on clusters involving a greater scrutiny of both 
tangible and intangible linkages and iii) to incorporate this with theory of the innovative 
milieu. It is argued that the research provided an original insight into Coventry’s First 
World War armaments and munitions industry by conceptualizing it as an evolving 
cluster of firms linked to support institutions and infrastructure over time (1914-18) and 
space (both within and slightly outside Coventry’s municipal boundary). As explained 
in Chapter 1, it was timely to examine broadly this industry as this had not been 
attempted before and according to Chapter 2 previous industrial agglomeration studies 
had ignored wartime case studies. 
 
The insight this study provided was Markusen’s (1996) industrial district models can be 
applied to a past British wartime industries. The study was also able to suggest ways in 
which this industry was successfully transformed from one cluster type to another over 
a period spanning only four-and-half years. During the mid-war cluster a novel way in 
which an economy can be conceptualized as a state-anchored/centred cluster (centred 
largely upon a committee) was demonstrated.  
                                                 
338 Rugby Engineering Society Minutes, 28th November 1918 p26. 
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Furthermore this study was able to represent this cluster type spatially which was 
something Markusen (1996) didn’t attempt. The importance of business or social 
networks to a historical clusters operation was also shown in this mid-war cluster. This 
and the other cluster forms which were revealed suggest that these industrial 
district/cluster models are in need of more careful refinement, especially in light of 
historical industries and wartime contexts. Finally by relating the late war cluster to the 
innovative milieu concept it was revealed how complex and multifaceted an early 
twentieth century local industrial cluster can become. 
 
A complementary two-phase extensive and intensive methodology was selected as the 
most appropriate strategy to reveal and explain the complex and evolutionary nature of 
this wartime industrial cluster. In revealing the extent of this cluster, the extensive phase 
uncovered all 76 government “controlled establishments”339
 
. Additionally another 61 
still privately operated munition firms within Coventry were also identified. The study 
also highlighted 13 support institutions and infrastructure involved in forming the 
linkages between these firms. This was summarized through a series of tables and maps 
in Chapter 5. Although this may only be a representation of the entire wartime cluster, 
when considered against a number of locational, historical and situational constraints 
outlined in Chapter 3 this was no mean achievement. 
It is accepted that changes to certain aspects of the methodology may have provided 
additional insight and made a greater contribution to the research aims. Firstly, due to 
time and financial constraints further business records located in Manchester, 
Birkenhead and London were not consulted. These sometimes included restricted 
business records where permission to access them was granted, for example, Coventry 
Ordnance, Coventry Chain, and Coventry Repetition Companies respectably340
                                                 
339 This is confirmed as official documentation for the many thousands of controlled establishments in 
Britain was located and consulted in the National Archives.  See NA MUN4/750, MUN4/3618, 
MUN5/101/360/16 & MUN5/254.  
.  
340 For example Renold Chain’s permission was gained to examine the records of Coventry Chain and 
Coventry Repetition. In the end after selecting what was relevant to examine, Manchester Archives were 
not willing to photocopy or could not locate many of the required documents and would only allow access 
through visitation.  
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In London, further time could have been spent at the Imperial War Museum listening to 
recorded interviews of WW1 Coventry munition workers341
 
. At the National Archives 
further consultation of the Ministry of Munitions, Admiralty, Air Board and Ministry of 
Aviation records could have possibly revealed more on certain Coventry firms 
activities. Despite this, all documents that could be identified to contain wartime 
information on Coventry was consulted. 
Secondly, further information as to the growth and performance of firms may have been 
forthcoming by examining any surviving bank records. Some of these for Coventry 
firms are contained within the Midland and Lloyds Bank archives in London342. These 
records may have also provided additional information as to how firms financed their 
wartime growth, possibly through bank loans, overdraft facilities or issuing more 
shares. Thirdly, as this study wished to examine a wartime cluster composed of 
engineering firms from many different sectors, this made a complete examination of all 
the trade press literature difficult. Where possible key publications were consulted 
locally343
 
 but a visit to the Newspaper Reading Room, British Library, in Colindale, 
London would have allowed a complete wartime examination of the more esoteric trade 
journals including amongst others: Arms and Explosives, American Machinist, The 
Industrial Engineer, Aeroplane, Aircraft, The Drop Forger, Electrical Review, 
Electrical Engineering, English Electrical Journal, The Metal Bulletin, Monthly review 
of Machine Shop Practice, Motor cycle and cycle trader, Vehicle monthly and Woman 
Engineer. 
Despite this the evidence base used for this study was robust and extensive, with both 
the extensive and intensive methodology phases contributing effectively to meeting the 
research aims. 
 
                                                 
341 In all this collection holds ten interviews with men and women workers in Coventry’s WW1 munitions 
industry, only the 5 with transcripts were consulted for this study. 
342 See Thoms (1992) Bank Records and the Early History of the Coventry Motor Car Industry. pp38-42. 
In particular Midland Bank Archive, London – Coventry district, daily journals MBA 358 and Lloyds 
Bank Archive, London – Coventry district, daily journals LBA B379a 
343 Such as Autocar, The Motor, The Engineer, Engineering, Alfred Herbert News, Machine Tool Review 
and Flight for the years covering the 1914-1918 war. See bibliography for the full list of trade journals 
consulted. 
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7.4 Directions for Future Research 
 
There are a number of areas which have been highlighted as pertinent issues within 
cluster theory and Coventry’s industrial development by this study which would benefit 
from further research. In terms of Coventry’s industrial development in the twentieth 
century, further research is necessary to reveal the extent and evolution of the metal-
working, electrical engineering and aeronautical sectors. All three of these sectors are 
left largely unexplored within the broad debate of Coventry’s remarkable ‘boom town’ 
reputation that lasted until the 1970s. This study revealed that all three of these sectors 
expanded as a result of First World War munitions production. However, it isn’t clear if 
this diversified and reinforced this prosperity or perhaps helped to narrow Coventry’s 
light engineering base and leave it more susceptible to the severe de-industrialisation 
which swept across the West Midlands and other parts of Britain during the 1970s and 
1980s.  
 
A second area for further research is to address whether the city’s manufacturers 
absorbed and applied any wartime lessons into the interwar years. For example, how did 
manufacturing to high quality standards and in larger quantities than ever before, affect 
firms engineering, shop-floor and management practices. This is an important question 
as according to Toms & Donnelly (1985 & 2000) most of the volume producers in the 
motor industry chose not to assemble their vehicles in Coventry in the interwar years. 
Apart from Singer (later to become part of Rootes), Standard and Hotchkiss (which 
became Morris Engines) no other motor firm in the city embraced volume production. 
The same could be said for the city’s cycle and motorcycle firms where firms such as 
Rover, Rudge Whitworth, Humber and Coventry Premier never regained their pre-1914 
leading positions. Furthermore Triumph went from a position as the leading motorcycle 
manufacturer in 1918 to bankruptcy by the mid 1930s. Related to this point was the 
negative reputation the city gained towards the end of the war as an area prone to labour 
unrest. Further research is therefore needed to answer whether it was this, or other 
reasons emanating from Coventry’s successful munitions cluster, as to why Coventry’s 
leading position as the centre for the British cycle and motor industries was successfully 
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